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Posts Tagged ‘transfer pricing’

Transfer Pricing Risk Management Zoom-Based Case Studies Start Tuesday, Jan 18, 2022 through April 30 (graduation May 6 on campus)

Posted by William Byrnes on November 9, 2021


Based on weekly case studies created by the faculty, supported by reading/text materials, pre-recorded videos with PPTs, and audio podcast files made by the faculty – twice-weekly Zoom (optional) live sessions (recorded for those unable to attend) of 90 – 120 minutes wherein students may work with teams through the case studies generally from an assigned stakeholder perspective. Access to the extensive Texas A&M library for case study research includes by example: Lexis, Westlaw, IBFD, Kluwer-Cheetah, Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), S&P CapIQ, FITCH, among several others. Apply for Texas A&M’s courses here.

Professor William Byrnes’ leverages the expertise of weekly case study experts that draw from a variety of disciplines including accounting, economics, finance, international business, management, and law. The textbook is authored by Professor William Byrnes and provided within the course [William Byrnes, Practical Guide to Transfer Pricing, 4th ed, 2022 version, published by Matthew Bender via LexisNexis and available in the law library in hardcopy].

Transfer pricing is the valuation of cross-border transactions between units of a multinational enterprise. This course introduces students to both theoretical and practical aspects of transfer pricing. This course deep dives into the legal issues (regulations and jurisprudence); accounting systems and variances among (managerial, financial, tax, and public accounting); financial data analytics through the lens of economic methods and profit level indicators; functional analysis and global value chain; contrasts with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and UN Transfer Pricing Manual. Each week, an industry-based case study is undertaken in a team-based learning approach of student groups generally consisting of three team members each.  The industry case studies include, as examples, agriculture (coffee supply chain), technology services, and petroleum.

Part I and Part II of this course both address strategy, compliance, and risk management.  Transfer Pricing Part I focuses on the topics of comparability, the transfer pricing methods, functional analysis, and global value chain analysis, and transfer pricing analysis for tangibles. Transfer Pricing Part II focuses on the transfer pricing methods and analysis for intangibles and for services. Topics more specifically that are addressed in this course via its textbook, video and audio lectures, weekly team-based case studies, and weekly live sessions, include the arm’s length standard, comparability analysis, risk analysis for tangibles and intangibles, transactional methods (CUP, CUT, Cost Plus, Resale Minus, Commodity), profit methods (e.g. comparable profits method, transactional net margin method, profit level indicators, key performance indicators, commensurate with income), functional analysis (supply chain, global value chain analysis, DAEMPE functions), industry economic data gathering and analysis, cost-sharing arrangements, profit splits and residuals, platform contributions, and safe harbors.  Apply for Texas A&M’s courses here.

Prof. William Byrnes Course Topics and Subject Matter Expert Calendar

Week 1 January 17 Arm’s Length Standard case study by Dr. Bruno da Silva

Jan 18 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (2-minute student introductions, orientation to teamwork and case studies, expectations and obligations regarding participation asynchronously or synchronously, discuss the syllabus, set up first-week case study)

2nd live session for 2022 to be determined, for 2021 it was: Friday at 9am – 10:30am (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Review the orientation video and slides
  • Read textbook chapter 40
  • Review the analysis of the historical and more recent arm’s length cases (watch videos and review slides)
  • On Tuesday January 18th, the first day of the course, we will discuss the optional use of teams by students, the case study, the team’s roles for the case study, and how team’s should operate, or how individual students may do the work without using a team approach. Students are not required to join a team and may undertake the work/projects individually. This choice is decided weekly.

Week 2 Jan 25: CUP & Comparables, Eden Hofert – the Christmas Tree case (Canadian)/Compaq by Dr. Lorraine Eden

Jan 26 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (2-minute student introductions, orientation to teamwork and case studies, expectations and obligations regarding participation asynchronously or synchronously, discuss syllabus, set up first week case study)

Jan 29 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

Week 3 Jan 31: Cost Plus & Resale Minus (Byrnes’ Starbucks case study) by Dr. George Salis

Feb 1 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, feedback)

  • Watch background and overview videos of big data & econometrics as it is used in transfer pricing.
  • Read textbook Chapter 7 then read chapter 6.
  • Contrast the analysis within the Cost Plus Method and Resale Minus Method cases.
  • Each team has a stakeholder role in Byrnes’ case study of Starbucks cost inclusion and exclusion, agriculture supply chain, and coffee global value chain.

Week 4 Feb 7: Comparable Profits Method & TNMM by Dr. George Salis

Feb 8 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (discussion about Byrnes’ case study and the CPM)

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 8 and 9.
  • Watch second set of videos of big data & econometrics.
  • Review the CPM/TNMM examples.
  • Teams prepare the Case Study.

Week 5 Feb 14: functional analysis & global value chain, profit split methods by Dr. George Salis

Feb 15 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (discussion about Byrnes’ case study and the CPM, GVC)

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 11 and 12, skim chapters 97 and 98
  • Watch videos about FA and GVC.
  • Review the GVC examples (chapters from textbook regarding coffee, technology, tobacco).
  • Team’s prepare the Case Study.

Week 6 Feb 21 Best Method – Snowin’ and Blowin’ case study by Dr. Lorraine Eden

Feb 22 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 15 and 16
  • Watch video.
  • Team’s prepare the Case Study.

Week 7 Feb 28 Capstone summation and tax risk technology presentations

March 1 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (counsel litigation discussion)

second session to be determined (at 9am – 10:30 (tech provider training))

March 7-11 Spring Break for distance education graduate programs

Week 1 of Course 2 (week 8 of both courses) March 14: Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT and CPM by Dr. Debora Talutto

March 15 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (counsel litigation discussion)

second session (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapter 10
  • Analyze the CUT cases
  • Case Study presentation

Week 9 March 21: Intangibles Buy In/Out Cost Sharing Arrangements, Platform Contribution Transactions by Dr. George Salis

March 22 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

second session (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapter 13
  • Analyze the CSA/PCT cases
  • Case Study presentations

Week 10 March 28: Digital; Unitary Apportionment; Pillar 1; EU State Aid

by Dr. Bruno da Silva dasilva.brunoaniceto@gmail.com

March 29 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 1 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 44 and 75
  • Review Pillar One
  • Case Study presentation

Week 11 April 4 Digital –Amazon, Internet of Things (IOT) by Dr. Lorraine Eden and Dr. Niraja Srinivasan

April 5 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 8 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read OECD Pillar 1 comment letters in the course folder
  • Read Lorraine Eden’s articles
  • Read Chapter 46

Week 12: April 11 Services by Hafiz Choudhury

April 12 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 15 Friday at 9am – 10:00 (presentations, peer feedback)

Week 13 April 18: Restructuring (and extractive industry experience) by Hafiz Choudhury

April 19 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 22 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 27, 43
  • In the second week, the investors find out that the state owned off take customer is not utilizing the full capacity of the FSRU

Week 14 April 25 Capstone presentations for comment letters

April 26 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 29 Friday at 9am – 10:00 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Review past comment letter submissions
Texas A&M, an annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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Transfer Pricing Risk Management Zoom-Based Case Studies Start Tuesday, Jan 18, run until May 5 (graduation May 6 on campus)

Posted by William Byrnes on January 8, 2021


Based on weekly case studies created by the faculty, supported by reading/text materials, pre-recorded videos with PPTs, and audio podcast files made by the faculty – twice-weekly Zoom (optional) live sessions (recorded for those unable to attend) of 90 – 120 minutes wherein students may work with teams through the case studies generally from an assigned stakeholder perspective. Access to the extensive Texas A&M library for case study research includes by example: Lexis, Westlaw, IBFD, Kluwer-Cheetah, Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), S&P CapIQ, FITCH, among several others. Apply for Texas A&M’s courses here.

Professor William Byrnes’ leverages the expertise of weekly case study experts that draw from a variety of disciplines including accounting, economics, finance, international business, management, and law. The textbook is authored by Professor William Byrnes and provided within the course [William Byrnes, Practical Guide to Transfer Pricing, 4th ed, 2022 version, published by Matthew Bender via LexisNexis and available in the law library in hardcopy].

Transfer pricing is the valuation of cross-border transactions between units of a multinational enterprise. This course introduces students to both theoretical and practical aspects of transfer pricing. This course deep dives into the legal issues (regulations and jurisprudence); accounting systems and variances among (managerial, financial, tax, and public accounting); financial data analytics through the lens of economic methods and profit level indicators; functional analysis and global value chain; contrasts with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and UN Transfer Pricing Manual. Each week, an industry-based case study is undertaken in a team-based learning approach of student groups generally consisting of three team members each.  The industry case studies include, as examples, agriculture (coffee supply chain), technology services, and petroleum.

Part I and Part II of this course both address strategy, compliance, and risk management.  Transfer Pricing Part I focuses on the topics of comparability, the transfer pricing methods, functional analysis and global value chain analysis, and transfer pricing analysis for tangibles. Transfer Pricing Part II focuses on the transfer pricing methods and analysis for intangibles and for services. Topics more specifically that are addressed in this course via its textbook, video and audio lectures, weekly team-based case studies, and weekly live sessions, include the arm’s length standard, comparability analysis, risk analysis for tangibles and intangibles, transactional methods (CUP, CUT, Cost Plus, Resale Minus, Commodity), profit methods (e.g. comparable profits method, transactional net margin method, profit level indicators, key performance indicators, commensurate with income), functional analysis (supply chain, global value chain analysis, DAEMPE functions), industry economic data gathering and analysis, cost-sharing arrangements, profit splits and residuals, platform contributions, and safe harbors.  Documentation, advance pricing agreement procedures, and mutual agreement procedures are topics addressed in the courses of “International Tax Risk Management I” and of “FATCA, CRS, and CbCR”. Apply for Texas A&M’s courses here.

Course Topics and Calendar

Week 1 January 17 Arm’s Length Standard case study by Dr. Bruno da Silva

Jan 18 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (2-minute student introductions, orientation to teamwork and case studies, expectations and obligations regarding participation asynchronously or synchronously, discuss the syllabus, set up first-week case study)

Friday at 9am – 10:30am (presentations, peer feedback)

Week 2 Jan 25: CUP & Comparables, Eden Hofert – the Christmas Tree case (Canadian)/Compaq by Dr. Lorraine Eden

Jan 26 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (2-minute student introductions, orientation to teamwork and case studies, expectations and obligations regarding participation asynchronously or synchronously, discuss syllabus, set up first week case study)

Jan 29 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

Week 3 Jan 31: Cost Plus & Resale Minus (Byrnes’ Starbucks case study) by Dr. George Salis

Feb 1 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, feedback)

  • Watch background and overview videos of big data & econometrics as it is used in transfer pricing.
  • Read textbook Chapter 7 then read chapter 6.
  • Contrast the analysis within the Cost Plus Method and Resale Minus Method cases.
  • Each team has a stakeholder role in Byrnes’ case study of Starbucks cost inclusion and exclusion, agriculture supply chain, and coffee global value chain.

Week 4 Feb 7: Comparable Profits Method & TNMM by Dr. George Salis

Feb 8 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (discussion about Byrnes’ case study and the CPM)

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 8 and 9.
  • Watch second set of videos of big data & econometrics.
  • Review the CPM/TNMM examples.
  • Teams prepare the Case Study.

Week 5 Feb 14: functional analysis & global value chain, profit split methods by Dr. George Salis

Feb 15 Tuesday at 9am – 10:00am (discussion about Byrnes’ case study and the CPM, GVC)

second session at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 11 and 12, skim chapters 97 and 98
  • Watch videos about FA and GVC.
  • Review the GVC examples (chapters from textbook regarding coffee, technology, tobacco).
  • Team’s prepare the Case Study.

Week 6 Feb 21 Best Method – Snowin’ and Blowin’ case study by Dr. Lorraine Eden

Feb 22 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

Feb 25 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 15 and 16
  • Watch video.
  • Team’s prepare the Case Study.

Week 7 Feb 28 Capstone summation and tax risk technology presentations

March 1 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (counsel litigation discussion)

March 4 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (tech provider training)

March 7-11 Spring Break for distance education graduate programs

Week 1 of Course 2 (week 8 of both courses) March 14: Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT and CPM by Dr. Debora Talutto

March 15 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am (counsel litigation discussion)

second session (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapter 10
  • Analyze the CUT cases
  • Case Study presentation

Week 9 March 21: Intangibles Buy In/Out Cost Sharing Arrangements, Platform Contribution Transactions by Dr. George Salis

March 22 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

second session (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapter 13
  • Analyze the CSA/PCT cases
  • Case Study presentations

Week 10 March 28: Digital; Unitary Apportionment; Pillar 1; EU State Aid

by Dr. Bruno da Silva dasilva.brunoaniceto@gmail.com

March 29 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 1 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 44 and 75
  • Review Pillar One
  • Case Study presentation

Week 11 April 4 Digital –Amazon, Internet of Things (IOT) by Dr. Lorraine Eden and Dr. Niraja Srinivasan

April 5 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 8 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read OECD Pillar 1 comment letters in the course folder
  • Read Lorraine Eden’s articles
  • Read Chapter 46

Week 12: April 11 Services by Hafiz Choudhury

April 12 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 15 Friday at 9am – 10:00 (presentations, peer feedback)

Week 13 April 18: Restructuring (and extractive industry experience) by Hafiz Choudhury

April 19 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 22 Friday at 9am – 10:30 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Read textbook chapters 27, 43
  • In the second week, the investors find out that the state owned off take customer is not utilizing the full capacity of the FSRU

Week 14 April 25 Capstone presentations for comment letters

April 26 Tuesday at 9am – 10:30am

April 29 Friday at 9am – 10:00 (presentations, peer feedback)

  • Review past comment letter submissions
Texas A&M, an annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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U.S. and E.U. International Tax, Transfer Pricing Courses Start Jan 19, 2021

Posted by William Byrnes on November 24, 2020


Based on weekly case studies created by the faculty, supported by reading/text materials, pre-recorded videos with PPTs, and audio podcast files made by the faculty – twice-weekly Zoom live sessions (recorded as well) of 90 – 120 minutes wherein students in teams work through the case studies generally from an assigned stakeholder perspective. Access to the extensive Texas A&M library for case study research includes by example: Lexis, Westlaw, IBFD, Kluwer-Cheetah, Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), S&P CapIQ, FITCH, among several others. Apply for Texas A&M’s courses here.

  • Transfer Pricing Risk Management I Tangibles, Methods, Economics, and Data
  • Transfer Pricing Risk Management II: Intangibles, Services, Pillar 1/Digital, Formulary
  • U.S. Tax Risk Management (Data, Analytics & Technology)
  • E.U. Tax Risk Management

U.S. Tax Risk Management (Data, Analytics & Technology) syllabus

E.U. Tax Risk Management syllabus

  • Week 1 March 8, 2021 E.U. General Framework of Compliance Tax Risk Management Dr. Eva Andrés (Barcelona)
  • Week 2 March 15, 2021 Parent Subsidiary Directive, Interest, Royalties. Dr. Santiago Ibañez Marcilla
  • Week 3 March 22, 2021 The European Union proposal on a carbon border tax and its compatibility with the World Trade Organization rules Dr. Xavier Fernández Pons
  • Week 4 March 29, 2021 Free Movement of Capital (investment funds) and others Fundamental Freedoms. Dr. Eva Andrés & Dr. Andreu Olesti
  • Week 5 April 5, 2021 Cross-Border Losses – Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 6 April 12, 2021 ATAD, DAC 6, Abuse – Dr. Bruno da Silva
  • Capstone Week April 19-25: Build a client case study, wrap up

Transfer Pricing Risk Management: Tangibles, Methods, Economics, and Data (William Byrnes course materials) syllabus

  • Week 1 January 19 Arm’s Length Standard (v Formulary Approach) Dr. Bruno Da Silva & William Byrnes
  • Week 2 Jan 25 CUP & Comparables Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 3 Feb 1 Cost Plus & Resale Minus Dr. George Salis
  • Week 4 Feb 8: Comparable Profits Method & TNMMDr. George Salis
  • Week 5 Feb 15 Profit Split Dr. George Salis
  • Week 6 Feb 22 Best Method Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Capstone Week March 1

Transfer Pricing Risk Management: Intangibles and Services (William Byrnes course materials) syllabus

Texas A&M, an annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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Earn your Texas A&M Transfer Pricing certificate w/ live team-based weekly case studies starting January 19

Posted by William Byrnes on November 11, 2020


Transfer Pricing Risk Management I and II: Tangibles, Methods, Economics, and Data, Intangibles, and Services

The back-to-back courses are limited to a maximum 30 certificate participants and degree seekers: Application HERE

William Byrnes, author of the leading transfer pricing treatise, leads a team of hands-on transfer pricing professionals and professors (see links below) who created weekly case studies for teams to work through, facilitated by Zoom on Tuesday at 9am Central (Dallas) time and Fridays at 9am (live session lasts at least 90 minutes and is recorded, available to students until May 1 (then deleted in compliance with FERPA and other rights). The Teams present their proposals and results critiqued and discussed by the teams and professors. See example live session on YouTube here

  • Week 1 January 19 Arm’s Length Standard (v Formulary Approach) Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 2 Jan 25 CUP & Comparables Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 3 Feb 1 Cost Plus & Resale Minus Dr. George Salis
  • Week 4 Feb 8: Comparable Profits Method & TNMMDr. George Salis
  • Week 5 Feb 15 Profit Split Dr. George Salis
  • Week 6 Feb 22 Best Method Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 7 Capstone March 1 (Hands-On Week with Financial Databases for Comparables Management) Dr. Debora Correa Talutto Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), and CrossBorder AI Solutions Dr. Debora Correa Talutto
  • Week 8 March 8 Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT, CPM Dr. Debora Correa Talutto
  • Week 9 March 15 CSA Intangibles Buy In/Out Dr. George Salis
  • Week 10 March 22 Digital Business Unitary Apportionment Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 11 March 39 Digital Value Chain, Internet of Things Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 12 April 5 U.S. v OECD v UN Manual case study Extractive Industries, Financing Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 13 April 12 Restructuring the Business, Services case study Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 14 Capstone April 19 Hand-On Week with Tax Technology to Manage Risk William Byrnes
  • Other guest experts/professors will be joining with case studies

Weekly course materials include in the tuition: the Lexis textbook and supplement materials, pre-recorded videos with PPTs, and audio podcast files made by the faculty (listen at the gym or when driving). Access to the extensive Texas A&M library for case study research includes as some examples: Lexis, Westlaw, IBFD, Kluwer-Cheetah, Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), and S&P CapIQ.

Texas A&M, annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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14 transfer pricing case studies start on January 19

Posted by William Byrnes on October 16, 2020


Transfer Pricing Risk Management I and II: Tangibles, Methods, Economics, and Data, Intangibles, and Services

William Byrnes, author of the leading transfer pricing treatise, lead professor. Weekly case study teams work through, facilitated (Zoom) with a weekly expert/professor on Mondays at 9am Central (Dallas) time and then on Fridays at 9am the Teams present their proposals and results critiqued and discussed by the teams and professors.

  • Week 1 January 19 Arm’s Length Standard (v Formulary Approach) Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 2 Jan 25 CUP & Comparables Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 3 Feb 1 Cost Plus & Resale Minus Dr. George Salis
  • Week 4 Feb 8: Comparable Profits Method & TNMMDr. George Salis
  • Week 5 Feb 15 Profit Split Dr. George Salis
  • Week 6 Feb 22 Best Method Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 7 Capstone March 1 (Hands-On Week with Financial Databases for Comparables Management) Dr. Debora Correa Talutto Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), and CrossBorder AI Solutions Dr. Debora Correa Talutto
  • Week 8 March 8 Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT, CPM Dr. Debora Correa Talutto
  • Week 9 March 15 CSA Intangibles Buy In/Out Dr. George Salis
  • Week 10 March 22 Digital Business Unitary Apportionment Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 11 March 39 Digital Value Chain, Internet of Things Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 12 April 5 U.S. v OECD v UN Manual case study Extractive Industries, Financing Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 13 April 12 Restructuring the Business, Services case study Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 14 Capstone April 19 Hand-On Week with Tax Technology to Manage Risk William Byrnes
  • Other guest experts/professors will be joining with case studies

Weekly course materials include the written materials, pre-recorded videos, PPTs, and audio files (listen at the gym or when driving). Access to the extensive Texas A&M library for case study research includes as examples: Lexis, Westlaw, IBFD, Kluwer-Cheetah, Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), and S&P CapIQ.

Courses are limited to maximum 30 participants: Application HERE

Texas A&M, annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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Lecture and Live Class Videos from Transfer Pricing January 11 through April 30

Posted by William Byrnes on September 29, 2020


Texas A&M University School of Law’s online international tax risk management graduate curricula for industry professionals. Over 350 lawyers or accountants or economists are enrolled for Texas A&M Law’s graduate online programs – BUT sections remain 30 and under for maximum engagement among students and faculty per section.  Apply now for courses that begin January 11 spring semester.  

Transfer Pricing Risk Management: Tangibles, Methods, Economics, and Data (William Byrnes lead professor, weekly leader below, several other guests join for discussions and case studies) Team-based case studies are live each Monday and Friday at 9am Central time.

