On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump[1] (avaialble on Lexis here) provided its 6-3 majority answer in a 170-page, multi-part decision to the question whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act’s (‘IEEPA’) authorization to ‘regulate…importation’ provides the executive branch broad power to impose tariffs?[2] And if so, under what conditions?[3]

The Brass Tacks of the Supreme Court Decision

The Court held, simply stated, that “IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.”[4] What is relevant for our (tax) readers is that the Supreme Court remanded the case to the D.C. Federal District for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.[5] Why for ‘lack of jurisdiction’? Recall that this case originated with the United States Court of International Trade’s nullification of the tariffs, that is, the Presidential Orders establishing them, in the May 28, 2025, decision in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States.[6]

The underlying consequence of this order, by our understanding,[7] is that the Court has also ruled that only the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over tariff disputes. Given that the Court of International Trade vacated the tariff orders,[8] the U.S. government will need to refund approximately $200 billion to importers, by our estimates, a substantial majority of which has been collected upon goods from China.[9]   

The 21-page majority decision, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, consists of five parts addressing distinct jurisprudential arguments. Four concurrence opinions add another 62 pages (for a total of 83 pages within the majority analysis). The five-part majority that attracted six votes (including the Chief Justice as author) did not attract all six Justices to sign on to each part of the underlying legal reasoning for the ultimate holding. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in parts I, II–A–1, and II-B, which were joined by the five Justices Gorsuch, Barrett, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Parts II-A-2 and III, only Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch wrote a 46-page concurring opinion, as did Justice Barrett at four pages. Justice Kagan authored, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, an additional seven-page concurrence, followed by an independent concurrence of five pages by Justice Jackson.

In the dissent, Justice Thomas authored an initial 18-page dissent, followed by a 63-page dissent authored by Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.

The Court’s six-vote summary decision language of part III is as follows:[10]  

“The President asserts the extraordinary power to unilaterally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope. In light of the breadth, history, and constitutional context of that asserted authority, he must identify clear congressional authorization to exercise it. IEEPAs grant of authority to regulate . . . importation falls short. IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or duties. The Government points to no statute in which Congress used the word regulate to authorize taxation. And until now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power.”

Note that Justice Sotomayor stated in the oral arguments for the case that 16 statutes used the term taxes simultaneously, “when Congress intended ‘regulate’ to mean taxing…”^[11]

What We Thought The Decision Would Be Based on Oral Arguments.

We previously read the U.S. Supreme Court’s 185-page oral argument transcript in this tariff case (Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump).^[12] We concluded in our initial discernment, based on the statements embedded in the questions of six of the justices, that the Supreme Court would likely decide that the Executive branch may not impose import duties (i.e., tariffs) under the IEEPA.^[13] Six justices asked pointed questions, indicating they would hold that the authority to levy taxes remains the exclusive purview of Congress.^[14] Our premonition was not unique, though. Several respected financial news organizations, such as the Wall Street Journal,^[15] also reported a likely six-Justice majority, as did many actual constitutional law scholars.

The Crux of the Arguments of the Executive Branch

In order to exercise powers granted by Congress within the IEEPA, the President must first declare a national emergency with respect to an “unusual and extraordinary threat” … “to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States…”.^[16] In the first instance of its IEEPA analysis, the Supreme Court (the “Court”) will need to rule whether the President has met this IEEPA statutory language requirement for a declared national emergency. To this point, the Administration’s (the Executive branch, i.e., President Trump) case, represented and argued by the U.S. Solicitor General John Sauer, opened the oral arguments with the presentation of the Administration’s basis of an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’:^[17]

“On April 2, President Trump determined that our exploding trade deficits had brought us to the brink of an economic and national security catastrophe. He further pronounced that the traffic of fentanyl and other opioids into our country has created a public health crisis, taking hundreds of thousands of American lives. … President Trump has declared that these emergencies are country-killing and not sustainable, that they threaten the bedrock of our national and economic security …”

The current administration is hardly the first to declare a national emergency pursuant to the IEEPA. The non-partisan Congressional Research Service (the ‘CRS’), which provides research reports to Congress, reports that 77 national emergencies invoking the IEEPA (which was enacted in 1977) have been declared by Presidents, of which 46 continue to be in effect as of September 2025.^[18] Moreover, the CRS found that such national emergencies often have a shelf life of nearly a decade, yet some remain considerably longer.^[19] Presidents average just under four IEEPA national emergency declarations per term.

What Powers Did Congress Grant the Executive in the IEEPA?

What Presidential remediation actions has Congress authorized in the IEEPA under a declaration of a national emergency?  The pertinent language of the IEEPA that the administration relied upon for its remediation action in the form of tariffs is as follows:^[20]

“… the President may … investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; …” (emphasis added).

