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William Byrnes (Texas A&M) tax & compliance articles

BNP Paribas Pays $8.9 Billion for Sanction Violations With Iran, Sudan & Cuba

Posted by William Byrnes on June 30, 2014


$8.9 Billion Settlement of $19 Billion Possible Penalty

On June 30th, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), as part of a combined $8.9 billion settlement (settlement agreement here) with federal and state government agencies, today announced a $963 million agreement with BNP Paribas (BNPP) to settle its potential liability for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions regulations.  The $8.9 billion is the largest OFAC settlement to date.  However, the statutory maximum and base civil monetary penalties in this case were $19,272,380,006.

What Did BNP Paribas Do Exactly?

For a number of years, up to and including 2012, BNPP processed thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that involved countries, entities, and/or individuals subject to the sanctions programs listed above.  BNPP appears to have engaged in a systematic practice, spanning many years and involving multiple BNPP branches and business lines, that concealed, removed, omitted, or obscured references to, or the interest or involvement of, sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication payment messages sent to U.S. financial institutions.

The specific payment practices the bank utilized in order to process sanctions-related payments to or through the United States included omitting references to sanctioned parties; replacing the names of sanctioned parties with BNPP’s name or a code word; and structuring payments in a manner that did not identify the involvement of sanctioned parties in payments sent to U.S. financial institutions.  While these payment practices occurred throughout multiple branches and subsidiaries of the bank, BNPP’s subsidiary in Geneva and branch in Paris facilitated or conducted the overwhelming majority of the apparent violations.

How Bad Was BNP Paribas Conduct?

OFAC determined that BNPP did not voluntarily self-disclose its violations (it was a whistleblower), and that the apparent violations constitute an egregious case: BNPP’s systemic practice of concealing, removing, omitting, or obscuring references to information about U.S.-sanctioned parties in 3,897 financial and trade transactions routed to or through banks in the United States between 2005 and 2012, including:

$8 Billion with Sudan

BNPP officials have described Darfur as a “humanitarian catastrophe” and, while discussing the Sudanese business, noted that certain Sudanese banks “play a pivotal part in the support of the Sudanese government which…has hosted Osama Bin Laden and refuses the United Nations intervention in Darfur.”  BNPP’s senior compliance personnel agreed to continue the Sudanese business and rationalized the decision by stating that “the relationship with this body of counterparties is a historical one and the commercial stakes are significant. For these reasons, Compliance does not want to stand in the way.”

BNPP processed 2,663 wire transfers totaling approximately $8,370,372,624 between September , 2005, and July 24, 2009, involving Sudan.  The total base penalty for this set of apparent violations was $16,826,707,625.  $8 billion in four years – approximately $2 billion a year.

$1 Billion with Iran

BNPP processed 318 wire transfers totaling approximately $1,182,075,543 between July 15, 2005, and November 27, 2012, involving Iran.  The total base penalty for this set of apparent violations was $2,382,634,677.

$700 Million With Cuba

BNPP processed 909 wire transfers totaling approximately $689,237,183 between July 18, 2005, and September 10, 2012.  The total base penalty for this set of apparent violations was $59,085,000.

$1.5 Million with Burma

BNPP processed seven wire transfers totaling approximately $1,478,371 between November 3, 2005, and approximately May 2009, involving Burma.  The total base penalty for this set of apparent violations was $3,952,704.

Who Was Involved?

Benjamin M. Lawsky, New York’s Superintendent of Financial Services, said, “BNPP employees – with the knowledge of multiple senior executives – engaged in a long-standing scheme that illegally funneled money to countries involved in terrorism and genocide. As a civil regulator, we are taking action today not only to penalize the bank, but also expose and sanction individual BNPP employees for wrongdoing. In order to deter future offenses, it is important to remember that banks do not commit misconduct – bankers do.”

– COO Signed Off on Continuing Illicit Transactions at Meeting Where He Asked Minutes Not to be Taken”;

– North American Head of Ethics/Compliance wrote: “The Dirty Little Secret Isn’t So Secret Anymore, Oui?”

Did Anyone Go to Prison?

No.  No charges have been brought.

If Not Prison, Then What Was the Discipline?

Some executives were merely ‘separated’.  What does separated mean?  Asked to resign?  Awarded severance?  Kept the high salaries and bonuses derived from the illicit business – yes.  What of the COO who “signed off on continuing illicit transactions at a meeting where he asked minutes not to be taken“?  He was allowed to retire.  He keeps his pension, retirement funds, bonuses …

What BNP states: “As a result of BNP Paribas’ internal review, a number of managers and employees from relevant business areas have been sanctioned, a number of whom have left the Group.”

But what the Department of Financial Services states: At DFS’s direction, 13 individuals were terminated by or separated from the Bank as a result of the investigation, including the following senior executives:

  • George Chodron de Courcel, Group Chief Operating Officer
  • Vivien Levy-Garboua, Current Senior Advisor to the BNPP Executive Committee and Former Group Head of Compliance
  • Christopher Marks, Group Head of Debt Capital Markets
  • Dominique Remy, Group Head of Structured Finance for the Corporate Investment Bank (CIB)
  • Stephen Strombelline, Head of Ethics and Compliance for North America

In total, including those terminated, the Department of Financial Services reports that the Bank disciplined 45 employees, with levels of discipline ranging from dismissals, to cuts in compensation, demotion, and other sanctions, while 27 additional BNPP employees who would have been subject to potential disciplinary action during the investigation had already resigned.