  • Week 1 January 13 Arm’s Length Standard (v Formulary Approach) Dr. Bruno Da Silva 
  • Week 2 Jan 20 CUP & Comparables  Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 3 Jan 27 Cost Plus & Resale Minus  Dr. George Salis
  • Week 4 Feb 3: Comparable Profits Method & TNMM Dr. George Salis
  • Week 5 Feb 10 Profit Split Dr. George Salis
  • Week 6 Feb 17 Best Method Dr. Lorraine Eden 

Transfer Pricing Risk Management: Intangibles and Services (William Byrnes lead professor) Team-based case studies are live each Monday and Friday at 9am Central time.

  • Week 1 March 2 Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT, CPM  Dr. Debora Correa Talutto
  • Week 2 March 16 CSA Intangibles Buy In/Out Dr. George Salis
  • Week 3 March 23 Digital Business Unitary Apportionment Dr. Bruno Da Silva
  • Week 4 March 30 Digital Value Chain, Internet of Things Dr. Lorraine Eden
  • Week 5 April 6 U.S. v OECD v UN Manual case study Extractive Industries, Financing Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 6 April 13 Restructuring the Business, Services case study Hafiz Choudhury
  • Week 7 Capstone Hand-On Week with Financial databases “Tax Technology and the future of Transfer Pricing” Dr. Debora Correa Talutto April 20 – 26: Thomson OneSource, BvD (Moodys), and CrossBorder AI Solutions Dr. Debora Correa Talutto & William Byrnes

U.S. Tax Risk Management (Data, Analytics & Technology) 3 credits (Tuesday and Sunday at 8am Central Standard Dallas time zone)

  • Week 1 January 10, 2021 Outbound / FDII Melissa Muhammad (IRS LB&I) melissamuhammadesq@gmail.com
  • Week 2 January 17, 2021 Inbound / BEAT Melissa Muhammad
  • Week 3 January 24, 2021 [check the box] Form 1120 Documentation: Neelu Mehrotra: EY mehrotra.neelu@gmail.com
  • Week 4 January 31, 2021 [Subpart F & GILTI, PTEP ] Form 5471 Documentation: Neelu Mehrotra: EY
  • Week 5 February 7, 2021 M&A or topic and Neelu Mehrotra: EY
  • Week 6 February 14, 2021 FTCs; wrap-up: Melissa Muhammad 

E.U. Tax Risk Management 3 credits (Tuesday and Sunday at 8am Central Dallas time zone)

  • Week 1 February 28, 2021 General Framework & Fundamental Freedoms
  • Week 2 March 7, 2021 P/S + Interest / Royalty
  • Week 3 March 21, 2021 M&A directive
  • Week 4 March 28, 2021 Cross-Border Losses
  • Week 5 April 4, 2021 Free Movement of Capital (investment funds)
  • Week 6 April 11, 2021 ATAD, DAC 6, Abuse – Dr. Bruno da Silva
  • Capstone Week: Build a client case study, wrap up

Texas A&M, annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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Ireland and Apple Win State Aid Case! EU General Court Annuls Commission State Aid Decision Irish Tax Rulings Discriminated in Favor of Apple

Posted by William Byrnes on July 15, 2020


This State Aid case will be analyzed and included in the annual update of 4th Edition of Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing. The next supplement will contain 50 chapters of 2,000 pages of technical, jurisprudence, and regulatory analysis to advise clients from a tax risk management perspective and to mitigate controversy. Order a copy here: https://store.lexisnexis.com/products/practical-guide-to-us-transfer-pricing-skuusSku60720

Scroll down to paragraph 241-245 for the application of arm’s length to the Irish branches, paras 255-309, and then paragraph 322 for the analysis of the application of the TNMM transfer pricing method

(ii) Whether the Commission correctly applied the Authorised OECD Approach in its primary line of reasoning

241    Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, in essence, that the Commission’s primary line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Authorised OECD Approach, inasmuch as the Commission considered that the profits relating to the Apple Group’s IP licences should necessarily have been allocated to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, in so far as the executives of ASI and AOE did not perform active or critical functions with regard to the management of those licences.

242    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Authorised OECD Approach…, the aim of the analysis in the first step is to identify the assets, functions and risks that must be allocated to the permanent establishment of a company on the basis of the activities actually performed by that company. It is true that the analysis in that first step cannot be carried out in an abstract manner that ignores the activities and functions performed within the company as a whole. However, the fact that the Authorised OECD Approach requires an analysis of the functions actually performed within the permanent establishment is at odds with the approach adopted by the Commission consisting, first, in identifying the functions performed by the company as a whole without conducting a more detailed analysis of the functions actually performed by the branches and, second, in presuming that the functions had been performed by the permanent establishment when those functions could not be allocated to the head office of the company itself.

243    In its primary line of reasoning the Commission considered, in essence, that the profits of ASI and AOE relating to the Apple Group’s IP (which, according to the Commission’s line of argument, represented a very significant part of the total profit of those two companies) had to be allocated to the Irish branches in so far as ASI and AOE had no employees capable of managing that IP outside those branches, without, however, establishing that the Irish branches had performed those management functions.

244    Accordingly, as Ireland and ASI and AOE rightly argue, the approach followed by the Commission in its primary line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Authorised OECD Approach.

245    In those circumstances, as is rightly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE …, it must be found that the Commission erred in its application, in its primary line of reasoning, of the functional and factual analysis of the activities performed by the branches of ASI and AOE, on which the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 by the Irish tax authorities is based and which corresponds, in essence, to the analysis provided for by the Authorised OECD Approach.

(1)    Strategic decision-making within the Apple Group

298    Ireland and ASI and AOE claim that the ‘centre of gravity’ of the Apple Group’s activities was in Cupertino and not in Ireland. All strategic decisions, in particular those concerning the design and development of the Apple Group’s products, were taken, in accordance with an overall business strategy covering the group as a whole, in Cupertino. That centrally decided strategy was implemented by the companies of the group, which include ASI and AOE, which acted through their management bodies, much like any other company, according to the rules of company law applicable to them.

299    In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that ASI and AOE submitted evidence, in the administrative procedure and in support of their pleadings in the present instance, on the centralised nature of the strategic decisions within the Apple Group taken by directors in Cupertino and then implemented subsequently by the various entities of the group, such as ASI and AOE. Those centralised procedures concern, inter alia, pricing, accounting decisions, financing and treasury and cover all of the international activities of the Apple Group that would have been decided centrally under the direction of the parent company, Apple Inc.

300    More specifically, with regard to decisions in the field of R&D — which is, in particular, the functional area behind the Apple Group’s IP — ASI and AOE provided evidence showing that decisions relating to the development of the products which were then to be marketed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE, and concerning the R&D strategy which was to be followed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE had been taken and implemented by executives of the group based in Cupertino. It is also apparent from that evidence that the strategies relating to new product launches and, in particular, the organisation of distribution on the European markets in the months leading up to the proposed launch date had been managed at the Apple-Group level by, inter alia, the Executive Team under the direction of the Chief Executive Officer in Cupertino.

301    In addition, it is apparent from the file that contracts with third-party original equipment manufacturers (‘OEMs’), which were responsible for the manufacture of a large proportion of the products sold by ASI, were negotiated and signed by the parent company, Apple Inc., and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney. ASI and AOE also submitted evidence regarding the negotiations and the signing of contracts with customers, such as telecommunications operators, which were responsible for a significant proportion of the retail sales of Apple-branded products, in particular mobile phones. It is apparent from that evidence that the negotiations in question were led by directors of the Apple Group and that the contracts were signed on behalf of the Apple Group by Apple Inc. and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney.

302    Consequently, in so far as it has been established that the strategic decisions — in particular those concerning the development of the Apple Group’s products underlying the Apple Group’s IP — were taken in Cupertino on behalf of the Apple Group as a whole, the Commission erred when it concluded that the Apple Group’s IP was necessarily managed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, which held the licences for that IP.

(2)    Decision-making by ASI and AOE

303    With regard to ASI and AOE’s ability to take decisions concerning their essential functions through their management bodies, the Commission itself accepted that those companies had boards of directors which held regular meetings during the relevant period, and reproduced extracts from the minutes of those meetings confirming that fact in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision.

304    The fact that the minutes of the board meetings do not give details of the decisions concerning the management of the Apple Group’s IP licences, of the cost-sharing agreement and of important business decisions does not mean that those decisions were not taken.

305    The summary nature of the extracts from the minutes reproduced by the Commission in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision is sufficient to allow the reader to understand how the company’s key decisions in each tax year, such as approval of the annual accounts, were taken and recorded in the relevant board minutes.

306    The resolutions of the boards of directors which were recorded in those minutes covered regularly (that is to say, several times a year), inter alia, the payment of dividends, the approval of directors’ reports and the appointment and resignation of directors. In addition, less frequently, those resolutions concerned the establishment of subsidiaries and powers of attorney authorising certain directors to carry out various activities such as managing bank accounts, overseeing relations with governments and public bodies, carrying out audits, taking out insurance, hiring, purchasing and selling assets, taking delivery of goods and dealing with commercial contracts. Moreover, it is apparent from those minutes that individual directors were granted very wide managerial powers.

307    In addition, with regard to the cost-sharing agreement, it is apparent from the information submitted by ASI and AOE that the various versions of that agreement in existence during the relevant period were signed by members of the respective boards of directors of those companies in Cupertino.

308    Moreover, according to the detailed information provided by ASI and AOE, it is the case for both ASI and AOE that, among ASI’s 14 directors and AOE’s 8 directors on their respective boards for each tax year during the period when the contested tax rulings were in force, there was only one director who was based in Ireland.

309    Consequently, the Commission erred when it considered that ASI and AOE, through their management bodies, in particular their boards of directors, did not have the ability to perform the essential functions of the companies in question by, where appropriate, delegating their powers to individual executives who were not members of the Irish branches’ staff.

(d)    Conclusions concerning the activities within the Apple Group

310    It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that, in the present instance, the Commission has not succeeded in showing that, in the light, first, of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE and, second, of the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, the Apple Group’s IP licences should have been allocated to those Irish branches when determining the annual chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland.

The EU General Court of Justice press release described its decision as follows: In 2016 the Commission adopted a decision concerning two tax rulings issued by the Irish tax authorities (Irish Revenue) on 29 January 1991 and 23 May 2007 in favor of Apple Sales International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE), which were companies incorporated in Ireland but not tax resident in Ireland. The contested tax rulings endorsed the methods used by ASI and AOE to determine their chargeable profits in Ireland, relating to the trading activity of their respective Irish branches. The 1991 tax ruling remained in force until 2007, when it was replaced by the 2007 tax ruling. The 2007 tax ruling then remained in force until Apple’s new business structure was implemented in Ireland in 2014.

By its decision, the Commission considered that the tax rulings in question constituted State aid unlawfully put into effect by Ireland. The aid was declared incompatible with the internal market.
The Commission demanded the recovery of the aid in question. According to the Commission’s calculations, Ireland had granted Apple 13 billion euro in unlawful tax advantages.

By today’s judgment, the General Court annuls the contested decision because the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the General Court, the Commission was wrong to declare that ASI and AOE had been granted a selective economic advantage and, by extension, State aid.

The General Court endorses the Commission’s assessments relating to normal taxation under the Irish tax law applicable in the present instance, in particular having regard to the tools developed
within the OECD, such as the arm’s length principle, in order to check whether the level of chargeable profits endorsed by the Irish tax authorities corresponds to that which would have been obtained under market conditions.

However, the General Court considers that the Commission incorrectly concluded, in its primary line of reasoning, that the Irish tax authorities had granted ASI and AOE an advantage as a result of not having allocated the Apple Group intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE, and, consequently, all of ASI and AOE’s trading income, obtained from the Apple Group’s sales outside North and South America, to their Irish branches. According to the General Court, the Commission should have shown that that income represented the value of the activities actually carried out by the Irish branches themselves, in view of, inter alia, the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, on the one hand, and the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, on the other.

In addition, the General Court considers that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, methodological errors in the contested tax rulings which would
have led to a reduction in ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits in Ireland. Although the General Court regrets the incomplete and occasionally inconsistent nature of the contested tax rulings, the defects identified by the Commission are not, in themselves, sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

Furthermore, the General Court considers that the Commission did not prove, in its alternative line of reasoning, that the contested tax rulings were the result of discretion exercised by
the Irish tax authorities and that, accordingly, ASI and AOE had been granted a selective advantage.

The most relevant parts excerpted from the EU General Court’s decision follow [Apple State Aid CJEU decision 15 July 2020

2.      ASI and AOE

(a)    Company structure

3        Within the Apple Group, Apple Operations International is a fully owned subsidiary of Apple Inc. Apple Operations International fully owns the subsidiary Apple Operations Europe (AOE), which in turn fully owns the subsidiary Apple Sales International (ASI). ASI and AOE are both companies incorporated in Ireland, but are not tax resident in Ireland.

4        As stated in recitals 113 to 115 of the contested decision, a significant number of members of the boards of directors of AOE and ASI were directors employed by Apple Inc. and based in Cupertino. Excerpts from resolutions and minutes from annual general meetings and board meetings of ASI and AOE are reproduced in recital 115 (Tables 4 and 5) of that decision. The resolutions of the boards of directors concerned, inter alia, on a regular basis, the payment of dividends, the approval of directors’ reports, and the appointment and resignation of directors. Less frequently, those resolutions concerned the incorporation of subsidiaries and powers of attorney authorising certain directors to carry out various activities such as managing banking, relationships with governments and other public offices, audits, insurance, renting, purchase and sale of assets, taking delivery of goods, and commercial contracts.

(b)    The cost-sharing agreement

5        Apple Inc., on the one hand, and ASI and AOE, on the other, were bound by a cost-sharing agreement (‘the cost-sharing agreement’). The shared costs concerned, inter alia, the research and development (R&D) of technology incorporated in the Apple Group’s products. The initial cost-sharing agreement was signed in December 1980. The parties to that agreement were Apple Inc. (then Apple Computer Inc.) and AOE (then Apple Computer Ltd (ACL)). In 1999, ASI (then Apple Computer International) became a party to that agreement. During the period relevant to the investigation referred to in the contested decision, various amendments were made to the cost-sharing agreement, in order in particular to take into account changes in the applicable regulatory framework.

6        Under that agreement, the parties agreed to share the costs and the risks associated with the R&D concerning intangibles following development activities connected with the Apple Group’s products and services. The parties also agreed that Apple Inc. remained the official legal owner of the cost-shared intangibles, including the Apple Group’s intellectual property (‘IP’) rights. In addition, Apple Inc. granted ASI and AOE royalty-free licences enabling those companies, inter alia, to manufacture and sell the products concerned in the territory that had been assigned to them, that is to say, the world apart from North and South America. Furthermore, the parties to the agreement were required to bear the risks resulting from that agreement, the main risk being the obligation to pay the development costs relating to the Apple Group’s IP rights.

(c)    The marketing services agreement

7        In 2008, ASI concluded a marketing services agreement with Apple Inc., in connection with which Apple Inc. undertook to provide marketing services to ASI, including the creation, development and production of marketing strategies, programmes and advertising campaigns. ASI undertook to remunerate Apple Inc. for those services by payment of a fee corresponding to a percentage of the ‘reasonable costs incurred’ by Apple Inc. in relation to those services, plus a mark-up.

3.      The Irish branches

8        ASI and AOE set up Irish branches. AOE also had a branch in Singapore, which ceased its activities in 2009.

9        ASI’s Irish branch is responsible for, inter alia, carrying out procurement, sales and distribution activities associated with the sale of Apple-branded products to related parties and third-party customers in the regions covering Europe, the Middle East, India and Africa (EMEIA) and the Asia-Pacific region (APAC). Key functions within that branch include the procurement of Apple-branded finished products from third-party and related-party manufacturers, distribution activities associated with the sale of products to related parties in the EMEIA and APAC regions and with the sale of products to third-party customers in the EMEIA region, online sales, logistics operations, and operating an after-sales service. The European Commission stated (recital 55 of the contested decision) that many activities associated with distribution in the EMEIA region were carried out by related parties under service contracts.

10      AOE’s Irish branch is responsible for the manufacture and assembly of a specialised range of computer products in Ireland such as iMac desktops, MacBook laptops and other computer accessories, which it supplies to related parties for the EMEIA region. Key functions within that branch include production planning and scheduling, process engineering, production and operations, quality assurance and quality control, and refurbishing operations.

B.      The contested tax rulings

11      The Irish tax authorities adopted advance tax decisions, known as ‘tax rulings’, in relation to certain taxpayers who had made requests to that effect. By letters of 29 January 1991 and 23 May 2007 (collectively, ‘the contested tax rulings’), the Irish tax authorities indicated their agreement with the proposals made by the Apple Group’s representatives concerning the chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland. Those rulings are described in recitals 59 to 62 of the contested decision.

1.      The 1991 tax ruling

(a)    The tax base of ACL, AOE’s predecessor

12      By letter of 12 October 1990, addressed to the Irish tax authorities, the Apple Group’s tax advisors described ACL’s operations in Ireland, indicating the functions performed by its Irish branch established in Cork (Ireland). In addition, it was stated that the branch was the owner of the assets relating to the manufacturing activities, but that AOE retained ownership of the materials used, works in progress and finished products.

13      Following the letter from the Apple Group’s representatives to the Irish tax authorities of 16 January 1991 and the response from those authorities of 24 January 1991, those authorities confirmed, by letter of 29 January 1991, the terms proposed by the Apple Group, as described below. Thus, pursuant to those terms, confirmed by the Irish tax authorities, ACL’s chargeable profit in Ireland, relating to income from its Irish branch, was calculated on the basis of the following elements:

–        65% of that branch’s operating costs up to an annual amount of [confidential](1) and 20% of its operating costs in excess of [confidential];

–        if the overall profit of ACL’s Irish branch was less than the figure obtained using that formula, that lower figure was to be used to determine the branch’s net profit;

–        the operating costs to be taken into consideration for that calculation were to include all operating expenses, excluding materials for resale and cost-share for intangibles charged from companies affiliated with the Apple Group;

–        a capital allowance could be claimed, provided it did not exceed by [confidential] the depreciation charged in the relevant accounts.

(b)    The tax base of ACAL, ASI’s predecessor

14      By letter of 2 January 1991, the Apple Group’s tax advisors informed the Irish tax authorities of the existence of a new company, Apple Computer Accessories Ltd (ACAL), the Irish branch of which was described as being responsible for sourcing products intended for export from Irish manufacturers.

15      On 16 January 1991 the Apple Group’s representatives sent a letter to the Irish tax authorities summarising the terms of the agreement which had been concluded during a meeting between that group and those authorities on 3 January 1991 as regards ACAL’s chargeable profit. According to that letter, the calculation of the branch’s profit had to be based on a margin of 12.5% of operating costs (excluding materials for resale).

16      By letter of 29 January 1991, the Irish tax authorities confirmed the terms of the agreement as expressed in the letter of 16 January 1991.

2.      The 2007 tax ruling

17      By letter of 16 May 2007 addressed to the Irish tax authorities, the Apple Group’s tax advisors summarised their proposal for revising the method for determining the tax base of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE.

18      Regarding the Irish branch of ASI (the successor to Apple Computer International, itself the successor to ACAL), it was proposed that the chargeable profit to be allocated to that branch correspond to [confidential of its operating costs, excluding costs such as sums invoiced from affiliated companies within the Apple Group and material costs.

19      Regarding AOE’s Irish branch, the chargeable profit was to correspond to the sum of, on the one hand, an amount corresponding to [confidential] of the branch’s operating costs, excluding costs such as the sums invoiced from affiliated companies within the Apple Group and material costs, and, on the other, an amount corresponding to the IP return for the manufacturing process technology developed by that branch, namely [confidential] of that branch’s turnover. A deduction was to be allowed in respect of capital allowances for plant and buildings ‘computed and allowed in the normal manner’.

20      It was proposed that the terms of the future agreement enter into force with effect from 1 October 2007 for both branches, that those terms be applicable for five years if the circumstances remained unchanged, and that they be subsequently renewed on an annual basis. It was also stated that the agreement could be applied to any new entities that might be created or transformed within the Apple Group, provided their activities corresponded to those carried out by AOE, namely manufacturing in Ireland, and by ASI, namely activities not connected with manufacturing, such as sales and services in general.

21      By letter of 23 May 2007, the Irish tax authorities confirmed their agreement with all the proposals set out in the letter of 16 May 2007. That agreement was applied until the 2014 tax year.

2.      Identification of the reference framework and assessments concerning normal taxation under Irish law (part of the first and second pleas in law in Case T778/16 and first, second and fifth pleas in law in Case T892/16)

(a)    Reference framework

140    In recitals 227 to 243 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the relevant reference framework for its analysis of whether there was a selective advantage was the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit under the Irish corporate tax system, which have as their intrinsic objective the taxation of profit of all companies subject to tax in that Member State.

141    The Commission considered that that reference framework included both non-integrated and integrated companies because Irish corporation tax does not distinguish between those companies.