The above IEEPA paragraph does not mention the term “tariffs,” as the Supreme Court majority holding points out. Part II-A-2 for which Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett joined the Chief Justice elaborates:[21]

“IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit . . . importation or exportation.”  §1702(a)(1)(B). Absent from this lengthy list of specific powers is any mention of tariffs or duties.  Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly, as it consistently has in other tariff statutes.”

Typically, Presidents have exercised authority granted by the IEEPA through sanctions and the seizure of property owned by a foreign government, its nationals, or its state enterprises.^[22] Until 2025, no administration has mandated tariffs as a remedial tool under the IEEPA.^[23] Tariffs, a form of taxation collected via import duties, are an aspect of governance granted by the U.S. Constitution to Congress, as follows: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises …”.^[24]

In the oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized this aspect of Article I in his question to the Solicitor General:^[25] “[W]ho pays the tariffs?” The Solicitor General responded that tariffs are borne by a combination of foreign manufacturers and importers, i.e., foreign taxpayers, but, to the Chief Justice’s point, also by U.S. taxpayers.^[26] Then the Chief Justice followed: “…it’s been suggested that the tariffs are responsible for significant reduction in our deficit. I would say that’s raising revenue domestically.” To which the Solicitor General defended: “…there certainly is incidental and collateral effect of the tariffs that they do raise revenue, but it’s very important that they are regulatory tariffs, not revenue-raising tariffs.”^[27]

The Executive’s Reliance on Prior Court Decisions Related to Similar Language in Previous Legislation

The Administration argued that the language of the 1977 IEEPA should be understood in the context of prior court opinions based on substantially similar language in the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (‘TWEA’).^[28] The TWEA language concerning regulation of foreign commerce did not include the term tariff.^[29] The TWEA states that during war time, the President may:^[30]

“…investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest …”.

Three federal appellate court decisions held that, pursuant to the language of the TWEA, President Nixon had been afforded by Congress the authority to declare a state of emergency because of an imbalance of trade of the U.S. with its trading partners, and pertaining thereto, afforded the authority of Congress to impose a 10 percent supplemental tariff on all dutiable goods entering the United States in order that the President may regulate foreign commerce.^[31] We will examine the first decision as representative of the three.

In the decision U.S. v. Yoshida International, the Appellate Court provides a contextual historical statement that is potentially applicable to President Trump’s underlying justification of a national emergency: “During the summer of 1971, the United States was faced with an economic crisis. The nation suffered under an exceptionally severe and worsening balance of payments deficit.”^[32] President Nixon’s authority for levying the 10 percent tariff on all trading partners was enunciated by the President as follows:^[33]

“… pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, … and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962…, the President entered into, and proclaimed tariff rates under, trade agreements with foreign countries;”

In its analysis of the executive branch’s issuing of the tariff, the Appellate Court acknowledges the elephant in the room:^[34]

“But neither need nor national emergency will justify the exercise of a power by the Executive not inherent in his office nor delegated by the Congress. Expedience cannot justify the means by which a deserving and beneficial national result is accomplished. To indulge in judicial rationalization in order to sanction the exercise of a power where no power in fact exists is to strike the deadliest of blows to our Constitution.”

Thus, the Appellate Court undertook a deep dive into understanding whether Congress which levies duties as a regulatory tool to regulate imports, delegated to the President this same power to regulate imports using the same regulatory tool, for use in national emergencies.^[35] Cutting to the chase, it concluded that, via the TWEA, Congress authorized the President during an emergency: “to exercise the delegated substantive power, i.e., to “regulate importation,” by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related, … to the particular nature of the emergency declared.^[36]

However, the Appellate Court cautioned that the President may not “impose whatever tariff rates he deems desirable simply by declaring a national emergency”.^[37] Each Presidential action requires a facts and circumstances analysis to determine if it is appropriate and that it will not subvert the manifest Congressional intent to maintain control over its Constitutional power to levy tariffs. In the context of President Nixon’s tariffs, the Appellate Court observed that the relevant notice specifically stated that the imposition of the additional duty of 10 percent would only be charged up to the maximum tariff rate already promulgated by Congress, i.e., the tariff rate before any concessions.^[38] The Appellate Court’s analysis found that:^[39]

“It is clear that the surcharge herein had, as its primary purpose, the curtailment, i.e., the regulation, of imports. What was sought was an offset to actions of our foreign trading partners which had led to loss of our favorable balance of trade and to a serious negative balance…”.

In conclusion, the Appellate Court reasoned that President Nixon’s limited surcharge, as a temporary measure, calculated to meet a particular national emergency, did not fall afoul of imposing “whatever tariff rates he deems desirable”.^[40]

The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Application of the Prior Decisions

Regarding the Executive’s reasoning, the Supreme Court’s six-vote majority in Part II-B countered that:

“While this Court sometimes assumes that Congress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation, we do so only when [the] terms meaning was well-settled before the adoption. … A single, expressly limited opinion from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not clear that hurdle. The tariff authority asserted by President Nixon, moreover, was far removed from TWEAs original purposes of sanctioning foreign belligerents. We are therefore skeptical that Congress enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel power (citations omitted).”[41]

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[1] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, 2026 LX 89981 (Feb. 20, 2026).