Who Is Paying the Fine?

BNP Paribas shareholders inevitably.  No fines have been levied against the employees involved.  BNP shareholders include:

Belgian State (through SFPI (1)) 10.3%
Grand Duché de Luxembourg 1.0%
Employees 5.5%
Retail shareholders 4.9%
European institutional Investors 46.1%
Non-European institutional investors 30.0%
Other and unidentified 2.2%
Total 100%

How Will BNP Minimize the Risk of Its Doing It Again?  

Under the settlement agreement, BNPP is required to put in place and maintain policies and procedures to minimize the risk of the recurrence of such conduct in the future.  BNPP is also required to provide OFAC with copies of submissions to the Board of Governors relating to the OFAC compliance review that it will be conducting as part of its settlement with the Board of Governors.

BNP states that it has designed new robust compliance and control procedures:

  • a new department called Group Financial Security US, part of the Group Compliance function, will be headquartered in New York and will ensure that BNP Paribas complies globally with US regulation related to international sanctions and embargoes.
  • all USD flows for the entire BNP Paribas Group will be ultimately processed and controlled via the branch in New York.

Read my previous analysis warning to financial institutions about lack of education

Is AML Training Effective or Whitewashing?

Is AML Training Effective or Whitewashing? Part II

Are Financial Service Firms Serving High Net Wealth Suffering As a Result of Compliance Costs?

book cover

LexisNexis’ Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and Recovery and Compliance: A Global Guide – This eBook with commentary and analysis by hundreds of AML experts from over 100 countries,  is designed to provide the compliance officer accurate analyses of the AML/CTF Financial and Legal Intelligence, law and practice in the nations of the world with the most current references and resources. The eBook is organized around five main themes: 1. Money Laundering Risk and Compliance; 2. The Law of Anti-Money Laundering and Compliance; 3. Criminal and Civil Forfeiture; 4. Compliance and 5. International Cooperation.  As these unlawful activities can occur in any given country, it is important to identify the international participants who are cooperating to develop methods to obstruct these criminal activities.

Selected Settlement Agreements:

2014 Information

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and BNP Paribas SA

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Clearstream Banking, S.A.

2013 Information

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued a Finding of Violation to VISA International Service Association

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Royal Bank of Scotland plc.

2012 Information

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and HSBC Holdings plc

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Standard Chartered Bank

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and ING Bank, N.V.

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Online Micro, LLC

2011 Information

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Sunrise Technologies and Trading Corporation

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.

2010 Information

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Barclays Bank PLC.

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Innospec, Inc

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Aviation Services International, B.V.

2009 Information

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Lloyds TSB Bank, plc.

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Credit Suisse AG.

Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Ltd.

5 Responses to “BNP Paribas Pays $8.9 Billion for Sanction Violations With Iran, Sudan & Cuba”

  1. dave britton said

    professor how did you reach the maximum base civil penalty. Thanks
    Dave Britton

    Like

    • See http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/part-501/appendix-A “iv. In an egregious case, if the apparent violation comes to OFAC’s attention by means other than a voluntary self-disclosure, the base amount of the proposed civil penalty in the Pre-Penalty Notice shall be the applicable statutory maximum penalty amount applicable to the violation.”

      B. Amount of Civil Penalty 1. Egregious case.
      In those cases in which a civil monetary penalty is deemed appropriate, OFAC will make a determination as to whether a case is deemed “egregious” for purposes of the base penalty calculation. This determination will be based on an analysis of the applicable General Factors. In making the egregiousness determination, OFAC generally will give substantial weight to General Factors A (“willful or reckless violation of law”), B (“awareness of conduct at issue”), C (“harm to sanctions program objectives”) and D (“individual characteristics”), with particular emphasis on General Factors A and B. A case will be considered an “egregious case” where the analysis of the applicable General Factors, with a focus on those General Factors identified above, indicates that the case represents a particularly serious violation of the law calling for a strong enforcement response. …

      International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act (“IEEPA”) of 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110-96) increased the maximum civil penalty applicable to the greater of $250,000 or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed. See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/interim_pol_11272007.pdf

      Like

  2. […]   An egregious case, and the penalty enhancement, is described in my previous article about BNP Paribas’ transactions with Sudan and Iran.   The maximum statutory penalty amount for this was $250,000, and the base penalty amount was […]

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  3. “Interesting. I am sure it is my ignorance, but can you please tell me how the US has jurisdiction over a French bank?”

    BNP Paribas has operated in the USA since 1919 and currently has over 14,000 employees in the US. Its three USA core businesses are Corporate & Investment Banking, Investment Solutions, and Retail Banking.

    The USA just ex-communicated a bank from the US financial system on Thursday (see https://profwilliambyrnes.com/2014/07/18/fbme-bank-shut-out-of-us-financial-system-for-illicit-finance-business-from-the-darkest-corners-of-the-criminal-underworld/). So,.it could have been worse.

    The argument of US jurisdiction generally fails because foreign institutions continue to interact with the US financial system, such as dollar backed investments including T-bills, such as the US regulated financial markets and commodities exchanges, and such as correspondent banking for US business. The financial institutions are choosing to place themselves under the US regulatory jurisdiction.

    And its not as if the institutions are “voiceless”. These institutions may choose to exercise their voice regarding such US regulations through Washington, D.C. lobbyists, and through government-to-government interactions.

    Like

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