142    In addition, the Commission considered that even though resident and non-resident companies were taxed on different sources of income, in the light of the intrinsic objective of those rules, namely the taxation of profit of all companies subject to tax in Ireland, both types of company were in a comparable factual and legal situation. Consequently, those rules included section 25 of the TCA 97, which therefore could not be considered to constitute a separate reference framework in itself.

143    Ireland and ASI and AOE contest that definition of the reference framework and claim, in essence, that the relevant reference framework in the present instance is section 25 of the TCA 97, a separate charging provision applicable specifically to non-resident companies which are not in a situation comparable to that of resident companies. In addition, according to Ireland and ASI and AOE, the matter of whether an undertaking is integrated or non-integrated is not the issue in the present instance; instead, the issue is the taxation of non-resident companies.

144    It should be noted that, when analysing tax measures in the context of Article 107(1) TFEU, the determination of the reference framework is relevant for examining both the advantage condition and the selectivity condition.

145    As has been noted in paragraph 110 above, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage can be established only by comparison with so-called ‘normal’ taxation. It is precisely that so-called ‘normal’ taxation that is established by the reference framework.

146    In addition, in order to classify a domestic tax measure as selective, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining the ordinary or normal tax regime applicable in the Member State concerned (judgment of 8 September 2011, Paint Graphos and Others, C‑78/08 to C‑80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 49).

147    Moreover, the Court of Justice has confirmed its case-law according to which it is sufficient, in order to establish the selectivity of a measure that derogates from an ordinary tax system, to demonstrate that that measure benefits certain operators and not others, although all those operators are in an objectively comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by the ordinary tax system (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 76).

148    Indeed, while it is not always necessary, in order for it to be established that a tax measure is selective, that it should derogate from an ordinary tax system, the fact that it can be so characterised is highly relevant in that regard where the effect of that measure is that two categories of operators are distinguished and are subject, a priori, to different treatment, namely those who fall within the scope of the derogating measure and those who continue to fall within the scope of the ordinary tax system, although those two categories are in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by that system (judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 77).

149    In addition, the Court of Justice has held that the legislative means used are not a decisive element for the purpose of determining the reference framework (judgment of 28 June 2018, Lowell Financial Services v Commission, C‑219/16 P, not published, EU:C:2018:508, paragraphs 94 and 95).

150    It is apparent from case-law that it is the rules of taxation to which the recipient of the measure that is regarded as constituting State aid is subject that form the reference framework. It is also apparent from case-law that the substantive scope of the reference framework can be defined only in relation to the measure that is regarded as constituting State aid. Therefore, the purpose of the measures at issue and the legal framework of which they form part must be taken into consideration when determining the reference framework.

151    Moreover, the Commission explained its interpretation of the concept of reference framework in the notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU (OJ 2016 C 262, p. 1). Although that notice cannot bind the Court, it may nevertheless serve as a useful source of guidance (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2017, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑696/15 P, EU:C:2017:595, paragraph 53).

152    Paragraph 133 of the notice referred to in paragraph 151 above states, inter alia, that the reference system is composed of a consistent set of rules that generally apply — on the basis of objective criteria — to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective. Typically, those rules define not only the scope of the system, but also the conditions under which the system applies, the rights and obligations of undertakings that are subject to it and the technicalities of the way in which it functions.

153    Therefore, it is in the light of the foregoing considerations that the Court must assess whether the Commission correctly identified the relevant reference framework for examining the selectivity of the contested tax rulings.

154    In the present instance, upon reading the contested tax rulings, as described in paragraphs 11 to 21 above, it is clear that they were issued in order to allow ASI and AOE to determine their chargeable profits in Ireland for the purposes of corporation tax in that Member State.

155    Accordingly, the contested tax rulings form part of the general Irish corporation tax regime, the objective of which is to tax the chargeable profits of companies carrying on activities in Ireland, be they resident or non-resident, integrated or stand-alone.

156    It must be noted that, under that general Irish regime, according to the description — which is not contested by the parties — set out in recital 71 of the contested decision, corporation tax in Ireland is charged on the profits of companies (section 21(1) of the TCA 97). In addition, Ireland applies a different rate to trading income, non-trading income and capital gains. Section 21 of the TCA 97 sets the general rate of corporation tax at 12.5%. That rate applies to the trading income of companies taxed under the TCA 97, while non-trading income is taxed at a rate of 25% and capital gains are taxed at a rate of 33%. However, capital gains on disposals of certain shareholdings are subject to an exemption.

157    Moreover, as is stated in recital 72 of the contested decision, under section 26 of the TCA 97, resident companies are subject to corporation tax calculated on the basis of their worldwide profits and capital gains, excluding most distributions received from other companies resident in Ireland.

158    Lastly, under section 25 of the TCA 97, the wording of which is set out in recital 73 of the contested decision, a non-resident company is not to be within the charge to corporation tax unless it carries on a trade in Ireland through a branch or agency. If it does so, that company is to be taxed on all of its trading income arising directly or indirectly from the branch or agency and from the property or rights used by or held by or for the branch or agency as well as on capital gains attributable to the branch or agency.

159    Under section 25(1) of the TCA 97, non-resident companies are not to be taxed in Ireland unless they carry on a trade there through a branch or agency; if they do so, they must pay corporation tax on all of their chargeable profits. Section 25(2)(a) of the TCA 97 defines chargeable profits as any trading income arising directly or indirectly through or from the branch or agency, and any income from property or rights used by, or held by or for, the branch or agency.

160    Therefore, although the first part of the first sentence of section 25(1) of the TCA 97 could be understood as establishing a derogation from the normal taxation regime in favour of non-resident companies, the second part of that sentence makes that regime applicable to non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch, which must pay corporation tax on all of their chargeable profits. Thus, in accordance with that provision, those companies are also subject to the conditions for the application of corporation tax.

161    When seen from that perspective, resident and non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch are in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, namely the taxation of chargeable profits. The fact that the latter’s chargeable profits are specifically defined in section 25(2)(a) of the TCA 97 does not establish that section as the reference framework; rather, that provision is the legislative means used for the purpose of applying corporation tax to that category of company. As is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 148 and 149 above, the fact that, pursuant to those legislative means, one category of company is treated differently as compared with other companies does not mean that those two categories of company are not in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by that regime.

162    Therefore, the provisions concerning the chargeable profits of companies that are not resident in Ireland laid down in section 25 of the TCA 97 cannot in themselves constitute a specific regime that is separate from the ordinary rules. That provision in isolation is insufficient for the purpose of consistently applying corporation tax to those non-resident companies.

163    In those circumstances, it is appropriate to consider that the Commission did not err when it concluded that the reference framework in the present instance was the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit in Ireland, the intrinsic objective of which was the taxation of profit of all companies subject to tax in that Member State, and, consequently, that that framework included the provisions applicable to non-resident companies laid down in section 25 of the TCA 97.

164    Therefore, the complaints raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE concerning the reference framework defined in the contested decision must be rejected.

165    In view of the reference framework defined in the contested decision, namely the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit, which include, in particular, the provisions of section 25 of the TCA 97, it is necessary to analyse the complaints raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s interpretation of those provisions.

(b)    The Commission’s assessments concerning the normal taxation of profits under Irish tax law

166    In the contested decision (in particular in recitals 319 to 321 of that decision), as part of its primary line of reasoning, the Commission maintained that the fact that the Irish branches of ASI and AOE were not allocated the profits derived from the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE meant that the determination of the annual chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland departed from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle, with the result that the amount that would otherwise have been payable by ASI and AOE as corporation tax in Ireland was reduced.

167    The Commission’s analysis in this regard is based on the consideration, outlined in recitals 244 to 263 of the contested decision, that the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 for the purpose of allocating profits to a branch required the application of a profit allocation method which, under Article 107(1) TFEU, had to be based on the arm’s length principle. In addition, in recital 272 of the contested decision, the Commission referred to the Authorised OECD Approach when it stated that the profits to be allocated to a branch were the profits that that branch would have earned at arm’s length if it had been a separate and independent enterprise engaged in identical or similar activities under identical or similar conditions, taking into account the functions performed, the assets used, and the risks assumed by the company through its branch.

168    Ireland and ASI and AOE contest each element of the reasoning described in paragraphs 166 and 167 above.

169    First, Ireland and ASI and AOE take issue with the Commission’s application of section 25 of the TCA 97 in connection with its primary line of reasoning in so far as it complained, in essence, that the Irish tax authorities had not required all of ASI and AOE’s profits to be allocated to their Irish branches.

170    Secondly, Ireland and ASI and AOE dispute that Article 107 TFEU gives rise to an arm’s length principle as relied on by the Commission in its reasoning and, consequently, argue that no such principle is applicable in Ireland.

171    Thirdly, Ireland and ASI and AOE submit that the Authorised OECD Approach does not apply to Irish tax law. They argue that, in any event, even if it were assumed that the Authorised OECD Approach could be applied in the present instance, the Commission was wrong to conclude, on the basis of that approach, that the profits relating to the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE should have been allocated to their Irish branches.

172    Therefore, it is necessary to examine, first, the complaints raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE concerning the application of section 25 of the TCA 97, then, the matter of whether the Commission was entitled to rely on an arm’s length principle arising from Article 107 TFEU in its analysis and, lastly, the application in the present instance of the Authorised OECD Approach.

(1)    Application of section 25 of the TCA 97 (part of the second plea in law in Case T778/16 and of the first plea in law in Case T892/16)

173    In the present instance, it is not in dispute that:

–        ASI and AOE are companies that are incorporated in Ireland but which are not considered to be tax resident in Ireland, as the Commission acknowledged in recital 50 of the contested decision;

–        section 25 of the TCA 97 contains provisions that apply specifically to non-resident companies under which, where a non-resident company carries on a trade in Ireland through a branch, that company is to be taxed, inter alia, on all of its trading income arising directly or indirectly from the branch;

–        the non-resident companies ASI and AOE carried on a trade in Ireland through their respective branches.

174    Therefore, it is necessary to analyse whether the Commission was entitled to consider that, under section 25 of the TCA 97, when determining ASI and AOE’s profits in Ireland, the Irish tax authorities should have allocated the Apple Group’s IP licences to the Irish branches of those two companies.

175    Under Irish tax law, and in particular under section 25 of the TCA 97, in the case of non-resident companies carrying on their trade in Ireland through a branch, only the profits derived from trade directly or indirectly attributable to that Irish branch, on the one hand, and all income from property or rights used by, or held by or for, the branch, on the other, are taxable.

176    It is true, as the Commission correctly points out and as Ireland and ASI and AOE acknowledge, that section 25 of the TCA 97 does not lay down any specific method enabling it to be established which profits are directly or indirectly attributable to the Irish branches of non-resident companies and makes no reference to the arm’s length principle for the purposes of that attribution.

177    Nevertheless, it is clear that section 25 of the TCA 97 relates only to the profits derived from trade that the Irish branches have carried on themselves and excludes profits derived from trade carried on by other parts of the non-resident company in question.

178    Ireland and ASI and AOE submit that that taxation mechanism precludes, in principle, an approach in which the entirety of the non-resident company’s profits are examined and, to the extent that those profits cannot be allocated to other parts of that company, are allocated by default to the Irish branches (an ‘exclusion’ approach).

179    In that regard, Ireland and ASI and AOE rely on the opinion of an expert in Irish law, the relevance of which is not contested as such by the Commission. According to that opinion, when determining the chargeable profits of non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through their Irish branches, the relevant analysis for the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 must cover the actual activities of those Irish branches and the value of the activities actually carried out by the branches themselves. That opinion is based, inter alia, on the judgment of the High Court, Ireland, in S. Murphy (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dataproducts (Dub.) Ltd. [1988] I. R. 10 note 4507 (‘the judgment in Dataproducts’). The judgment in Dataproducts was also relied on as precedent both in support of the arguments of Ireland and Apple Inc. during the administrative procedure and in support of the arguments of Ireland and ASI and AOE in the present dispute.

180    It is apparent from the judgment in Dataproducts that the profits derived from property that is controlled by a non-resident company cannot be regarded as such as being profits attributable to the Irish branch of that company even if that property has been made available to that branch.

181    Similarly, it is apparent from that judgment that property belonging to a company that is not resident in Ireland and controlled by the executives of that company, who are also not resident in Ireland, cannot be allocated to that company’s Irish branch, even if that property is made available to that branch. In so far as the staff and directors of the Irish branch did not have control of the property in question, the income from that property could not be attributed to that branch for the purposes of taxation in Ireland. That remains the case even where it is only the Irish branch that has employees and physical property and the non-resident company has no physical property, employees or business activities other than those of the Irish branch. The non-resident company with no employees was considered to control that property through its management bodies.

182    Therefore, it is clear from the judgment in Dataproducts that the question that is relevant when determining the profits of the branch is whether the Irish branch has control of that property.

183    In the present instance, as has been stated in paragraphs 37 to 40 above, in its primary line of reasoning the Commission contended, in essence, that where the profits from trading activity were derived from the Apple Group’s IP, the licences for which were held by ASI and AOE, those profits should have been allocated to the Irish branches in so far as those companies had no physical presence or employees outside those branches and, therefore, were unable to control those licences.

184    In the light of the judgment in Dataproducts, when determining which profits are attributable to the Irish branch of a company that is not tax resident for the purposes of section 25 of the TCA 97, the property held by that company cannot be allocated to the Irish branch if it has not been established that that property is actually controlled by that branch. In addition, it is apparent from that judgment that the fact that the non-resident company has neither employees nor any physical presence outside the Irish branch is not in itself a decisive factor preventing the conclusion that it is that company which controls that property.

185    If the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE were not controlled by the Irish branches, it would be wrong to allocate all of the income generated by the companies arising from those licences to those branches under section 25 of the TCA 97. Only the profit derived from the trading activity of the Irish branches, including that carried on on the basis of the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE, should be regarded as relating to the activities of those branches.

186    It follows from the foregoing that, when it considered that the Apple Group’s IP licences should have been allocated to the Irish branches in so far as ASI and AOE were regarded as having neither the employees nor the physical presence to manage them, the Commission allocated profits using an ‘exclusion’ approach, which is inconsistent with section 25 of the TCA 97. In its primary line of reasoning, the Commission did not attempt to show that the Irish branches of ASI and AOE had in fact controlled the Apple Group’s IP licences when it concluded that the Irish tax authorities should have allocated the Apple Group’s IP licences to those branches and that, consequently, under section 25 of the TCA 97, all of ASI and AOE’s trading income should have been regarded as arising from the activities of those branches.

187    In those circumstances, it should be held that, as Ireland and ASI and AOE rightly argue in their complaints in the second plea in law in Case T‑778/16 and in the first plea in law in Case T‑892/16, the Commission erred, in its primary line of reasoning, in its assessment of the provisions of Irish tax law relating to the taxation of the profits of companies that are not resident in Ireland but which carry on a trade there through a branch.

188    As the Commission’s primary line of reasoning is based on a series of assessments concerning the normal taxation of profits under Irish tax law, it is necessary to go on to examine the arguments raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE regarding the other inherent aspects of those assessments.

(2)    The arm’s length principle (part of the first and third pleas in law in Case T778/16 and of the first and second pleas in law in Case T892/16)

189    In essence, Ireland and ASI and AOE, supported in that regard by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, submit that the arm’s length principle is not part of Irish tax law and that no freestanding obligation to apply that principle emerges from Article 107 TFEU, any other provision of EU law, or the judgment of 22 June 2006, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission (C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, EU:C:2006:416). Ireland submits that, in any event, the Commission itself applied the principle inconsistently in so far as it failed to take into consideration the economic reality, structure and particular features of the Apple Group.

190    The Commission, supported in that regard by the Republic of Poland and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, disputes those arguments and contends, in essence, that the method used to determine the chargeable profits under section 25 of the TCA 97 must produce a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and, therefore, an approximation based on the arm’s length principle, which would have been applied by the Irish tax authorities in the past when applying double taxation treaties.

191    It is therefore necessary to examine, in the first place, whether the Commission was entitled to rely on the arm’s length principle in order to determine whether there was a selective advantage and, if so, in the second place, whether the Commission correctly applied that principle in its primary line of reasoning.

(i)    Whether the Commission was entitled to rely on the arm’s length principle in order to determine whether there was a selective advantage

192    First, it should be borne in mind that, in recitals 244 to 248 of the contested decision, the Commission maintained that, in so far as section 25 of the TCA 97 did not state how the chargeable profits of an Irish branch were to be determined, that provision had to be applied by using a profit allocation method.

193    Secondly, in recital 249 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that, according to the judgment of 22 June 2006, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission (C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, EU:C:2006:416), a reduction in the taxable base that resulted from a tax measure that enabled a taxpayer to employ transfer prices in intra-group transactions that did not resemble prices which would have been charged in conditions of free competition between independent undertakings negotiating under comparable circumstances at arm’s length conferred a selective advantage on that taxpayer for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

194    In addition, in recitals 251 and 252 of the contested decision, the Commission specified that the purpose of the arm’s length principle was to ensure that transactions between integrated group companies are treated for tax purposes by reference to the amount of profit that would have arisen if the same transactions had been carried out by non-integrated stand-alone companies. Otherwise, integrated group companies would benefit from favourable treatment under the ordinary rules of taxation. According to the Commission, in the judgment of 22 June 2006, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission (C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, EU:C:2006:416), the Court of Justice endorsed the arm’s length principle as a benchmark for establishing whether an integrated group company received a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU as a result of a tax measure that determined its transfer pricing and thus its taxable base.

195    Thirdly, in recital 255 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the same principle applied to the internal dealings of different parts of a single integrated company, such as a branch that transacts with other parts of the company to which it belongs. According to the Commission, to ensure that a profit allocation method endorsed by a tax ruling does not confer a selective advantage on a non-resident company operating through a branch in Ireland, that method must generate a chargeable profit that is a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle. In recital 256 of the contested decision, it added that it applied the arm’s length principle not as a basis for ‘imposing’ taxes that would otherwise not be due under the reference framework, but as a benchmark to verify whether the chargeable profit of a branch was determined in a manner that ensured that it was not granted favourable treatment as compared with non-integrated companies whose chargeable profits reflected prices negotiated at arm’s length on the market.

196    Fourthly, with regard to the legal basis of that principle, the Commission stated in recital 255 of the contested decision that it did not directly apply Article 7(2) or Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention or the guidance provided by the OECD on profit allocation or transfer pricing, which were non-binding but which nonetheless constituted useful guidance on how to ensure that transfer pricing and profit allocation arrangements produce outcomes in line with market conditions.

197    In addition, in recital 257 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the arm’s length principle that it applied was derived from Article 107(1) TFEU, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, which was binding on the Member States and from the scope of which national tax rules were not excluded. It noted that that principle therefore applied regardless of whether the Member State in question had incorporated that principle in its national legal system.

198    The Commission concluded from this, in recitals 258 and 259 of the contested decision, that, if it could be shown that the profit allocation methods endorsed in the contested tax rulings resulted in a chargeable profit for ASI and AOE in Ireland that departed from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle, those rulings had to be considered to confer a selective advantage, in so far as they had led to a lowering of the amount of corporation tax payable in Ireland as compared with non-integrated companies whose taxable base was determined by the profits they generated under market conditions.

199    It should be emphasised at the outset that, as is apparent from, inter alia, recitals 258 and 259 of the contested decision, referred to in paragraph 198 above, the Commission relied on the arm’s length principle in its analysis of whether the contested tax rulings gave rise to a selective advantage, in particular in its primary line of reasoning.

200    In addition, it should be borne in mind, as has been stated in paragraph 163 above, that the reference framework that was relevant for the analysis of the advantage condition in the present instance was the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit in Ireland, the intrinsic objective of which was the taxation of profit of all companies subject to tax in that Member State, and, consequently, that that reference framework included the provisions applicable to non-resident companies laid down in section 25 of the TCA 97.

201    It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Commission was entitled to use the arm’s length principle to analyse in, inter alia, its primary line of reasoning whether the allocation of profits to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, as endorsed in the contested tax rulings, had conferred a selective advantage on those companies.

202    In the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation (judgment of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C‑88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 56). Consequently, such a measure confers an economic advantage on its recipient where it mitigates the burdens normally included in the budget of an undertaking and, as a result, without being a subsidy in the strict meaning of the word, is similar in character and has the same effect (judgment of 9 October 2014, Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia, C‑522/13, EU:C:2014:2262, paragraph 22).

203    Accordingly, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, it is necessary to compare the recipient’s situation resulting from the application of the measure in question with its situation had the measure in question not been adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2018, Cellnex Telecom and Telecom Castilla-La Mancha v Commission, C‑91/17 P and C‑92/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:284, paragraph 114) and had the normal rules of taxation been applied.

204    In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the dispute in the present instance centres around the taxation of companies that are not tax resident in Ireland and which carry on a trade in that State through their Irish branches. The issue therefore lies in determining what profits must be allocated to those branches for corporation tax purposes as part of ‘normal’ taxation, taking into account the normal rules of taxation applicable in the present instance, as referred to in paragraph 200 above, which include the provisions that apply to non-resident companies set out in section 25 of the TCA 97.