[2] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, *1; 2026 LX 89981, referring to 91 Stat. 1626.

[3] Note that we will provide a more informative, expansive article early next week. Shabbat has limited our time for this one to just two hours of discussion and writing.

[4] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, *3; 2026 LX 89981

[5] The Learning Resources case originated with Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 209 (May 29, 2025), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103492, 2025 LX 183012.

[6] V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 2025 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 67, SLIP OP. 2025-66, 2025 LX 120769.

[7] Note that we claim a proficient understanding, even a scholarly one, of various topic areas of taxation, but we are not constitutional law scholars.

[8] V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1383; 2025 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 67, *65; SLIP OP. 2025-66; 2025 LX 120769.

[9] Our estimate is based upon the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Trade Statistics available at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade. See also CBP’s press release of Dec. 16, 2025, “Thanks To President Trump, CBP announces record-breaking $200 billion in tariff revenue”, available at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/thanks-president-trump-cbp-announces-record-breaking-200-billion. Treasury annual and monthly tariff statistics collected and disseminated by USA Facts, “How much revenue does the federal government collect from tariffs?”, available at https://usafacts.org/answers/how-much-revenue-does-the-federal-government-collect-from-tariffs/country/united-states/. We also refer to the data analysis of the Yale-hosted The Budget Lab, “Tracking the Economic Effects of the Budget (Feb. 18, 2026), available at https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/tracking-economic-effects-tariffs.

[10] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, *34; 2026 LX 89981.

[11] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 15.

[12] The case is a consolidation of two cases. See the previous appellate decision Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24105 and the Supreme Court current citation is Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2783; and the second case’s current citation, consolidated with Learning Resources, Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2782. The oral arguments transcript is available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf.

[13] The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Title II, Pub. L. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (Dec. 28, 1977). We published an article via Kluwer Law’s International Tax blog with our lengthy analysis, available at https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/international-tax-law-blog/to-tariff-or-not-to-tariff-that-is-the-question-before-the-us-supreme-court/. In that article, we also asked AI what it thought and included its conclusion in the final part of that article.

[14] U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1, available at https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-1/ALDE_00013387/.

[15] Supreme Court Appears Skeptical of Trump’s Tariffs, WSJ (Nov. 5, 2025), available at https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/supreme-court-tariffs-case-stock-market-11-05-2025.

[16] 50 U.S. Code § 1701 [Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities] available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1701.

[17] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 4.

[18] For an overview of the history of the IEEPA, see The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use, CRS Rep. 45618 (Sep. 1, 2025) available at https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45618. Referred to hereafter as the ‘CRS IEEPA Report’.

[19] CRS IEEPA Report at 18, 20. President Jimmy Carter’s declaration of a national security emergency regarding Iran, pursuant to the IEEPA, remains in place over fifty years later to this day. See Executive Order 12170 of Nov. 14, 1979, 44 FR 65729.

[20] 50 U.S. Code § 1702 [Presidential authorities] available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1702.

[21] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, *6; 2026 LX 89981.

[22] CRS IEEPA Report at 32.

[23] CRS IEEPA Report at 60.

[24] U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1, available at https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C1-1-1/ALDE_00013387/.

[25] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 37.

[26] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 38.

[27] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, Doc. No. 24-1287, trans. at 38.

[28] An Act to define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 65–91, 40 Stat. 411. Commonly referred to as the Trading with the Enemy Act (‘TWEA’).

[29] CRS IEEPA Report at 64.

[30] 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1)(B).

[31] In United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1975), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that it was “incontestable that [TWEA] does in fact delegate to the President, for use during war or during national emergency only, the power to ‘regulate importation'” and upheld the President’s action imposing a 10 percent tariff to all trading partners because it was reasonably related to the emergency confronted. Cited at CRS IEEPA Report at 64. Also see Alcan Sales v. United States, 534 F.2d 920 (Cust. & Pat. App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S. Ct. 506 (1976). Also see Alcan Sales, Div. of Alcan Aluminum Corp., v. United States, 693 F.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1982).

[32] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 17; 526 F.2d 560, 567; 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *5-6.

[33] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 18-19, 526 F.2d 560, 568, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *8-9.

[34] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 21, 526 F.2d 560, 570, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *15.

[35] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 25, 526 F.2d 560, 574, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *25.

[36] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 576-577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *32.

[37] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *33.

[38] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 28, 526 F.2d 560, 577, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *34.

[39] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 31, 526 F.2d 560, 579, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *40.

[40] United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 29, 526 F.2d 560, 578, 1975 CCPA LEXIS 119, *35-36.

[41] Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 714, *31-32; 2026 LX 89981.