205    Therefore, the question that is relevant in the present instance is not linked to the prices of intra-group transactions within a group of undertakings, as was the situation in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 24 September 2019, Netherlands and Others v Commission (T‑760/15 and T‑636/16, EU:T:2019:669).

206    It is true that the allocation of profits to a branch of a company may lend itself to the application by analogy of the principles applicable to the prices of intra-group transactions within a group of undertakings. In the same way as the prices of intra-group transactions between companies integrated in a single group of undertakings are not determined under market conditions, the allocation of profits to a branch of a single company is not carried out under market conditions.

207    However, in order for those principles to be applied by analogy, it must be clear from national tax law that the profits derived from the activities of the branches of non-resident undertakings should be taxed as if they resulted from the economic activities of stand-alone undertakings operating under market conditions.

208    In that regard, in the second place, it should be borne in mind that, as has been stated in paragraph 161 above, from the perspective of the conditions for the application of the corporation tax regime in Ireland, under section 25 of the TCA 97, both resident companies, on the one hand, and non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch, on the other, are in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, namely taxing the chargeable profits of those companies, be they resident or non-resident.

209    In addition, as has been noted in paragraph 179 above, when determining the chargeable profits of non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through their Irish branches, the relevant analysis for the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 must cover the actual activities of those Irish branches and the value of the activities actually carried out by the branches themselves.

210    Moreover, it should be noted that, when questioned explicitly on this point in a written question put by the Court and orally at the hearing, Ireland confirmed that, for the purposes of the application of section 25 of the TCA 97, as referred to in paragraph 209 above, the value of the activities actually carried out by the branches is to be determined according to the value of that type of activity on the market.

211    Accordingly, under Irish tax law, the profit resulting from the trading activity of such a branch is to be taxed as if it were determined under market conditions.

212    In those circumstances, when the Commission examines, in connection with the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a tax measure concerning the chargeable profits of a non-resident company carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch, it may compare the tax burden of such a non-resident company resulting from the application of that tax measure with the tax burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under national law to a resident company, placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions.

213    Those findings are borne out, mutatis mutandis, by the judgment of 22 June 2006, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission (C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, EU:C:2006:416), as the Commission correctly pointed out in the contested decision. The case that gave rise to that judgment concerned Belgian tax law, which provided for integrated companies and stand-alone companies to be treated on equal terms. The Court of Justice recognised in paragraph 95 of that judgment the need to compare a regime of derogating aid with the ordinary rules ‘based on the difference between profits and outgoings of an undertaking carrying on its activities in conditions of free competition’.

214    Thus, although, through the tax measure concerning the chargeable profits of a non-resident company carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch, national authorities have accepted a certain level of profit attributable to that branch, Article 107(1) TFEU allows the Commission to check whether that level of profit corresponds to the level that would have been obtained through carrying on that trade under market conditions, in order to determine whether there is, as a result, any mitigation of the burdens normally included in the budget of the undertaking concerned, thus conferring on that undertaking an advantage for the purposes of that provision. The arm’s length principle, as described by the Commission in the contested decision, is thus a tool enabling the Commission to make that determination in the exercise of its powers under Article 107(1) TFEU.

215    Moreover, the Commission rightly noted, in recital 256 of the contested decision, that the arm’s length principle served as a ‘benchmark’ for verifying whether the chargeable profit of a branch of a non-resident company was determined, for the purposes of corporation tax, in a manner that ensured that non-resident companies operating through a branch in Ireland were not granted favourable treatment as compared with resident stand-alone companies whose chargeable profits reflected prices negotiated at arm’s length on the market.

216    In the third place, it should also be stated that when the Commission uses that tool to check whether the chargeable profit of a non-resident company carrying on a trade in Ireland through a branch pursuant to a tax measure corresponds to a reliable approximation of a chargeable profit generated under market conditions, it can identify an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU only if the variation between the two comparables goes beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the methodology used to obtain that approximation.

217    In the fourth place, it is true, as Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, that when the contested tax rulings were issued in 1991 and 2007 respectively, the arm’s length principle had not been incorporated into Irish tax law either directly, notably by incorporating the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, adopted by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD on 27 June 1995 and revised on 22 July 2010 (‘the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’), or by incorporating the Authorised OECD Approach for the purposes of allocating profits to branches of non-resident companies.

218    Nevertheless, even though that principle had not been formally incorporated into Irish law, as has been stated in paragraphs 210 above, Ireland confirmed that the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 by the Irish tax authorities required the actual activities of the Irish branches in question to be identified and the value of those activities to be determined according to the market value of that type of activity.

219    In addition, it must be pointed out that it is apparent from the judgment of the High Court in Belville Holdings v. Cronin [1985] I. R. 465, which is relied on by the Commission in its written response to the questions put by the Court, and the scope of which was debated by the parties at the hearing, that, as early as 1984, it was the position of the Irish tax authorities that, where the declared value of a transaction between associated undertakings did not correspond to the value that would have been negotiated on the open market, that value had to be adjusted so that it did correspond to the market value. That approach, which was endorsed in principle by the High Court, involved adjustments equivalent to those proposed on the basis of the arm’s length principle, in particular in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

220    Moreover, as the Commission rightly pointed out, the arm’s length principle was included in the double taxation treaties signed by Ireland with the United States of America and with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in order to resolve situations of potential double taxation. Thus, those treaties determine the profits that each State that is a party to those treaties may tax when a company established in one of those States carries on a trade in the other State through a permanent establishment. Therefore, it must be concluded that, at least in its bilateral relations with those States, Ireland agreed to apply the arm’s length principle in order to avoid taxpayers being subject to double taxation.

221    In the fifth place, as is correctly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE, the Commission cannot, however, contend that there is a freestanding obligation to apply the arm’s length principle arising from Article 107 TFEU obliging Member States to apply that principle horizontally and in all areas of their national tax law.

222    In the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it falls within the competence of the Member States to designate bases of assessment and to spread the tax burden across the different factors of production and economic sectors (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 97).

223    Although it is true that this does not mean that each tax measure affecting, inter alia, the basis of assessment taken into account by the tax authorities is exempt from the application of Article 107 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraphs 103 and 104), the fact remains that, at the current stage of development of EU law, the Commission does not have the power independently to determine what constitutes the ‘normal’ taxation of an integrated undertaking while disregarding the national rules of taxation.

224    Nevertheless, although so-called ‘normal’ taxation is to be determined according to the national tax rules and in spite of the fact that those rules must be used as a reference point when establishing the very existence of an advantage, the fact remains that, if those national rules provide that the branches of non-resident companies, as concerns the profits derived from those branches’ trading activity in Ireland, and resident companies are to be subject to the same conditions of taxation, Article 107(1) TFEU gives the Commission the right to check whether the level of profit allocated to the branches that has been accepted by the national authorities for the purpose of determining the chargeable profits of those non-resident companies corresponds to the level of profit that would have been obtained if that activity had been carried on under market conditions.

225    In those circumstances, it is necessary to reject the arguments of Ireland and ASI and AOE put forward in the first plea in law in Case T‑778/16 and in the first and second pleas in law in Case T‑892/16, inasmuch as they complain that, in the present instance, the Commission, in view of the Irish tax authorities’ application of section 25 of the TCA 97, checked, by reference to the arm’s length principle — which, according to the contested decision, the Commission used as a tool — whether the level of profit allocated to the branches for their trade in Ireland, as accepted in the contested tax rulings, corresponded to the level of profit that would have been obtained through carrying on that trade under market conditions.

(ii) Whether the Commission correctly applied the arm’s length principle in its primary line of reasoning

226    In Ireland’s third plea in law in Case T‑778/16, it claims that the Commission’s own application of the arm’s length principle in its primary line of reasoning was inconsistent because it failed to take into account the economic reality, structure and particular features of the Apple Group.

227    In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind what has been stated in paragraphs 209 and 210 above, namely that, when determining the chargeable profits of non-resident companies carrying on a trade in Ireland through their Irish branches, the relevant analysis for the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 must cover the actual activities of those branches and the market value of the activities actually carried out by the branches themselves.

228    In its primary line of reasoning, the Commission concluded that the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE should have been allocated to the Irish branches due to the lack of staff and physical presence of those two companies, without attempting to show that that allocation followed from the activities actually carried on by those Irish branches. In addition, the Commission inferred from that conclusion that all of the trading income of ASI and AOE should have been regarded as arising from the activities of the Irish branches without attempting to show that that income was representative of the value of the activities actually carried out by the branches themselves.

229    In those circumstances, it must be held that the arguments raised by Ireland in the third plea in law in Case T‑778/16, inasmuch as they contest the Commission’s conclusions in its primary line of reasoning based on the arm’s length principle, are well founded.

230    For the reasons set out in paragraph 188 above, it will be necessary to go on to examine the arguments raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s assessments in its primary line of reasoning concerning the Authorised OECD Approach.

(3)    The Authorised OECD Approach (part of the second and fourth pleas in law in Case T778/16 and fifth plea in law in Case T892/16)

231    In essence, Ireland and ASI and AOE submit that the Authorised OECD Approach does not form part of the Irish tax system and, in particular, does not apply in the context of the taxation of non-resident companies provided for in section 25 of the TCA 97. That provision is not based on the Authorised OECD Approach. Moreover, Ireland and ASI and AOE submit that, even if it is assumed that the allocation of chargeable profits under section 25 of the TCA 97 should have been carried out in accordance with the Authorised OECD Approach, the Commission misapplied that approach inasmuch as it failed to examine the functions actually performed within the Irish branches of ASI and AOE.

232    It is therefore necessary to examine, in the first place, whether the Commission was entitled to rely on the Authorised OECD Approach when it verified whether there was a selective advantage and, if so, in the second place, whether the Commission correctly applied that approach in its primary line of reasoning.

(i)    Whether the Commission was entitled to rely on the Authorised OECD Approach

233    As has been stated in paragraph 202 above, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation, as this allows it to be verified whether those measures lead to a reduction in the tax burden on the recipients of the measures in question as compared with the burden that those recipients would normally have had to bear had the measures not been adopted.

234    Accordingly, it is Irish tax law that the Commission should have used for its comparison to verify whether the contested tax rulings had created an advantage and whether that advantage was selective.

235    As is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraph 195 above, the Commission explicitly stated in recital 255 of the contested decision that it did not directly apply Article 7(2) or Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention or the guidance provided by the OECD on profit allocation or transfer pricing. Further, as has been pointed out in paragraph 217 above, the Authorised OECD Approach has not been incorporated into Irish tax law.

236    However, even though the Commission was entitled to observe that it cannot be formally bound by the principles developed within the OECD and, more specifically, by the Authorised OECD Approach, the fact remains that, in its primary line of reasoning, in particular in recitals 265 to 270 of the contested decision, it relied, in essence, on the Authorised OECD Approach when it considered that profit allocation within a company involved allocating assets, functions and risks among the various parts of that company. Moreover, the Commission itself refers directly to the Authorised OECD Approach when substantiating its considerations, for example in footnote 186 of the contested decision.

237    In that regard, it should be noted that the Authorised OECD Approach is an approach that is based on work carried out by groups of experts and which reflects international consensus regarding profit allocation to permanent establishments. It is, therefore, certainly of practical significance when interpreting questions relating to that profit allocation, as the Commission acknowledged in recital 79 of the contested decision.

238    Moreover, it should be borne in mind, as Ireland itself acknowledged in paragraph 123 of its application without being challenged in that regard by the Commission, that, when applying section 25 of the TCA 97 it is necessary to look at the facts and circumstances of the branches in Ireland, including the functions performed, the assets used and the risks assumed by the branches. In addition, it should also be borne in mind that, when questioned specifically on that point in a written question put by the Court and orally at the hearing, Ireland confirmed that, in order to determine the profits to be allocated to branches for the purposes of section 25 of the TCA 97, it was necessary to carry out an objective analysis of the facts that included, first, identifying the ‘activities’ performed by the branch, the assets it uses for its activities, including intangibles such as IP, and the related risks that it assumes and, second, determining the value of that type of activity on the market.

239    Contrary to what is claimed by Ireland in its arguments concerning the differences between section 25 of the TCA 97 and the Authorised OECD Approach, it is clear that there is essentially some overlap between the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 as described by Ireland and the functional and factual analysis conducted as part of the first step of the analysis proposed by the Authorised OECD Approach.

240    In those circumstances, the Commission cannot be criticised for having relied, in essence, on the Authorised OECD Approach when it considered that, for the purposes of applying section 25 of the TCA 97, the allocation of profits to the Irish branch of a non-resident company had to take into account the allocation of assets, functions and risks between the branch and the other parts of that company.

(ii) Whether the Commission correctly applied the Authorised OECD Approach in its primary line of reasoning

241    Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, in essence, that the Commission’s primary line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Authorised OECD Approach, inasmuch as the Commission considered that the profits relating to the Apple Group’s IP licences should necessarily have been allocated to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, in so far as the executives of ASI and AOE did not perform active or critical functions with regard to the management of those licences.

242    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Authorised OECD Approach as described, inter alia, in recitals 88 and 89 of the contested decision, the aim of the analysis in the first step is to identify the assets, functions and risks that must be allocated to the permanent establishment of a company on the basis of the activities actually performed by that company. It is true that the analysis in that first step cannot be carried out in an abstract manner that ignores the activities and functions performed within the company as a whole. However, the fact that the Authorised OECD Approach requires an analysis of the functions actually performed within the permanent establishment is at odds with the approach adopted by the Commission consisting, first, in identifying the functions performed by the company as a whole without conducting a more detailed analysis of the functions actually performed by the branches and, second, in presuming that the functions had been performed by the permanent establishment when those functions could not be allocated to the head office of the company itself.

243    In its primary line of reasoning the Commission considered, in essence, that the profits of ASI and AOE relating to the Apple Group’s IP (which, according to the Commission’s line of argument, represented a very significant part of the total profit of those two companies) had to be allocated to the Irish branches in so far as ASI and AOE had no employees capable of managing that IP outside those branches, without, however, establishing that the Irish branches had performed those management functions.

244    Accordingly, as Ireland and ASI and AOE rightly argue, the approach followed by the Commission in its primary line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Authorised OECD Approach.

245    In those circumstances, as is rightly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE in their complaints in the second and fourth pleas in law in Case T‑778/16 and in the fifth plea in law in Case T‑892/16, it must be found that the Commission erred in its application, in its primary line of reasoning, of the functional and factual analysis of the activities performed by the branches of ASI and AOE, on which the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 by the Irish tax authorities is based and which corresponds, in essence, to the analysis provided for by the Authorised OECD Approach.

(4)    Conclusions regarding the identification of the reference framework and the assessments of normal taxation under Irish law

246    In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that the Commission did not err when it identified as the reference framework in the present instance the ordinary rules of taxation of corporate profit, which include, in particular, the provisions of section 25 of the TCA 97.

247    In addition, the Commission did not err when it relied on the arm’s length principle as a tool in order to check whether, in the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 by the Irish tax authorities, the level of profit allocated to the branches for their trading activity in Ireland as accepted in the contested tax rulings corresponded to the level of profit that would have been obtained by carrying on that trading activity under market conditions.

248    Moreover, the Commission cannot be criticised for having relied, in essence, on the Authorised OECD Approach when it considered that, for the purposes of applying section 25 of the TCA 97, the allocation of profits to the Irish branch of a non-resident company had to take into account the allocation of assets, functions and risks between the branch and the other parts of that company.

249    However, it must be found that, in its primary line of reasoning, the Commission made errors concerning the application of, first, section 25 of the TCA 97, as has been stated in paragraph 187 above, second, the arm’s length principle, as has been stated in paragraph 229 above, and, third, the Authorised OECD Approach, as has been stated in paragraphs 244 and 245 above. In those circumstances, it is appropriate to conclude that the Commission’s primary line of reasoning was based on erroneous assessments of normal taxation under the Irish tax law applicable in the present instance.

250    For the sake of completeness, it will, however, be necessary to go on to examine the complaints raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s factual assessments concerning the activities within the Apple Group.

3.      The Commission’s assessments concerning the activities within the Apple Group (first plea in law in Case T778/16 and third and fourth pleas in law in Case T892/16)

251    As has been stated in paragraph 177 above, section 25 of the TCA 97 relates to the profits derived from trade that the Irish branches have carried on themselves. In addition, it should be borne in mind that, as has been stated in paragraph 238 above, when applying section 25 of the TCA 97, it is necessary to look at the facts and circumstances of the branches in Ireland, including the functions performed, the assets used and the risks assumed by the branches.

252    Moreover, the Commission itself emphasised in recitals 91 and 92 of the contested decision that, when dealing with the issue of the allocation of intangible property, such as IP, to permanent establishments, the Authorised OECD Approach relies on the concept of significant people functions related to the management of the property in question and decision-making, in particular with regard to the development of the intangible property.

253    It is therefore appropriate to examine the complaints raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE in the first plea in law in Case T‑778/16 and in the third and fourth pleas in law in Case T‑892/16 regarding the Commission’s factual assessments concerning the activities within the Apple Group.

254    Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, in essence, that the activities and functions performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, identified by the Commission, represented only a tiny part of their economic activity and their profits and that, in any event, those activities and functions included neither management nor strategic decision-making concerning the development or marketing of the IP. Rather, Ireland and ASI and AOE submit that all strategic decisions, in particular those concerning product design and development, were taken following an overall commercial strategy determined in Cupertino and implemented by the two companies in question through their management bodies and, in any event, outside the Irish branches. Consequently, there is no justification for allocating the Apple Group’s IP licences to the Irish branches.

(a)    Activities of ASI’s Irish branch

255    As has been stated in paragraph 9 above, ASI’s Irish branch is responsible for, inter alia, carrying out procurement, sales and distribution activities associated with the sale of Apple-branded products to related parties and third-party customers in the areas covering the EMEIA and APAC regions.

256    In recitals 289 and 290 of the contested decision, the Commission referred to product quality control, R&D facilities management and business risk as being functions that necessarily had to be allocated to the Irish branches given that, outside those branches, ASI and AOE had no staff capable of carrying out those functions.

257    More specifically, the Commission emphasised that, in so far as the Irish branch of ASI was authorised to distribute Apple-branded products, its activities necessitated access to that brand, which was granted to ASI as a whole in the form of the Apple Group’s IP licences (recital 296 of the contested decision).

258    The Commission then asserted that ASI’s Irish branch performed a number of functions crucial for the development and maintenance of the Apple brand on the local market and for ensuring customer loyalty to that brand in that market. By way of example, it stated that ASI’s Irish branch had incurred local marketing costs directly with marketing service providers (recital 297 of the contested decision). In addition, ASI’s Irish branch was responsible for gathering and analysing regional data to estimate the expected demand forecast for Apple-branded products (recital 298 of the contested decision). Moreover, the Commission highlighted the fact that there were [confidential] full-time equivalent employees (‘FTEs’) categorised as R&D personnel based in Ireland (recital 300 of the contested decision).

259    First, with regard to the ‘exclusion’ approach to allocation adopted by the Commission in recitals 289 to 295 of the contested decision, which involved attributing to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE the quality control, R&D facilities management and business risk management functions solely on the basis that ASI and AOE had no staff outside their Irish branches, it is necessary to recall the considerations set out in paragraphs 243 and 244 above, which states that such an approach is inconsistent with Irish law and with the Authorised OECD Approach. The Commission did not succeed, by that reasoning, in showing that those functions had actually been carried out by the Irish branches.

260    In order to substantiate its assessment, the Commission relies on Exhibit B to the cost-sharing agreement as amended in 2009 which includes two tables, reproduced in Figures 8 and 9 of the contested decision (recital 122 of the contested decision), concerning all of the relevant functions relating to intangible property subject to the agreement in question and the related risks. Each of those functions and risks has an ‘x’ next to it in the columns for, respectively, Apple Inc. (identified as ‘Apple’) and ASI and AOE (identified collectively as ‘International Participant’), except for IP Registration and Defence, which is solely associated with Apple Inc.

261    In respect of the intangible property that is subject to the cost-sharing agreement, that is to say essentially all of the Apple Group’s IP, the functions listed in Exhibit B to that agreement cover R&D, quality control, forecasting, financial planning and analysis in relation to development activities, R&D facilities management, contracting with related parties or third parties in relation to development activities, contract administration in relation to development activities, selection, hiring and supervision of employees, contractors and subcontractors to perform development activities, IP registration and defence, and market development.

262    The risks listed in Exhibit B to the cost-sharing agreement relating to all of the Apple Group’s IP include, inter alia, product development risk, product quality risk, market development risk, product liability risk, fixed and tangible asset risk, IP protection and infringement risk, brand development and recognition risk, and risks related to changes in regulatory regimes.

263    As Apple Inc. claimed in the administrative procedure and as ASI and AOE have argued before the Court, it is apparent from the exhibit in question that it lists the functions that the parties to the cost-sharing agreement were authorised to perform and the associated risks that they might have been required to assume. However, the Commission provided no evidence to show that ASI or AOE, let alone their Irish branches, had actually performed any of those functions.

264    In addition, with regard to those functions and risks, the Commission contends that it is ‘clear’ that, with no employees outside their Irish branches, ASI and AOE would not have been able to monitor such risks. However, the Commission provides no evidence that demonstrates that the staff of the branches in question actually performed those functions and managed those risks.

265    Moreover, Ireland — supported in this regard by Apple Inc. in the administrative procedure and by ASI and AOE before the Court — claimed that ASI’s branch had had no staff until 2012, before which all of the staff had been employed by the Irish branch of AOE. That information is stated in recital 109 of the contested decision and was confirmed during the hearing. If the Commission’s argument that ASI would not have been able to perform such functions outside its branch given its lack of staff had to be followed, this would mean that, for a large part of the period covered by the Commission’s examination, ASI’s Irish branch, which also had no staff, would have been equally unable to perform those functions.

266    In the same vein, the Commission relies on the fact that ASI’s board of directors would not have been in a position to perform those functions or assume those risks purely through occasional board meetings. However, the Commission did not attempt to establish that the management bodies of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE had actually actively managed, on a day-to-day basis, all of the functions and risks relating to the Apple Group’s IP listed in Exhibit B to the cost-sharing agreement.

267    Lastly, it can be concluded that the activities and risks listed in Exhibit B to the cost-sharing agreement, mentioned in paragraphs 261 and 262 above are, in essence, all of the functions at the heart of the Apple Group’s business model, which is centred on the development of technological products. With regard, in particular, to the risks listed in Exhibit B, they can be regarded as key risks which are inherent to that business model. The Commission argues, in essence, that ASI’s Irish branch performed all of those functions and assumed all of those risks relating to the Apple Group’s activities outside North and South America without providing evidence of the actual performance of those functions or assumption of those risks by the branch in question. Given the extent of the Apple Group’s activities outside North and South America, which represent approximately 60% of the group’s turnover, the Commission’s assertion in that regard is not reasonable.

268    Secondly, with regard to the activities and functions that the Commission listed in recitals 296 to 300 of the contested decision as having actually been performed by ASI’s Irish branch, it should be noted that, in the present instance, none of those activities or functions, regardless of whether they are taken individually or as a whole, justifies allocating the Apple Group’s IP licences to that branch.

269    With regard to quality control, ASI and AOE claimed, without being challenged by the Commission on the point, that thousands of people around the world worked in the quality control function, while only one person was employed in that function in Ireland. In addition, they stated that those functions could even be outsourced through agreements with third-party manufacturers.

270    In that regard, it is clear that, in the absence of other evidence, it cannot be concluded from the fact that a function such as quality control is crucial for the reputation of the Apple brand, whose products were distributed by ASI’s Irish branch, that that function was necessarily performed by that branch.

271    As regards the management of risk exposure in connection with the branches’ normal activity, the Commission put forward only a single argument, in which it claimed that it was ‘clear’ that, in so far as ASI had no employees, it could not control and monitor commercial risks. In that regard, it is sufficient to refer to paragraph 266 above, according to which it was for the Commission to prove with specific evidence that the branches of ASI and AOE had performed the functions and assumed the risks that were allocated to them. Consequently, the Commission’s reasoning, far from leading to a clear result, is insufficient to prove that that type of function was actually performed by ASI’s Irish branch.

272    ASI and AOE claimed, without being challenged on the point by the Commission, that no one employed by the Irish branches was responsible for R&D facilities management.

273    With regard to the [confidential] FTEs categorised as employees in the R&D function, ASI and AOE provided detailed explanations regarding the specific tasks performed by those employees, namely ensuring products meet safety and environmental standards in the region [confidential], testing products to ensure they meet technical standards in the region [confidential], assisting a Cupertino-based team with software delivery [confidential], translating software into various languages of the region [confidential] and administrative support [confidential]. They argue that those activities are clearly support roles and, as important as they may be, they cannot be regarded as key functions that determine that the Apple Group’s IP licences should be allocated to the Irish branches in question.

274    With regard to the local marketing costs incurred directly with marketing service providers, the fact that ASI’s Irish branch incurred those costs does not mean that that branch is responsible for designing the marketing strategy itself. As ASI and AOE claim, without being challenged on the point by the Commission, ASI’s Irish branch had no staff assigned to the marketing function.

275    As for the activities involving gathering and analysing regional data, Ireland and ASI and AOE do not dispute that ASI and AOE were involved in such activities during the relevant period. However, as Ireland and ASI and AOE submit, without being challenged on the point by the Commission, those activities seem to have consisted of merely gathering data which was to be added to a database of worldwide scope. Those statistical data treatment activities seem to be support activities rather than activities that are essential for all of ASI’s trading activity. In any event, the fact that the Irish branches are responsible for gathering data is insufficient to justify allocating the Apple Group’s IP licences to those branches.

276    With regard to the activities relating to the AppleCare service, in recital 299 of the contested decision the Commission stated, on the basis of the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland, that these were after-sales support and repair services for Apple-branded products covering the entire EMEIA region, for which ASI’s Irish branch was responsible. The Commission considered that, in so far as the objective of that function was to ensure customer satisfaction, it had a direct link to the Apple brand.

277    In that regard, it is apparent from the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland, on which the Commission itself relied, that ASI’s Irish branch performed a number of so-called ‘execution’ functions, operating in accordance with the guidance and strategy decided in the United States, including some relating to the AppleCare service. As part of that service, the responsibilities of ASI’s Irish branch were described as being linked to the warranty and repair programmes for Apple-branded products, repair network management, and telephone support for customers. The tasks specifically performed by ASI’s branch were described as the collection of data on product failures and the monitoring of those failures and of returned products, which were sent to the analytics teams in the United States. The report also notes that ASI’s branch was responsible for managing suppliers of repair services, which were centrally approved by the Apple Group, and for distributing spare parts within the supplier network. That description matches the description in the ad hoc report submitted by Apple Inc. The Commission did not challenge that description of the tasks relating to the AppleCare service performed by ASI’s Irish branch.

278    At the hearing, ASI and AOE confirmed that AppleCare was a service provided by the Irish branch, which bore the costs of the infrastructure and staff connected with that service. That staff was, inter alia, responsible for answering questions from users of Apple-branded products through a call centre.

279    On the basis of the description of the AppleCare service given by Ireland and ASI and AOE, to which the Commission makes reference in the contested decision, it can be summarised as after-sales support for users of Apple-branded products, which includes the repair and exchange of defective products. The nature of the support service provided by the Irish branch involves assisting in the implementation of the warranty itself, for which ASI is responsible. Moreover, such an after-sales service is not linked to the design, development, manufacture or sale of the products themselves.

280    Although the quality of an after-sales service may have a significant impact on the perception of the brand and may be the impetus for product improvements, the fact that those activities were performed by ASI’s Irish branch does not necessarily mean that the Apple Group’s IP licences should be allocated to it. After-sales services are often outsourced without it being necessary to allocate the IP of the company in question to the external supplier in question.

281    Thirdly, the analysis of the activities of ASI’s Irish branch, including the functions assessed by the Commission as justifying the allocation of the Apple Group’s IP licences to that branch, indicates that they are routine functions performed in accordance with instructions from executives based in the United States which do not contribute significant added value to ASI’s activities taken as a whole. In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that the ad hoc reports submitted by Apple Inc. and Ireland include a detailed analysis of the activities of ASI’s Irish branch. Those two reports concluded that those activities were routine and characterised them as supply, sale and distribution activities that were of limited risk. Although the Commission disputes the latter assessment, it has not, as such, challenged the description of those activities and functions provided by Ireland and Apple Inc.

282    Fourthly, the Commission argued that those activities and functions performed by ASI’s Irish branch necessitated access to the Apple brand. Although the activities of ASI’s Irish branch may have had an impact on the image and prestige of the Apple brand and it may even have been necessary to use the Apple Group’s IP in order to perform those activities, that access to and use of the brand by the branch could have been assured through licences specific to that branch’s needs without it being necessary to allocate all of the IP licences in question to that branch. Therefore, the Commission did not succeed in showing, through its arguments, that the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI had to be allocated to its branch.

283    After analysing the functions and activities performed by ASI’s Irish branch which the Commission had identified as justifying allocating the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI to that branch, it must be concluded that these are support activities for implementing policies and strategies designed and adopted outside of that branch, in particular with regard to the research, development and marketing of Apple-branded products.

284    In those circumstances, it must be concluded, as was argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE, that the Commission erred when it considered that the functions and activities performed by ASI’s Irish branch justified allocating the Apple Group’s IP licences and the income arising from those licences to that branch.

(b)    Activities of AOE’s Irish branch

285    As has been stated in paragraph 10 above, AOE’s Irish branch is responsible for the manufacture and assembly of iMac desktops, MacBook laptops and other computer accessories. Those activities take place in Ireland. It supplies its products to related parties within the Apple Group.

286    In recital 301 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that AOE’s Irish branch developed specific processes and manufacturing expertise and ensured quality assurance and quality control functions which were needed to preserve the value of the Apple brand.

287    In addition, in recitals 301 and 302 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the costs covered by the cost-sharing agreement associated with that branch were taken into account in the 1991 tax ruling and that in the 2007 tax ruling [confidential] of its turnover had been allocated as IP return. On the basis of those factors, the Commission inferred that the Irish authorities should have concluded that AOE’s Irish branch was involved in IP development or in the management and control of the Apple Group’s IP licences.

288    First, the findings in paragraphs 259 to 272 above apply equally to AOE’s Irish branch, in so far as the Commission’s arguments concerning quality control, R&D facilities management and business risk management functions refer indiscriminately to ASI and AOE’s Irish branches.

289    Secondly, concerning, more specifically, the specific processes and manufacturing expertise, the parties agree that those functions were actually performed by AOE’s Irish branch. However, Ireland and ASI and AOE dispute the conclusions that the Commission draws from that fact.

290    In that regard, it should be noted that those specific processes and that expertise were developed by AOE’s Irish branch itself in the context of its manufacturing activities. Although those processes and that expertise may benefit from protection through certain IP rights, they are limited in scope and are specific to the activities performed by that Irish branch. Consequently, those processes and that expertise are insufficient to justify allocating all of the Apple Group’s IP licences to that branch.

291    Thirdly, as Ireland and ASI and AOE claim and the Commission acknowledges, the contested tax rulings took account of the contributions made by AOE’s Irish branch to the Apple Group’s IP.

292    First, in the 1991 tax ruling, as the Commission notes in recital 302 of the contested decision, the contribution made by AOE’s Irish branch to the costs associated with the cost-sharing agreement was included in the operating costs on the basis of which AOE’s chargeable profits were calculated. Consequently, part of AOE’s chargeable profits was deemed to be calculated by taking into account part of the Apple Group’s IP. However, the Commission has provided no evidence to substantiate its argument set out in recital 302 of the contested decision according to which, given that part of the costs relating to the Apple Group’s IP had been taken into account when AOE’s chargeable profits were calculated, the Irish tax authorities should have allocated all of the Apple Group’s IP licences to AOE’s Irish branch.

293    Second, in the 2007 tax ruling, the existence of IP specific to the manufacturing activities of AOE’s Irish branch and the corresponding remuneration were recognised expressly when the return on the IP developed by that branch was included in the formula for the calculation of AOE’s chargeable profits. In that regard, the Commission provided no evidence to substantiate its argument set out in recital 303 of the contested decision that, in the light of the remuneration relating to the IP developed by AOE’s Irish branch, that branch must have been involved in the development, management or control of the licences covering all of the Apple Group’s IP. The fact that remuneration for the IP developed specifically in the context of the manufacturing activities of AOE’s Irish branch was allocated to that branch does not mean that the licences covering all of the Apple Group’s IP must also be attributed to it.

294    Consequently, the Commission cannot base its conclusion that the profits from all of the Apple Group’s IP should have been allocated to AOE’s Irish branch solely on the involvement of that branch in the creation of specific processes and the development of expertise in the manufacture of the products for which it is responsible.

295    In those circumstances, it must be concluded, as Ireland and ASI and AOE argued, that the Commission erred when it considered that the functions and activities performed by AOE’s Irish branch justified allocating the Apple Group’s IP licences and the income arising from them to that branch.

(c)    Activities other than those of ASI and AOE’s branches

296    As has been stated in paragraphs 37 to 40 above, the Commission’s primary line of reasoning in the contested decision is based on the contention that the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE should have been allocated to their Irish branches because, aside from those branches, ASI and AOE had no physical presence and no employees capable of performing key functions and managing the licences in question, whereas the branches of ASI and AOE were the only part of those companies with a tangible presence and employees.

297    It is necessary to examine the arguments put forward by Ireland and ASI and AOE in which they contest the Commission’s contention and claim, in essence, that the Apple Group’s strategic decision-making was centralised in Cupertino and that ASI and AOE implemented those decisions through their management bodies without the Irish branches actively having taken part in that decision-making.

(1)    Strategic decision-making within the Apple Group

298    Ireland and ASI and AOE claim that the ‘centre of gravity’ of the Apple Group’s activities was in Cupertino and not in Ireland. All strategic decisions, in particular those concerning the design and development of the Apple Group’s products, were taken, in accordance with an overall business strategy covering the group as a whole, in Cupertino. That centrally decided strategy was implemented by the companies of the group, which include ASI and AOE, which acted through their management bodies, much like any other company, according to the rules of company law applicable to them.

299    In that regard, it should be noted, in particular, that ASI and AOE submitted evidence, in the administrative procedure and in support of their pleadings in the present instance, on the centralised nature of the strategic decisions within the Apple Group taken by directors in Cupertino and then implemented subsequently by the various entities of the group, such as ASI and AOE. Those centralised procedures concern, inter alia, pricing, accounting decisions, financing and treasury and cover all of the international activities of the Apple Group that would have been decided centrally under the direction of the parent company, Apple Inc.

300    More specifically, with regard to decisions in the field of R&D — which is, in particular, the functional area behind the Apple Group’s IP — ASI and AOE provided evidence showing that decisions relating to the development of the products which were then to be marketed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE, and concerning the R&D strategy which was to be followed by, inter alia, ASI and AOE had been taken and implemented by executives of the group based in Cupertino. It is also apparent from that evidence that the strategies relating to new product launches and, in particular, the organisation of distribution on the European markets in the months leading up to the proposed launch date had been managed at the Apple-Group level by, inter alia, the Executive Team under the direction of the Chief Executive Officer in Cupertino.

301    In addition, it is apparent from the file that contracts with third-party original equipment manufacturers (‘OEMs’), which were responsible for the manufacture of a large proportion of the products sold by ASI, were negotiated and signed by the parent company, Apple Inc., and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney. ASI and AOE also submitted evidence regarding the negotiations and the signing of contracts with customers, such as telecommunications operators, which were responsible for a significant proportion of the retail sales of Apple-branded products, in particular mobile phones. It is apparent from that evidence that the negotiations in question were led by directors of the Apple Group and that the contracts were signed on behalf of the Apple Group by Apple Inc. and ASI through their respective directors, either directly or by power of attorney.

302    Consequently, in so far as it has been established that the strategic decisions — in particular those concerning the development of the Apple Group’s products underlying the Apple Group’s IP — were taken in Cupertino on behalf of the Apple Group as a whole, the Commission erred when it concluded that the Apple Group’s IP was necessarily managed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, which held the licences for that IP.

(2)    Decision-making by ASI and AOE

303    With regard to ASI and AOE’s ability to take decisions concerning their essential functions through their management bodies, the Commission itself accepted that those companies had boards of directors which held regular meetings during the relevant period, and reproduced extracts from the minutes of those meetings confirming that fact in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision.

304    The fact that the minutes of the board meetings do not give details of the decisions concerning the management of the Apple Group’s IP licences, of the cost-sharing agreement and of important business decisions does not mean that those decisions were not taken.

305    The summary nature of the extracts from the minutes reproduced by the Commission in Tables 4 and 5 of the contested decision is sufficient to allow the reader to understand how the company’s key decisions in each tax year, such as approval of the annual accounts, were taken and recorded in the relevant board minutes.

306    The resolutions of the boards of directors which were recorded in those minutes covered regularly (that is to say, several times a year), inter alia, the payment of dividends, the approval of directors’ reports and the appointment and resignation of directors. In addition, less frequently, those resolutions concerned the establishment of subsidiaries and powers of attorney authorising certain directors to carry out various activities such as managing bank accounts, overseeing relations with governments and public bodies, carrying out audits, taking out insurance, hiring, purchasing and selling assets, taking delivery of goods and dealing with commercial contracts. Moreover, it is apparent from those minutes that individual directors were granted very wide managerial powers.

307    In addition, with regard to the cost-sharing agreement, it is apparent from the information submitted by ASI and AOE that the various versions of that agreement in existence during the relevant period were signed by members of the respective boards of directors of those companies in Cupertino.

308    Moreover, according to the detailed information provided by ASI and AOE, it is the case for both ASI and AOE that, among ASI’s 14 directors and AOE’s 8 directors on their respective boards for each tax year during the period when the contested tax rulings were in force, there was only one director who was based in Ireland.

309    Consequently, the Commission erred when it considered that ASI and AOE, through their management bodies, in particular their boards of directors, did not have the ability to perform the essential functions of the companies in question by, where appropriate, delegating their powers to individual executives who were not members of the Irish branches’ staff.

(d)    Conclusions concerning the activities within the Apple Group

310    It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that, in the present instance, the Commission has not succeeded in showing that, in the light, first, of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE and, second, of the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, the Apple Group’s IP licences should have been allocated to those Irish branches when determining the annual chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland.

311    In those circumstances, it is necessary to uphold the complaints raised by Ireland in the first plea in law in Case T‑778/16 and by ASI and AOE in the third and fourth pleas in law in Case T‑892/16 regarding the Commission’s factual assessments concerning the activities of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE and the activities outside of those branches.

4.      Conclusion regarding the Commission’s assessment that there was a selective advantage on the basis of its primary line of reasoning

312    In the light of the findings in paragraph 249 above regarding the Commission’s erroneous assessments of normal taxation under the Irish tax law applicable in the present instance and the findings in paragraph 310 above regarding the Commission’s erroneous assessments of the activities within the Apple Group, it is necessary to uphold the pleas in law alleging that, in its primary line of reasoning, the Commission did not succeed in showing that, by issuing the contested tax rulings, the Irish tax authorities granted ASI and AOE an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

313    It is therefore not necessary to examine the pleas in law contesting the Commission’s assessments in its primary line of reasoning regarding the selectivity of the measures at issue and the lack of justification for them.

314    Therefore, it is appropriate to go on to examine the pleas in law submitted by Ireland and ASI and AOE contesting the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its subsidiary and alternative lines of reasoning in the contested decision.

E.      Pleas in law contesting the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning (fourth plea in law in Case T778/16 and eighth plea in law in Case T892/16)

315    In connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning in the contested decision (recitals 325 to 360), the Commission contended that, even if the Irish tax authorities had been fully entitled to accept that the Apple Group IP licences held by ASI and AOE should not have been allocated to their Irish branches, the profit allocation methods endorsed in the contested tax rulings had nonetheless led to a result departing from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle, because those methods undervalued the annual chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland.

316    More specifically, in particular in recitals 328 to 330 of the contested decision, the Commission contended that the profit allocation methods endorsed in the contested tax rulings constituted one-sided profit allocation methods which resembled the transaction net margin method (‘the TNMM’) laid down by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

317    According to the Commission, the profit allocation methods endorsed by the contested tax rulings were vitiated by errors resulting from (i) the choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as the focus or ‘tested party’ in one-sided profit allocation methods (recitals 328 to 333 of the contested decision), (ii) the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator (recitals 334 to 345 of the contested decision), and (iii) the levels of return accepted (recitals 346 to 359 of the contested decision). According to the Commission, each of those errors entailed a reduction in the tax liability of those companies in Ireland as compared with non-integrated companies whose chargeable profits reflected prices negotiated at arm’s length on the market (recital 360 of the contested decision).

318    Thus, it must be held that all the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning seek to establish the existence of an advantage that was granted to ASI and AOE because the profit allocation methods approved by the contested tax rulings had not led to arm’s length profits.

319    In that regard, it should be noted that the mere non-observance of methodological requirements, in particular in connection with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, is not a sufficient ground for concluding that the calculated profit is not a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome, let alone that the calculated profit is lower than the profit that should have been obtained if the method for determining transfer pricing had been correctly applied. Thus, merely stating that there has been a methodological error is not sufficient, in itself, to demonstrate that the tax measures at issue have conferred an advantage on the recipients of those measures. Indeed, the Commission must also demonstrate that the methodological errors that have been identified have led to a reduction in the chargeable profit and thus in the tax burden borne by those recipients, in the light of the tax burden which they would have borne pursuant to the normal rules of taxation under national law had the tax measures in question not been adopted.

320    It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that the arguments put forward by Ireland and by ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s assessments as summarised in paragraphs 315 to 317 above must be analysed.

321    Ireland and ASI and AOE raise, first, complaints regarding the Commission’s assessments of the application of the TNMM and the fact that it relied on instruments developed within the OECD. Next, Ireland and ASI and AOE contest the three methodological errors specifically referred to by the Commission, namely those concerning the choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as the ‘tested party’ for the profit allocation methods, the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator, and the levels of return accepted in the contested tax rulings.

1.      The assessment made regarding the profit allocation methods endorsed by the contested tax rulings in the light of the TNMM

322    The parties disagree, in essence, as to the extent to which the Commission was entitled to rely, for the purposes of its subsidiary line of reasoning, on the arm’s length principle, as laid down in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, to which the Authorised OECD Approach refers. More specifically, they disagree as to whether the Commission was entitled to use the TNMM, as laid down in, inter alia, those guidelines, in order to ascertain whether the profit allocation method endorsed by the contested tax rulings had led to ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits being lower than those of a company in a comparable situation.

323    In the first place, concerning the application of the Authorised OECD Approach, it is necessary to recall the considerations set out in paragraphs 233 to 245 above. Thus, in essence, although the Authorised OECD Approach has not been incorporated into Irish tax law, the way in which section 25 of the TCA 97 is applied by the Irish tax authorities overlaps, for the most part, with the analysis proposed by the Authorised OECD Approach. First, the application of section 25 of the TCA 97, as described by Ireland in its application and as confirmed by Ireland during the hearing, requires, first, an analysis of the functions performed, the assets used and the risks assumed by the branches, which, in essence, corresponds to the first step of the analysis proposed by the Authorised OECD Approach. Second, regarding the second step of that analysis, it should be borne in mind that the Authorised OECD Approach refers to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In that regard, neither Ireland nor ASI and AOE have challenged the Commission’s assertion, set out in, inter alia, recital 265 of the contested decision, that the profit allocation methods approved by the contested tax rulings resembled the one-sided transfer pricing methods referred to in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, such as the TNMM.

324    In the second place, it should be noted that, in the context of the administrative procedure, Ireland and Apple Inc. submitted ad hoc reports, drawn up by their respective tax advisors, which specifically relied on the TNMM for the purpose of demonstrating that ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits in Ireland, which were declared in Ireland on the basis of the contested tax rulings, fell within an arm’s length range. Ireland and ASI and AOE cannot criticise the Commission for having relied on the Authorised OECD Approach or for having used the TNMM in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning, when they themselves relied thereon in the context of the administrative procedure.

325    Having regard to the foregoing, the complaints regarding the use by the Commission of the TNMM, as laid down in, inter alia, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in order to ascertain whether the profit allocation method endorsed by the contested tax rulings had led to a reduction in ASI and AOE’s tax liability must be rejected.

326    In those circumstances, it will be necessary to go on to examine Ireland and ASI and AOE’s arguments regarding the application by the Commission of the TNMM in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning, in order to assess whether the Commission succeeded in demonstrating that the contested tax rulings had conferred an advantage on ASI and AOE.

327    In that regard, the parties disagree as regards the Commission’s statements relating to three errors in the profit allocation method endorsed by the contested tax rulings, concerning, first, the choice of the branches as tested parties, second, the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator and, third, the levels of return accepted.

2.      The choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as the ‘tested party’ when applying the profit allocation methods

328    It should be borne in mind that, in recitals 328 to 333 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that, even assuming that the Apple Group’s IP licences had been correctly allocated to the head offices of ASI and AOE, those head offices had been unable to perform complex functions without any staff or physical presence. By contrast, according to the Commission, the Irish branches had performed IP-related functions that were crucial in building brand awareness and brand recognition in the EMEIA region. The Commission inferred from this that the Irish branches of ASI and AOE had been incorrectly chosen as tested parties.

329    In that regard, it should be noted that the TNMM constitutes a one-sided method of determining transfer pricing. It consists in determining, relative to an appropriate base, the net profit obtained by a taxpayer, namely the ‘tested party’, from a controlled transaction or from controlled transactions which are closely linked or continuous. In order to determine the appropriate base, it is necessary to choose a profit level indicator, such as costs, sales or assets. The net profit indicator obtained by the taxpayer from a controlled transaction must be determined by reference to the net profit indicator that the same taxpayer or an independent undertaking obtains from comparable transactions on the free market. The TNMM therefore requires the identification of a party to the transaction in respect of which an indicator is tested. This is the ‘tested party’.

330    In addition, according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines of 2010, to which the Commission makes reference in, inter alia, recitals 94 and 255 of the contested decision as useful guidance, and which are also relied on by the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc., the choice of tested party must be in line with the functional analysis of the transaction. Furthermore, it is stated that, as a general rule, the tested party is the party to which a transfer pricing method can be applied in the most reliable manner and for which the most reliable comparables can be identified. This will most often be the party that has the least complex functional analysis.

331    First, it should be emphasised that, in the contested decision, in particular recital 333 thereof, the Commission merely asserted that the error as to the determination of the entity to be tested had led to a decrease in ASI and AOE’s chargeable profit.

332    As has been stated in paragraph 319 above, the mere non-observance of methodological requirements when applying a profit allocation method is not a sufficient ground for concluding that the calculated profit is not a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome, let alone that the calculated profit is lower than the profit that should have been obtained if the method for determining transfer pricing had been correctly applied.

333    Accordingly, the mere statement by the Commission that there is a methodological error resulting from the choice of tested party in connection with the profit allocation methods used in respect of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE approved by the contested tax rulings, even assuming that error is established, is not sufficient, per se, to demonstrate that those tax rulings conferred an advantage on ASI and AOE. Indeed, the Commission would also have needed to demonstrate that such an error had led to a reduction in the chargeable profit of those two companies that they would not have obtained had those rulings not been issued. However, in the present instance, the Commission did not put forward evidence to prove that the choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as tested parties had led to a reduction in the chargeable profit of those companies.

334    Secondly and in any event, it should be noted that in the context of the TNMM, it is necessary to choose a party to test beforehand, according to, in particular, the functions performed by that party, in order to be able subsequently to calculate the return in a transaction related to those functions. The fact that it is normally the party that performs the least complex functions that is chosen does not predetermine the functions that are actually performed by the chosen party or the way in which the return for the functions performed is established.

335    Indeed, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not state which party to the transaction must be chosen, but recommend choosing the undertaking for which reliable data regarding the most closely comparable transactions can be found. It is then specified that this often means choosing the associated undertaking which is the least complex of the undertakings concerned by the transaction and which does not have any valuable intangibles or unique assets. It follows that those guidelines do not necessary require that the least complex entity be chosen, but that they simply advise choosing the entity for which the greatest amount of reliable data exists.

336    Thus, provided that the functions of the tested party have been correctly identified, and that the return for those functions has been correctly calculated, the fact that one party or another has been chosen as the tested party is irrelevant.

337    Thirdly, it should be borne in mind that the Commission based its subsidiary line of reasoning on the premiss that the Apple Group’s IP licences were correctly allocated to the head offices of ASI and AOE.

338    In that regard, as is correctly emphasised by Ireland and ASI and AOE, it should be noted that IP constitutes the key asset for an undertaking, such as the Apple Group, whose business model is essentially based on technological innovations. That IP may therefore be regarded, in the present instance, as a unique asset for the purposes of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

339    However, as is apparent from the Authorised OECD Approach, in principle, in the case of an undertaking such as the Apple Group, the mere fact of one of the parties being the owner of the IP involves the performance of significant people functions in relation to that intangible, such as active decision-making as regards setting up the development programme giving rise to that IP and active management of that programme. Allocating the IP to a part of the undertaking may therefore be considered an indication that that part performs complex functions.

340    It follows that the Commission cannot claim, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, that the Apple Group’s IP was correctly allocated to the head offices of ASI and AOE and, at the same time, that it is the Irish branches of those two companies which performed the most complex functions in relation to that IP, without providing any evidence as to the actual performance of such complex functions by those branches.

341    By contrast, as has been stated in paragraphs 281 and 290 above, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating in the present instance that those branches had actually performed functions and made crucial decisions in respect of the Apple Group’s IP, in particular as regards its design, creation and development.

342    Fourthly, it should be noted that the contested tax rulings are based on the descriptions of the functions performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE set out in the requests made by the Apple Group to the Irish tax authorities. As is apparent from recitals 54 to 57 of the contested decision, those functions consist in the procurement, sale and distribution of Apple-branded products to related parties and third-party customers in the EMEIA region (in the case of ASI’s branch) and in the manufacture and assembly of a specialised range of computer products in Ireland (in the case of AOE’s branch).

343    It must be pointed out that those functions may be regarded, prima facie, as easily identifiable and not particularly complex. In any event, they do not constitute unique and specific functions for which it is difficult to identify the comparables. On the contrary, these are common and relatively standard functions in commercial relations between undertakings.

344    It is true that the information submitted by the Apple Group to the Irish tax authorities prior to the issuing of the contested tax rulings was very concise on the subject of the functions, assets and risks of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches. The contested tax rulings were issued after the Apple Group’s tax advisors sent the Irish tax authorities some short letters in which they briefly described the activities of ASI and AOE’s branches and proposed a methodology for calculating the chargeable profits of those two companies in Ireland. The content of those exchanges is fairly vague and makes it apparent that the discussions between the Irish tax authorities and the Apple Group’s tax advisors at the two meetings held were decisive for the purpose of determining the chargeable profit of those companies, without there being any documented objective and detailed analysis regarding the functions of the branches and the assessment of those functions.

345    Thus, unlike the ad hoc reports that were submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. ex post facto in the context of the administrative procedure, no profit allocation report or any additional information was provided to the Irish tax authorities prior to the issuing of the contested tax rulings.

346    Furthermore, as was confirmed at the hearing, the information concerning the activities of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches provided before the 1991 tax ruling were not significantly added to prior to the issuing of the 2007 tax ruling and were not subsequently updated.

347    That lack of evidence submitted to the Irish tax authorities concerning the functions actually performed by the Irish branches and the assessment of those functions for the purpose of determining the profit to be allocated to those branches may be regarded as a methodological defect in the application of section 25 of the TCA 97, which requires an analysis to be conducted at the outset regarding the functions performed, the assets used, and the risks assumed by the branches.

348    However, as regrettable as that methodological defect is, the Commission, in carrying out its State aid control under Article 107 TFEU, cannot, for its part, confine itself to stating that the choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as the tested parties when applying the profit allocation method was incorrect, without proving that the functions actually performed by those branches constituted particularly complex or unique functions, or functions that were difficult to identify, so that the comparables for such a one-sided profit allocation method would not have been identifiable or reliable and, consequently, the resulting allocation would necessarily have been incorrect.

349    Furthermore and in any event, even assuming that such an error in the profit allocation method is established, as has been outlined in paragraphs 319 and 332 above, the Commission must prove that the profit allocation in question led to a mitigation of the tax burden of the companies in question as compared with the tax burden which they would have borne had the contested tax rulings not been issued, such that an advantage was actually granted.

350    However, the Commission has not submitted any evidence in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning to demonstrate that such a methodological defect, resulting from the lack of information submitted to the Irish tax authorities, led to a reduction in the tax base of ASI and AOE as a result of the application of the contested tax rulings.

351    Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to uphold the complaints raised by Ireland and by ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s statements concerning the incorrect choice of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches as the tested parties when applying the profit allocation methods on which the contested tax rulings were based.

3.      The choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator

352    As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in the contested tax rulings (see paragraphs 12 to 21 above), the chargeable profits of the Irish branches were calculated as a margin of the operating costs.

353    In recitals 334 to 345 of the contested decision, the Commission argued that, assuming that the Irish branches could have been regarded as the tested parties for the purposes of the one-sided profit allocation method, the choice of those branches’ operating costs as the profit level indicator was incorrect. According to the Commission, the profit level indicator in a one-sided profit allocation method must reflect the functions performed by the tested party, which was not the situation in the present instance. Indeed, the Commission contended that ASI’s sales, and not the operating costs of its Irish branch, were a better reflection of the activities carried on and the risks assumed by the Irish branch and thus of its contribution to ASI’s turnover.

354    Consequently, the Commission (recital 345 of the contested decision) concluded that, because of the use of the operating costs as the profit level indicator in the profit allocation method approved by the contested tax rulings, the chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland did not reflect a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle. As a result, in its view, the Irish tax authorities had conferred a selective advantage on ASI and AOE as compared with non-integrated companies, whose chargeable profits reflected prices negotiated at arm’s length on the market.

(a)    The choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator for the Irish branch of ASI

355    Regarding, specifically, the Irish branch of ASI (recital 336 of the contested decision), the Commission considered that it was inappropriate to rely on the operating costs, which would be ‘generally’ recommended for analysing the profits of low-risk distributors. It contended that the Irish branch of ASI was not such a distributor, in so far as that branch had assumed risks connected with turnover, warranties, and third-party contractors.

356    It should be noted at the outset that the Commission did not specifically state the source on which it was relying in order to make such an assertion. In addition, the use of the term ‘generally’ indicates that it was not ruling out the use of operating costs as a profit level indicator in certain situations.

357    Besides the fact that the argument presented by the Commission is imprecise, it should be noted that such an argument is not in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, on which the Commission relied in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning, as is correctly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE. It follows from paragraph 2.87 of those guidelines that the profit level indicator must be focused on the value of the functions of the tested party, taking account of its assets and its risks. Therefore, according to those guidelines, the choice of profit level indicator is not fixed for any type of function, provided that that indicator reflects the value of the function in question.

358    In any event, it is necessary to examine whether the Commission succeeded in demonstrating that the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator was not appropriate in the present instance and, in so far as the risks assumed by the branches must be taken into account, whether it was correct to conclude that the Irish branch of ASI had assumed risks connected with turnover, warranties, and third-party contractors.

(1)    The appropriate profit level indicator

359    In recitals 340 and 341 of the contested decision, the Commission contended that the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator was not appropriate, inasmuch as that choice did not properly reflect the risks assumed and the activities carried out by the Irish branch of ASI, and that sales would have been a more appropriate indicator. It contended that, for the same reasons, the Berry ratio used in the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. was not suitable for determining an arm’s length return for the functions performed by that branch.

360    In the first place, it should be noted that the Commission bases its statements, in essence, on the argument that the Irish branch of ASI must be regarded as having assumed risks and performed functions relating to ASI’s operations, in so far as that company would have been unable to do so itself given its lack of staff and physical presence.

361    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the considerations outlined, in connection with assessing the primary line of reasoning, in paragraph 259 above, according to which the allocation of functions, and thus profits, to a branch using an ‘exclusion’ approach is not in line with either Irish law or the Authorised OECD Approach, in so far as such an analysis does not enable it to be demonstrated that those functions were actually performed by the Irish branches.

362    Accordingly, in order to demonstrate that the choice of the operating costs of the Irish branch of ASI as the profit level indicator for that branch was incorrect, the Commission could not allocate the functions performed and risks assumed by ASI to its Irish branch without demonstrating that that branch had actually performed those functions and assumed those risks.

363    In the second place, it should be noted that, in recital 342 of the contested decision, the Commission itself refers to paragraph 2.87 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. As has been noted in paragraph 357 above, both sales and operating costs may constitute an appropriate profit level indicator under those guidelines.

364    More specifically, it is stated in paragraph 2.87 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that the choice of the profit level indicator should be relevant for the purpose of demonstrating the value of the functions of the tested party in the transaction under review, taking account of its assets and its risks.

365    However, the Commission, by stating, in recitals 337 and 338 of the contested decision, that the use of the operating costs as the profit level indicator does not reflect the risks connected with turnover, warranties, and products handled by third-party contractors and that the sales figure would be more appropriate as a profit level indicator, does not answer the question whether the operating costs suitably reflect the value contributed by the Irish branch of ASI in view of the functions, assets and risks assumed by that branch. Indeed, the Commission merely states that ASI’s sales would have been an appropriate profit level indicator without demonstrating why, in the present instance, the operating costs of its branch were not capable of reflecting the value which that branch had contributed to the company’s operations through the functions, risks and assets for which it had actually been responsible within that company.

366    In the third place, regarding the Berry ratio, it should be borne in mind that that ratio was used in the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. as the profit level indicator in order to prove ex post facto that the profits allocated to ASI and AOE under the contested tax rulings fell within the arm’s length ranges.

367    However, in recital 340 of the contested decision, the Commission rejected the use of that ratio as a financial ratio for estimating the arm’s length remuneration in the present instance. The Commission contended that the situations in which the Berry ratio could be used according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines did not correspond to the situation of ASI’s Irish branch.

368    In that regard, it should be noted that, in paragraph 2.101 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, to which the Commission refers in recital 342 of the contested decision, it is stated that, in order for the Berry ratio to be an appropriate means of testing the remuneration of a controlled transaction, it is necessary, first, that the value of the functions performed in the controlled transaction be proportional to the operating costs, second, that the value of the functions performed in the controlled transaction not be materially affected by the value of the products distributed, in other words, that it not be proportional to the turnover, and, third, that the taxpayer not perform, in the controlled transactions, any other significant function (for example, manufacturing) that should be remunerated using another method or another financial indicator.

369    First of all, it must be noted that, in the contested decision, the Commission did not argue that the value of the operating costs taken into account in the contested tax rulings was not proportional to the value of the functions performed by the Irish branch of ASI, as described in recitals 54 and 55 of the contested decision. It must be pointed out that the Commission has not put forward arguments or submitted evidence demonstrating that not all the costs that should have been regarded as operating costs were taken into consideration and that that failure to take those costs into consideration led to a selective advantage for ASI and AOE. Nor did it seek to demonstrate that the value allocated to the costs that had been taken into account was too low and that a selective advantage had resulted from it. Indeed, it merely contested the very principle of taking operating costs into account as a profit level indicator.

370    Next, it should be noted that there is no connection between the operating costs of the Irish branch of ASI and that company’s turnover. That lack of correlation was acknowledged by the Commission itself in recital 337 of the contested decision.

371    Lastly, it is necessary to recall the considerations set out in paragraphs 342 and 343 above concerning the non-complex and easily identifiable nature of the functions performed by the Irish branch of ASI. That branch, in essence, performed distribution functions. It was not responsible for manufacturing functions or other complex functions connected with, inter alia, technological development or IP.

372    Accordingly, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, the conditions for applying the Berry ratio, as stated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, are satisfied in the case of ASI’s Irish branch.

373    Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it must be held that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the choice of the operating costs was not appropriate as a profit level indicator for ASI’s Irish branch.

374    In any event, even assuming that it can be argued, as is asserted by the Commission in recital 336 of the contested decision, that operating costs cannot serve as a profit level indicator except for ‘low-risk’ distributors, it is necessary to assess whether the Irish tax authorities were entitled to consider that the Irish branch of ASI had not assumed the risks that, according to the Commission, should have been allocated to that branch.

(2)    The risk connected with turnover

375    In recital 337 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that ASI had assumed the risk connected with turnover and that, in so far as its head office had no staff to manage those risks, ‘it [had to] be assumed’ that the Irish branch had assumed those risks. It added that the choice of the operating costs did not reflect that risk, which was borne out by the fact that the operating costs had remained relatively stable during the reference period whereas the turnover had increased exponentially.

376    First of all, it must be pointed out that the Commission’s argument is based, according to the very wording of the contested decision, on an assumption.

377    Next, it should be noted that the Commission was not in a position to explain in the contested decision exactly what the risk connected with turnover was.

378    When it was questioned in that regard during the hearing, the Commission stated that that risk was rather an inventory risk, namely the risk that the products listed in ASI’s inventory, the distribution of which was ensured by the Irish branch, would remain unsold.

379    In order to support its argument that the Irish branch of ASI had assumed the risk connected with a potential decrease in ASI’s sales, the Commission merely allocated that risk using an exclusion approach, which, as has been stated in paragraphs 361 and 362 above, does not constitute a valid basis for allocation.

380    In addition, at the hearing, the Commission referred to Figure 9 of the contested decision (set out in recital 122 of that decision), which reproduces a table included in the cost-sharing agreement concerning the allocation of risks between Apple Inc., on the one hand, and ASI and AOE, on the other. As has been stated in paragraphs 263 to 268 and paragraph 271 above, that table compiles the list of risks which ASI could be called on to assume, but does not prove that those risks were actually borne by ASI. What is more, that table concerns ASI, and not its Irish branch.

381    By contrast, Apple Inc., ASI and AOE submitted, in the context of both the administrative procedure and the present action, evidence demonstrating that the framework agreements with the manufacturers of Apple-branded products (or OEMs) had been concluded centrally in respect of the Apple Group as a whole by Apple Inc. and ASI in the United States.

382    In addition, Apple Inc., ASI and AOE submitted evidence concerning other framework agreements, also concluded centrally in respect of the Apple Group as a whole, concluded with the main buyers of Apple-branded products, namely telecommunications operators, in particular in the EMEIA region.

383    Furthermore, Apple Inc., ASI and AOE submitted evidence concerning the international pricing policy for Apple-branded products, which is set centrally in respect of the Apple Group as a whole.

384    It must be pointed out that the evidence submitted shows that the Irish branch of ASI did not take part in negotiations relating to framework agreements or in the signing of such agreements, whether they be those concluded with the suppliers of the products it distributes, namely the OEMs, or those concluded with the customers to whom it distributes Apple-branded products, such as telecommunications operators. Indeed, that branch is not even mentioned in those agreements.

385    In addition, the evidence submitted shows that the Irish branch of ASI had no decision-making powers concerning supply (namely determining the products to be manufactured), demand (namely determining the customers to whom the products were to be sold), or the prices at which those Apple-branded products were sold, in particular in the EMEIA region, in so far as those elements were determined under the framework agreements.

386    Accordingly, as is correctly argued by ASI and AOE, the Irish branch of ASI cannot be allocated the risks inherent in products remaining unsold or a drop in demand, in so far as both supply and demand are determined centrally, outside that branch.

387    The evidence submitted confirms the role of ASI’s Irish branch that emerges from the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc., according to which that branch, as a distributor, was responsible for ensuring the flow of products between producers and customers and for gathering and communicating at group level information regarding supply and demand forecasts for the EMEIA region and regarding inventory levels. The fact that the Irish branch of ASI performed ‘monitoring’ functions for the EMEIA region does not mean that it is deemed to have assumed the economic risk that might have resulted from a decrease in ASI’s turnover in that region.

388    Lastly, concerning the assertion, set out in recital 337 of the contested decision, that ASI’s sales increased exponentially during the reference period whereas the operating costs of its Irish branch remained stable, it should be pointed out that that fact is more an indication of the limited impact of the activities carried out by the Irish branch of ASI on ASI’s trading activity as a whole.

389    In addition, such a fact is not sufficient, in itself, to call in question the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator. Indeed, the Commission established its line of reasoning without indicating the reason why an increase in ASI’s sales would have necessarily involved an increase in the profits to be allocated to its Irish branch.

390    Consequently, it must be held that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the Irish branch of ASI was responsible for the risk connected with turnover.

(3)    The risk connected with product warranties

391    In recital 338 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that, in so far as ASI provided warranties for all the products sold in the EMEIA region and in so far as those warranties constituted its most significant liability, the risks relating thereto could not have been assumed by ASI, which had no staff, but, necessarily, by its Irish branch.

392    More specifically, the Commission contended, in recital 338 of the contested decision, that those risks constituted ASI’s most significant liability, which was transferred to Apple Distribution International (ADI), a company related to the Apple Group. The Commission referred, in that regard, to recital 135 of the contested decision, in which it is explained that ADI took over distribution activities in the EMEIA region on ASI’s behalf and that, to that end, under a protocol dated 23 April 2012, ADI assumed ASI’s liabilities, the most significant element of which was the provisions relating to product warranties.

393    First, those factual elements highlighted by the Commission bear witness to the fact that the warranties for Apple-branded products in the EMEIA region were assumed by ASI and that the provisions for those warranties were part of that company’s liabilities until 2012. However, that information does not, in itself, enable a connection to be established between the risks represented by those warranties granted by ASI, given material expression in the provisions set out in the liabilities of that company’s balance sheet, and its Irish branch. In addition, the Commission’s theory is not valid for the years after 2012, when those risks were transferred to ADI. However, the Commission did not confine its line of reasoning to the period prior to 2012.

394    Secondly, the risk connected with product warranties cannot be allocated to the Irish branch of ASI if that branch is not responsible, from an economic point of view, for claims invoking such a warranty. The Commission did not adduce evidence demonstrating that the Irish branch of ASI had assumed such a responsibility.

395    Thirdly, while it is not disputed that the Irish branch of ASI managed the AppleCare after-sales service, as has been noted in paragraphs 276 to 278 above, the functions performed by that branch in connection with that service are, however, of an ancillary nature in relation to the warranties themselves.

396    In order to challenge the Commission’s line of argument, Ireland and ASI and AOE rely on, inter alia, the ad hoc reports which they submitted and on which the Commission itself relied, which describe the activities of the Irish branches connected with warranties for Apple-branded products. According to those reports, the Irish branch of ASI was responsible, in connection with the AppleCare service, for, in essence:

–        gathering data regarding defective products;

–        managing the network of authorised third-party repairers;

–        distributing components for repair within that network;

–        managing the call centre.

397    Having regard to the ancillary nature of those functions, it may not be concluded, in the absence of other evidence, that the Irish branch of ASI bore the economic consequences connected with product warranties, as ASI and AOE confirmed during the hearing.

398    In addition, the fact relating to the significant number of employees assigned to the AppleCare service is not, in itself, decisive, in view of the fact that that service includes the call centre for the after-sales services, which is, naturally, a function that requires a large number of staff.

399    Furthermore, the Commission did not adduce other evidence demonstrating that the staff of ASI’s Irish branch would have been actively involved in adopting decisions significantly affecting the risks connected with warranties for Apple-branded products sold by ASI and that that branch was ultimately responsible for those risks, economically speaking, by virtue of those warranties.

400    In those circumstances, it cannot be inferred from the fact that the Irish branch of ASI managed the AppleCare service that that branch assumed the risks connected with warranties for Apple-branded products.

(4)    The risks connected with the activities of third-party contractors

401    In recital 339 of the contested decision, the Commission contended that, in so far as ASI systematically outsourced its distribution function to third-party contractors outside Ireland, the total sales figure would have been a more appropriate profit level indicator, in view of the risk borne by the Irish branch in relation to products which were not handled in Ireland.

402    It should be noted at the outset that the response to the question as to what risk would have been created by the circumstance referred to in paragraph 401 above and how that risk would have been borne by the Irish branch of ASI is not clear from reading recital 339 of the contested decision. Such an assessment, which lends itself to diverging interpretations, cannot be accepted as validly supporting the Commission’s subsidiary line of reasoning.

403    In any event, when questioned on that point during the hearing, the Commission stated that the risk when ASI outsourced its distribution functions to third-party contractors while remaining the owner of those products was the same type of risk as that referred to in recital 337 of the contested decision, namely a risk connected with the possibility of a decrease in demand and the possibility of unsold products.

404    Accordingly, assuming that the risk referred to by the Commission in recital 339 of the contested decision can be understood as being the same type of risk as the risk connected with turnover identified in recital 337 of the contested decision, the same considerations as set out in paragraphs 376 to 390 above also apply to this type of risk, which has still not been shown to have been assumed by the Irish branch of ASI.

405    Furthermore, assuming such a risk exists, the mere fact that certain distribution activities have been outsourced to third-party contractors outside Ireland, cannot, without further information, support the argument that such a risk had to be allocated to the Irish branch of ASI.

406    Indeed, the fact that, following transactions with suppliers and customers negotiated and organised in the United States, the distribution of the products in question is handled outside Ireland by third-party contractors would rather strengthen the argument that the risks that could derive therefrom are not borne by the Irish branch of ASI.

407    It is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the risks identified in recitals 336, 337 and 339 of the contested decision had actually been borne by the Irish branch of ASI.

(b)    The choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator  for the Irish branch of AOE

408    Regarding AOE, in recitals 343 and 344 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that, in view of the fact that AOE had no physical presence and had no employees capable of managing the risks outside its Irish branch, that branch had to be regarded as assuming all the risks, in particular those relating to inventories. In those circumstances, it considered that a profit level indicator including the total costs would have been more appropriate than the operating costs.

409    The Commission bases its arguments on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. However, it should be noted that, as has been stated in paragraph 357 above, those guidelines do not recommend the use of any particular profit level indicator, such as the total costs, and do not preclude the use of operating costs as a profit level indicator.

410    In addition, according to paragraph 2.93 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, to which the Commission refers in recital 343 of the contested decision, ‘in applying a cost-based [TNMM], fully loaded costs are often used’. Accordingly, it is not inconceivable, in principle, that operating costs may constitute an appropriate profit level indicator.

411    Furthermore, the Commission’s argument that a profit level indicator including the total costs is better suited to a manufacturing company such as AOE cannot succeed in the present instance. Indeed, as has been stated in paragraph 12 above, it is AOE and not its Irish branch that has ownership of the materials used, works in progress and finished products. In so far as the total costs take into account the costs of all those elements, the use of the total costs as the profit level indicator does not seem, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, the most suitable way of reflecting the value of the functions actually performed by AOE’s Irish branch, taking into account in particular that branch’s assets.

412    In those circumstances, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that its recommended profit level indicator based on the total costs would be more appropriate in the present instance for the purpose of determining the arm’s length profits for the Irish branch of AOE.

(c)    Conclusions regarding the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator

413    Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in the contested decision, that the choice of the operating costs of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE as the profit level indicator when applying a one-sided profit allocation method was inappropriate.

414    In addition and in any event, the Commission also did not submit evidence demonstrating that such a choice, as such, necessarily had to lead to the conclusion that the contested tax rulings had reduced ASI and AOE’s tax liability in Ireland.

415    In that regard, the Court finds that neither the exchanges preceding the issuing of the contested tax rulings, nor Ireland and ASI and AOE when questioned on that point in the context of the present proceedings, were able to provide a sufficient explanation of the reason for the inconsistencies detected in those rulings concerning the operating costs, used as the basis for calculating the chargeable profit of the branches in the 1991 tax ruling and which were no longer included as the basis for calculating the chargeable profit of the branches in the 2007 tax ruling.

416    However, even where there are inconsistencies which show defects in the methodology used to calculate the chargeable profits in the contested tax rulings, it is necessary to recall the considerations set out in paragraph 348 above, from which it follows that the Commission cannot confine itself to invoking a methodological error but must prove that an advantage has actually been granted, inasmuch as such an error has actually led to a reduction in the tax burden of the companies in question as compared to the burden which they would have borne had the normal rules of taxation been applied. However, it must also be specified that the Commission did not argue in the contested decision that the exclusion of certain categories of operating costs used as a basis for calculating the profit allocated to the branches of ASI and AOE had given rise to an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

417    Accordingly, the complaints raised by Ireland and by ASI and AOE in relation to the Commission’s statements regarding the methodological error relating to the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator for the Irish branches of ASI and AOE in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning must be upheld.

4.      The levels of return accepted in the contested tax rulings

418    In recitals 346 to 359 of the contested decision, the Commission challenged the levels of return of ASI and AOE’s Irish branches accepted by the contested tax rulings, while noting that the Irish tax authorities had not been provided with any profit allocation reports or any other explanation by the Apple Group supporting the proposals made by that group that had led to the contested tax rulings.

419    First, concerning ASI, in recital 346 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that the 1991 tax ruling had accepted as the chargeable profit a 12.5% margin on the operating costs of its Irish branch, while the 2007 tax ruling had accepted a [confidential] margin.

420    Second, concerning AOE, in recital 347 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that the chargeable profit endorsed by the Irish tax authorities corresponded to [confidential] of the operating costs, a percentage which would have decreased to [confidential] if the chargeable profit had exceeded [confidential]. In the 2007 tax ruling, the chargeable profit corresponded to [confidential] of the branch’s operating costs, increased by a return of [confidential] of the turnover, in respect of the IP developed by AOE. In addition, it emphasised that AOE’s chargeable profit seemed to have been arrived at through negotiation and to have depended on employment considerations as was demonstrated by the taking into account of the need ‘not to prohibit the expansion of the Irish operations’ in the discussions preceding the issuing of the 1991 tax ruling.

421    It is apparent from recitals 348 and 349 of the contested decision that the explanations provided during the administrative procedure by Ireland and by Apple Inc. regarding the calculation of ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits did not convince the Commission. It considered that the returns accepted by the Irish tax authorities for the Irish branches of ASI and AOE had been based on significantly reduced profit margins, although there would not have been any economic rationale for a company to accept such low profits.

422    In particular, concerning the 2007 tax ruling, in recitals 350 to 359 of the contested decision, the Commission focused on the ex post reasoning set out in the ad hoc reports prepared by Ireland and the Apple Group’s respective tax advisors relating to the levels of return agreed for the Irish branches of ASI and AOE. According to the Commission, those reports had been based on a comparability study, the relevance of which was disputed on the ground that the products offered by the companies selected for comparability purposes were not comparable to the high-quality branded products offered by the Apple Group. More specifically, the Commission argued that the risks connected with warranties for high-end goods assumed by ASI were not comparable to those borne by the companies selected in the study for their products. In addition, it highlighted the fact that at least 3 companies out of the 52 selected were in a situation of compulsory liquidation.

423    Furthermore, in recitals 354 and 355 of the contested decision, the Commission, for the sake of completeness, nevertheless carried out its own assessment of the level of return which should have been allocated to ASI and AOE, using the same comparable companies reproduced in the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland but using as the profit level indicator the turnover (resulting from sales) for ASI and the total costs for AOE. Following that corrected analysis, the Commission came to the conclusion that the levels of return accepted in the contested tax rulings were excessively low.

424    Regarding ASI, in recital 355 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that, taking the sales of the companies chosen in the comparability study as the profit level indicator, in 2012, the average return was 3%, with an interquartile range of 1.3 to 4.5%. However, the Commission noted that the trading income allocated to the Irish branch of ASI for 2012 as chargeable profits under the 2007 tax ruling was around [confidential], that is, around [confidential] of ASI’s turnover in 2012. That return was almost 20 times lower than that obtained by the Commission in its corrected analysis.

425    Regarding AOE, in recital 357 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that its chargeable profit in 2012 had amounted to around [confidential] of the total costs of the Irish branch. That percentage fell within the interquartile range presented in the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and the Apple Group’s respective tax advisors and was close to the 25th percentile, which the tax advisors had considered to be the lower end of an arm’s length range. Thus, the Commission noted that, according to the ad hoc report submitted by Apple Inc., for the period from 2009 to 2011, the lower quartile mark-up on total costs would have been [confidential] with a median of [confidential] and, according to the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland, for the period from 2007 to 2011, the lower quartile mark-up on total costs would have been [confidential] (with a median of [confidential]).

426    However, in recitals 358 and 359 of the contested decision, the Commission specified that those reports could not support the ex post conclusion that the remuneration of the functions performed by the Irish branch of AOE was in line with the arm’s length principle. First of all, it called in question the comparability of the data in so far as no detailed analysis of the comparability of the business or cost structure of the companies selected had been provided. Next, it explained that the 25th percentile had been used as the lower end of the range, which corresponded to an overly broad approach, in particular having regard to the comparability concerns identified in the ad hoc reports in question. Lastly, the Commission noted that, in the ad hoc reports, the comparison had been carried out only in relation to manufacturing companies, whereas the Irish branch of AOE had also provided shared services to other companies from the Apple Group in the EMEIA region, such as financial services, information systems and technology, and services relating to human resources.

427    On the basis of those statements, in recital 360 of the contested decision the Commission concluded that the contested tax rulings had approved a remuneration which the Irish branches would not have accepted, from the perspective of their own profitability, if they had been separate and independent undertakings carrying on identical or similar activities under identical or similar conditions.

428    The parties disagree both as to the existence and as to the impact of the errors identified by the Commission as regards the levels of return accepted by the contested tax rulings and the ex post validation thereof proposed in the ad hoc reports prepared by Ireland and the Apple Group’s respective tax advisors.

(a)    The remuneration of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE endorsed by the 1991 tax ruling

429    In the first place, the Commission complains that the Irish tax authorities accepted, in the contested tax rulings, the levels of return for the Irish branches of ASI and AOE without such levels of return being substantiated by any reports.

430    First, it should be noted that Ireland and ASI and AOE argue that, at the time the contested tax rulings were issued, the submission of a profit allocation report was not required under the applicable Irish tax law, which has not been contested by the Commission.

431    Second, it should be noted that the Commission’s complaint relates to an error of methodology (or a lack thereof), in so far as it concerns defects in the method for calculating the chargeable profits endorsed by the contested tax rulings, resulting from a lack of profit allocation reports.

432    It is true that the explanations provided by the Apple Group to the Irish tax authorities as justification for the proposed levels of return, as reproduced in recital 64 of the contested decision, were brief. The Apple Group asserted that the proposed levels were above a mark-up of 15%, which would ordinarily have been achieved by a ‘cost center’, but below a mark-up of 100%, which could be common in the pharmaceutical industry, which was not comparable to the IT sector. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the Apple Group acknowledged before the Irish tax authorities that its proposal was not based on any scientific grounds, but that it considered that such a proposal resulted in a sufficiently high amount of chargeable profits.

433    In that regard, the Court notes that neither the exchanges preceding the issuing of the contested tax rulings nor Ireland and ASI and AOE when questioned on that point in the context of the present proceedings were able to provide a sufficient explanation of the exact reason for the indicators and figures used to calculate the chargeable profits of ASI and AOE. Thus, there is no concrete and contemporary piece of evidence explaining the reasons for the level of the percentages of the operating costs accepted in the contested tax rulings, let alone for the changes in those percentages over time.

434    However, it must be pointed out that, apart from raising the issue of the lack of profit allocation reports, the Commission did not conduct its analysis in such a way as to demonstrate that, as a result of that calculation, the tax actually paid by ASI and AOE on the basis of the contested tax rulings was less than that which should have been paid under the normal rules of taxation, had the contested tax rulings not been issued.

435    Thus, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 332 above, the mere finding of an error as regards the methodology leading to the calculation of the profits to be allocated to the branches is not sufficient to demonstrate that the contested tax rulings conferred an advantage on ASI and AOE.

436    In the second place, the Commission complained that the Irish tax authorities had accepted, without justification, a threshold for AOE’s chargeable profits, namely [confidential], beyond which the chargeable profits no longer corresponded to 65% of the Irish branch’s operating costs, but to [confidential] of those costs. According to the Commission, a rational economic operator would not accept lower returns and forgo a part of its profits, if its operating costs were increasing, which indicated an increase in the volume of its activities, even if those returns were sufficient to cover its costs and achieve a certain level of profit.

437    The Commission argued that that threshold constituted tax relief which had been granted on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as employment considerations, and that, accordingly, it was deemed to confer a selective advantage.

438    In that regard, Apple Inc. claimed, in its observations following the Opening Decision, that that departure was justified by the fact that the incremental fixed investment necessary for expansion was greater at the start of operations than when those operations were ongoing. Furthermore, in the responses to the written questions from the Court, ASI and AOE confirmed that the threshold of [confidential] had never been reached and that, accordingly, the second, lower percentage had never been used for the purpose of calculating AOE’s chargeable profits. The Commission has not contested that information.

439    In the first place, it should be noted that, while it is true that it has been held that, if the competent authorities have a broad discretion to determine, inter alia, the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as maintaining employment, the exercise of that discretion may be regarded as giving rise to a selective measure (judgment of 18 July 2013, P, C‑6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 27), the fact remains that, in order to determine whether State measures may constitute State aid, regard must primarily be had to the effects of those measures on the undertakings favoured (see judgment of 13 September 2010, Greece and Others v Commission, T‑415/05, T‑416/05 and T‑423/05, EU:T:2010:386, paragraph 212 and the case-law cited).

440    In any event, the mere allusion, during the exchanges between the Irish tax authorities and the Apple Group preceding the 1991 tax ruling, to the fact that the Apple Group was one of the largest employers in the region where the Irish branches of ASI and AOE were established does not prove that ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits were determined on the basis of employment-related issues. Indeed, it is apparent from the report of the exchange in question, reproduced in recital 64 of the contested decision, that the allusion to employees of the Apple Group in the region in question was made to provide information regarding the background to and expansion of the group’s operations in the region and not to provide consideration for the proposal regarding the allocation of the profits to the Irish branches in question.

441    Thus, in the absence of other evidence, the Commission cannot argue that the tax ruling in question was issued as consideration for the potential creation of jobs in the region.

442    In the second place, it should be noted that the threshold in question was never reached and that, accordingly, the profits of AOE’s Irish branch were never allocated on the basis of the lower percentage provided for by the 1991 tax ruling.

443    Indeed, AOE’s turnover significantly decreased between the period preceding the 1991 tax ruling, namely USD 751 million in 1989, as stated in recital 64 of the contested decision, and 2006, the last year in which the 1991 tax ruling was applied, namely USD 359 million, as stated in recital 97 of the contested decision.

444    Therefore, even assuming that the Commission’s assertions regarding a lack of justification from an economic perspective for the threshold laid down by that ruling are proved, it cannot argue that an advantage was granted as a result of the inclusion of a threshold in the 1991 tax ruling, when such a mechanism was not actually implemented.

445    In the third place, even if the Commission’s argument were to be understood as meaning that the levels of return accepted by the Irish tax authorities were too low for the functions performed by the branches, in view of the assets and risks relating to those functions, that argument cannot succeed without other evidence.

446    The Commission’s subsidiary line of reasoning is based on the premiss that the Irish tax authorities could have correctly allocated the Apple Group’s IP licences to the head offices, which, according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, implies the performance of complex or unique functions. However, as can be seen from the conclusions expressed in paragraph 348 above, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the Irish branches of ASI and AOE had performed the most complex functions.

447    In addition, particularly as regards ASI, the Commission bases its reasoning on the consideration that the Irish branch assumed very significant risks in relation to the Apple Group’s activities. However, as can be seen from the conclusions expressed in paragraph 407 above, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that those risks had actually been borne by the Irish branch of ASI.

448    Accordingly, in the absence of other evidence, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the levels of return established under the 1991 tax ruling had been too low to remunerate the functions actually performed by the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, in view of their assets and their risks.

(b)    The remuneration of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE endorsed by the 2007 tax ruling

449    Besides the complaint relating to the lack of a profit allocation report in support of the 2007 tax ruling, which has been set aside for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 430 to 435 above, the Commission challenged the remuneration of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, in the form of the profits allocated to those branches, under the 2007 tax ruling, by contesting the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. in order to provide ex post evidence of the fact that those profits fell within arm’s length ranges. In particular, the Commission called in question the reliability of the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. because the companies chosen for the comparability study on which those reports were based were not comparable to ASI and AOE.

(1)    The choice of the companies used in the comparability studies

450    In the contested decision, the Commission noted, inter alia, two errors concerning the comparability of the companies chosen in the comparability study with the Irish branch of ASI. First, in recital 350 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that it was not possible to identify the companies chosen in the ad hoc report submitted by Apple Inc. Second, in recital 351 of the contested decision, the Commission emphasised that the selection of the comparable companies in the comparability study had not taken account of the fact that, unlike those companies, the Apple Group sold high-quality branded products and positioned its products as such on the market. In that regard, the Commission noted that, although ASI was responsible for warranties on the products sold which, in the case of high-quality branded products, presented a very high risk, the comparable companies used were not exposed to such a risk.

451    Concerning the comparability with the Irish branch of AOE, the Commission noted (in recital 359 of the contested decision) that the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland had taken into account only manufacturing companies, whereas AOE also provided shared services to other companies from the Apple Group in the EMEIA region, such as financial services, information systems and technology, and services relating to human resources.

452    It should be noted at the outset that, even assuming that the errors identified by the Commission regarding the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. ex post facto are proved and that they invalidate the conclusions in those reports, the Commission could not infer therefrom that the contested tax rulings had led to a reduction in ASI and AOE’s tax liability in Ireland.

453    Those reports were submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. in order to demonstrate ex post facto that the profits allocated to the Irish branches of ASI and AOE under the contested tax rulings fell within arm’s length ranges. The submission of those ad hoc reports by Ireland and Apple Inc. cannot alter the burden of proof concerning the existence of an advantage in the present instance, which rests with the Commission, as recalled in paragraph 100 above.

454    In any case, it is necessary to examine whether the defects identified by the Commission in the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. are proved and may invalidate the conclusions in those reports.

455    First, it should be noted, as Ireland and ASI and AOE correctly submit, that analysing transfer pricing is not an exact science and it is not possible to check for exact results as to what is considered to be an arm’s length level. In that regard, it is necessary to recall paragraph 1.13 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which states that the objective of determining transfer pricing is ‘to find a reasonable estimate of an arm’s length outcome based on reliable information’ and that ‘transfer pricing is not an exact science but does require the exercise of judgment on the part of both the tax administration and taxpayer’.

456    Secondly, concerning the undertakings chosen for the comparability study serving as the basis for the ad hoc report submitted by Apple Inc., ASI and AOE submit that, during the administrative procedure, Apple Inc. asked the Commission several times for its observations regarding that ad hoc report, without any specific question regarding the data from the comparability study being raised. The Commission does not dispute those arguments. In addition, in the present action ASI and AOE have submitted the data used for that ad hoc report, stating that they were taken from the same database as was used in the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland. The Commission has not raised any further specific objections with regard to the ad hoc report submitted by Apple Inc.

457    Thirdly, in so far as the Commission challenged the use, with regard to the two ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc., of a comparability study, which was based on a search in a database containing comparable data, the following points should be noted.

458    First of all, in so far as the Commission’s complaints must be understood as challenging the use of a database containing comparable data as such, they cannot succeed. Indeed, without the support of a database, it would not be possible to carry out, in connection with the second step in the one-sided profit allocation method, a comparability study that enables the profits to be regarded as arm’s length profits to be estimated, which presupposes that it is possible to make such an estimate using comparable companies.

459    However, the Commission did not provide evidence to support excluding, as such, the use of databases drawn up by specialised independent companies, such as the database that was used in the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. As is correctly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE, those databases are created using the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) and, in the absence of evidence demonstrating defects which invalidate those databases, they constitute an empirical basis for carrying out the comparability studies.

460    Next, regarding the Commission’s arguments contesting the comparability of the companies chosen for the comparability study, concerning the Irish branch of ASI, it should be noted that the Commission merely relied on the same arguments as it had raised regarding the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator, namely that ASI was responsible for warranties on sold products and that it assumed a significant risk in respect of high-end products handled by third-party subcontractors, whereas the companies chosen did not assume those kinds of significant risks and therefore were not comparable. However, for the same reasons as those expressed in paragraphs 391 to 402 above, those arguments must be rejected.

461    In addition, as has been stated by Ireland and ASI and AOE, it should be noted that, in so far as, as concluded in paragraph 413 above, operating costs could not be ruled out as a profit level indicator in the present instance, the high-quality nature of the brand would have no significant impact on comparability in the present instance. Indeed, as ASI and AOE correctly submit, the fact that a company distributes high-quality branded products cannot necessarily have an impact on its operating costs as compared to the operating costs which it would have to bear if it distributed lower-quality products. This has been demonstrated in the present instance by the fact, acknowledged by the Commission itself in recital 337 of the contested decision, that the operating costs of the Irish branch of ASI had remained relatively stable in relation to the exponential increase in ASI’s sales.

462    Regarding the reservations as to the comparability of the manufacturing companies chosen in connection with the comparability study with regard to the Irish branch of AOE, because of the ancillary functions which that branch would have performed in addition to manufacturing activities, it should be noted that those ancillary functions are not representative of all the functions performed by that branch, as is correctly argued by Ireland and ASI and AOE. In that regard, those parties rely in particular on the analysis of the activities of AOE’s Irish branch in the ad hoc reports submitted by them, which, on that specific point, was not contested by the Commission.

463    Lastly, regarding the fact, referred to by the Commission, that 3 of the 52 companies chosen for the comparability study have become companies in liquidation, such reservations cannot affect the reliability of that study as a whole. In addition, those companies were put into compulsory liquidation after the tax years in respect of which the study was conducted. Furthermore, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, it does not appear, in view of the considerations set out in paragraph 455 above, that 3 companies, out of the 52 targeted in the study in question, represents a significant proportion liable to distort the outcome of the comparability study.

464    In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the Commission did not succeed in calling in question the reliability of the comparability studies on which the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc. are based and, accordingly, in establishing that those reports are not reliable.

(2)    The corrected comparability analysis conducted by the Commission

465    It should be noted that, in recitals 353 to 356 of the contested decision, the Commission conducted its own comparability analysis, which may be designated as ‘the corrected comparability analysis’.

466    In its corrected comparability analysis, the Commission sought to assess whether the remuneration for the Irish branches of ASI and AOE as endorsed by the contested tax rulings fell within arm’s length ranges.

467    In the first place, concerning the Irish branch of ASI, the Commission used the data from the companies selected in the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland, taking the Irish branch of ASI as the tested party and the sales as the profit level indicator. Those data were reproduced in Figure 13, set out in recital 354 of the contested decision. The Commission thus compared the profits allocated to the Irish branch of ASI in relation to ASI’s sales with the median return on sales of the companies selected in the ad hoc report submitted by Ireland, for the years 2007 to 2011.

468    It should be noted at the outset that it is true that the Commission’s approach, consisting in comparing the results of its own analysis, on the one hand, and ASI’s chargeable profits under the contested tax rulings, on the other, could have enabled it, in principle, to demonstrate the existence of a selective advantage.

469    However, the conclusions of the corrected comparability analysis conducted by the Commission cannot invalidate the conclusions of the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc., according to which the profits of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE, determined pursuant to the contested tax rulings, fell within arm’s length ranges.

470    First of all, it must be pointed out that the Commission’s corrected comparability analysis relies on sales as a profit level indicator for the purpose of applying the TNMM. However, as is apparent from the considerations expressed in paragraphs 402 and 412 above, it has not been demonstrated that the use of the operating costs as the profit level indicator was inappropriate in the present instance. In addition, it has not been demonstrated that the use of sales would have been more appropriate.

471    Next, it should be borne in mind that the analysis conducted by the Commission in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning is based on the premiss that, in essence, the functions performed by the Irish branch of ASI were of a complex nature and were decisive for the success of the Apple brand and, accordingly, of ASI’s trading activity. In addition, according to the Commission, that branch had assumed significant risks in relation to ASI’s activities. However, as has been concluded in paragraphs 348 and 407 above, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the Irish branch of ASI had performed complex functions and assumed those significant risks.

472    Lastly, in recitals 353 to 355 of the contested decision, the Commission sought to assess the median return on sales of comparable undertakings against the median return on ASI’s sales, as a function of the profit allocated to its Irish branch under the 2007 tax ruling. However, that approach is not in line with either the Authorised OECD Approach or section 25 of the TCA 97, in so far as the return on ASI’s sales cannot reflect, in the case of its Irish branch, the value of the functions actually performed by that branch, for the following reasons.

473    First, as stated in paragraphs 384 and 385 above, the distribution functions guaranteed by the Irish branch of ASI consisted in the procurement, sale and distribution of Apple-branded products under framework agreements negotiated outside that branch. Accordingly, the added value contributed by the Irish branch of ASI cannot be grasped by examining the return on ASI’s sales.

474    Second, the functions actually performed by the Irish branch of ASI did not have a decisive impact on either the Apple Group’s IP or the Apple brand, as has been stated in paragraph 341 above. Those two factors are intrinsically linked and may be brought together under the Apple brand designating high-quality products, which was regarded by the Commission itself in recital 351 of the contested decision as decisively affecting the value of ASI’s sales. For this reason, the return on ASI’s sales does not provide a realistic image of the actual contribution of its Irish branch to those sales.

475    In those circumstances, the conclusions of the corrected comparability analysis conducted by the Commission concerning the remuneration of ASI’s Irish branch, an analysis which used sales as a profit level indicator, cannot invalidate the conclusions of the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and Apple Inc., which used the operating costs as the profit level indicator.

476    In the second place, concerning AOE’s remuneration, as the Commission itself noted in recital 357 of the contested decision, the results of the comparability analysis used by the Commission, as summarised in paragraph 425 above, show that the profits allocated to the Irish branch of AOE in Ireland under the contested tax rulings fell within ranges which could be regarded as being arm’s length ranges.

477    Accordingly, the results of the analysis conducted by the Commission, in essence, confirm the conclusions derived from the ad hoc reports submitted by Ireland and by Apple Inc., according to which the profits allocated to the Irish branch of AOE fell within arm’s length ranges. In that regard, it should be noted, in the light of the considerations expressed in paragraph 455 above regarding the transfer pricing analyses, that the fact that those results fall more towards the lower end of an arm’s length range cannot invalidate those results.

478    Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the complaints raised by Ireland and by ASI and AOE in respect of the Commission’s statements regarding the methodological error relating to the levels of return accepted in the contested tax rulings must be upheld.

5.      Conclusions regarding the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning

479    The findings made above concerning the defects in the methods for calculating the chargeable profits of ASI and AOE demonstrate the incomplete and occasionally inconsistent nature of the contested tax rulings. However, in themselves, those circumstances are not sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

480    Indeed, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the methodological errors to which it had referred with regard to the profit allocation methods endorsed by the contested tax rulings, consisting in the choice of the Irish branches as tested parties (paragraph 351 above), the choice of the operating costs as the profit level indicator (paragraph 417 above), and the levels of return accepted by the contested tax rulings (paragraph 478 above) had led to a reduction in ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits in Ireland. Accordingly, it did not succeed in demonstrating that those rulings had granted those companies an advantage.

481    In those circumstances, the pleas in law relied on by Ireland and by ASI and AOE, alleging that, in connection with its subsidiary line of reasoning, the Commission has not succeeded in demonstrating the existence of an advantage in the present instance for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU must be upheld.

F.      Pleas in law contesting the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its alternative line of reasoning (fifth plea in law in Case T778/16 and ninth plea in law in Case T892/16)

482    The Commission set out its alternative line of reasoning in recitals 369 to 403 of the contested decision, which is divided into two alternative parts.

483    In the first place, in recitals 369 to 378 of the contested decision, the Commission contended that the arm’s length principle was inherent in the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 and that, in so far as the contested tax rulings derogated from that principle, they conferred a selective advantage on ASI and AOE in the form of a reduction of their taxable base.

484    In the second place, in recitals 379 to 403 of the contested decision, the Commission contended that, even assuming that the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 was not governed by the arm’s length principle, the contested tax rulings still had to be regarded as granting ASI and AOE a selective advantage in so far as those rulings were the result of the discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities.

485    Ireland and ASI and AOE contest, in essence, the assessments made by the Commission in both parts of the alternative line of reasoning.

1.      First part of the Commission’s alternative line of reasoning

486    In the first part of its alternative line of reasoning, the Commission considered that the contested tax rulings derogated from section 25 of the TCA 97, on the ground that the arm’s length principle was inherent in that section (recital 377 of the contested decision). The Commission then referred to its subsidiary line of reasoning, in which it considered that the contested tax rulings did not allow a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle to be calculated and, therefore, concluded that those rulings had granted ASI and AOE a selective advantage (recital 378 of the contested decision).

487    In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, in so far as the first part of the Commission’s alternative line of reasoning is based on statements that it made in its subsidiary line of reasoning and that, as has been found in paragraph 481 above, the Commission cannot rely on that reasoning in order to conclude that there was an advantage in the present instance, it must be held that the Commission is equally unable to rely on the first part of its alternative line of reasoning in order to conclude that there was a selective advantage in the present instance.

488    In those circumstances, it must be concluded that, in the first part of the alternative line of reasoning, the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating that the contested tax rulings had granted ASI and AOE a selective advantage.

2.      Second part of the Commission’s alternative line of reasoning

489    In the second part of its alternative line of reasoning, the Commission contends that, even assuming that the application of section 25 of the TCA 97 was not governed by the arm’s length principle, the contested tax rulings still conferred a selective advantage on ASI and AOE in so far as those rulings were issued by the Irish tax authorities on a discretionary basis.

490    First, the Commission maintained that it had shown in its primary and subsidiary lines of reasoning that the contested tax rulings had endorsed profit allocation methods that resulted in a reduction in the chargeable profits of ASI and AOE in Ireland and that conferred an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

491    Second the Commission stated that, in so far as section 25 of the TCA 97 does not lay down any objective criteria for the allocation of profits among the various parts of a single non-resident company, the Irish tax authorities’ discretion in applying that provision is not based on objective criteria related to the tax system, which means that it can be presumed that the contested tax rulings are selective. In addition, the Commission examined 11 tax rulings that had been sent to it by Ireland and observed that those rulings contained a number of discrepancies, on the basis of which it considered that the Irish tax authorities’ practice concerning tax rulings was discretionary as no consistent criterion was used to determine the profits to be allocated to the Irish branches of non-resident companies for the purpose of applying section 25 of the TCA 97.

492    The Commission concluded from the above that the contested tax rulings had been issued on the basis of the Irish tax authorities’ discretion in the absence of objective criteria related to the tax system and that, therefore, those rulings had to be considered to confer a selective advantage on ASI and AOE for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

493    With regard to the conclusions reached by the Commission, first, it should be noted that, in so far as the Commission did not succeed in showing that there was an advantage through its primary and subsidiary lines of reasoning, it cannot, solely through its alternative line of reasoning as described above, show that there is a selective advantage in the present instance. Even assuming that it were established that the tax authorities had discretion, the existence of such discretion does not necessarily mean that it was used to reduce the tax liability of the recipient of the tax ruling as compared with the liability to which that recipient would normally have been subject.

494    Therefore, the Commission’s alternative line of reasoning is insufficient to establish the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

495    Second and in any case, the Commission did not succeed in showing that the Irish tax authorities had exercised a broad discretion in the present instance.

496    It is necessary to recall the case-law stating that, in order to establish the selective nature of a tax advantage, it is not necessary for the competent national authorities to have the discretionary power to grant the benefit of that measure. However, the existence of such discretion may be such as to enable those authorities to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods to the detriment of others, in particular where the competent authorities have the discretionary power to determine the beneficiaries and the conditions of the measure granted on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system (judgment of 25 July 2018, Commission v Spain and Others, C‑128/16 P, EU:C:2018:591, paragraph 55).

497    It is clear that, in recital 381 of the contested decision, the Commission limited itself to stating that Ireland had not identified any objective standard for allocating the profits of a non-resident company for the purpose of applying section 25 of the TCA 97. In that same recital, it concluded directly from the above that ‘this would mean that [the Irish tax authorities’] discretion in applying that provision [was] not based on objective criteria related to the tax system, which [gave] rise to a presumption of a selective advantage’.

498    As has been pointed out in paragraphs 238 and 239 above, in order to apply section 25 of the TCA 97, it is necessary to carry out an objective analysis of the facts that includes, first, identifying the activities performed by the branch, the assets it uses for its functions and the related risks that it assumes and, second, determining the value of that type of activity on the market. Such an analysis corresponds, in essence, to the analysis proposed by the Authorised OECD Approach.

499    Consequently, the Commission cannot argue that the Irish tax authorities’ application of section 25 of the TCA 97 did not involve the use of any consistent criterion in order to determine the profits to be allocated to the Irish branches of non-resident companies.

500    It is true that, in the present instance, the Irish tax authorities’ application of section 25 of the TCA 97 in the contested tax rulings was insufficiently documented. As has been stated in paragraphs 347 and 433 above, the information and evidence in support of that application were very concise. That lack of documented analysis is indeed a regrettable methodological defect in the calculation of ASI and AOE’s chargeable profits, endorsed in the contested tax rulings. However, such a defect is, in itself, insufficient to show that the contested tax rulings were the result of a broad discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities.

501    Third, the 11 tax rulings concerning the allocation of profits to the Irish branches of non-resident companies examined by the Commission in recitals 385 to 395 of the contested decision are not of such a kind as to show that the Irish tax authorities have a broad discretion which leads to the recipient companies being given favourable treatment as compared with other companies in a comparable situation.

502    As is apparent from recitals 385 to 395 of the contested decision, each of those 11 tax rulings relates to companies with entirely different activities. As the Commission itself noted in recital 88 of the contested decision, the allocation of profits among several associated companies depends on the functions performed, the risks assumed and the assets used by each company. It should therefore be concluded that the 11 tax rulings approve different profit allocation methods simply because the situations of the taxpayers are different. Therefore, the fact that those different situations were taken into account when the rulings in question were issued does not in any way show that the Irish tax authorities had any discretion.

503    It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Commission cannot rely on the second part of its alternative line of reasoning in order to conclude that there was a selective advantage in the present instance.

504    Consequently, the pleas in law relied on by Ireland and ASI and AOE alleging that, in its alternative line of reasoning, the Commission did not succeed in showing that there was a selective advantage in the present instance for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU must be upheld, without there being any need to examine the complaints alleging breaches of essential procedural requirements and of the right to be heard raised by ASI and AOE regarding the Commission’s assessments in its alternative line of reasoning.

G.      Conclusions regarding the Commission’s assessment concerning the existence of a selective advantage

505    In view of the conclusions set out in paragraphs 312, 481 and 504 above, in which the Court finds that the pleas in law relied on by Ireland and ASI and AOE against the assessments made by the Commission in connection with its primary, subsidiary and alternative lines of reasoning must be upheld, it must be concluded that the Commission did not succeed in showing, in the present instance, that, by issuing the contested tax rulings, the Irish tax authorities had granted ASI and AOE a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU.

506    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, although, according to the settled case-law cited in paragraph 100 above, the Commission may classify a tax measure as State aid, it may do so only in so far as the conditions for such a classification are satisfied.

507    In the present instance, as the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was a selective advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety without it being necessary to examine the other pleas in law raised by Ireland and ASI and AOE.

10 reasons to apply for Texas A&M International Tax Risk Management — request a brochure https://info.law.tamu.edu/international-tax  

  1. International Tax courses are limited to 15 students. Many have 9 – 12 for maximum interaction with the professors and each other in real-time Zoom discussions. No one is ‘left out’. Everyone has a substantial weekly learning experience.
  2. Courses meet twice weekly on Zoom for 90 minutes (or more) to discuss the case study and the weekly issues, and then students in teams (generally of three) roll play the case study representing a stakeholder interest assigned by the professor/s in the second meeting, ending with a recap discussion of the case study. See an example weekly case study moot on YouTube 
  3. Courses include original authored textbooks and study materials and original case studies by the faculty.
  4. Courses include original authored weekly video-lectures and/or audio podcasts by the faculty.
  5. All students have access to Lexis, Westlaw, Bloomberg LawCheetah (formerly Kluwer-CCH), IBFDTax AnalystsS&PBvD-MoodysThomsonOECD Library, and hundreds of other information resource providers (check out our university virtual libraries here and here)
  6. Degree options for all tax professionals — lawyers (Master of Laws, LL.M.) and accountants, economists, financial professionals (Master of Jurisprudence, M.Jur.)
  7. The founder Professor William Byrnes is the pioneer of Online Learning for Legal Education, having initiated the original version of this program in 1994 (see his LinkedIn Group of 27,000+ member network of former students, book subscribers, webinar attendees, and career contacts).
  8. The founder Professor William Byrnes is a leading international tax author with 10 annual treatises published by Lexis and Wolters Kluwer, and three Tax Facts titles by National Underwriter. See his list of publications and over 1,100 media tax articles here.
  9. Join the Texas A&M Aggie former student network of 500,000+ to open career and social doors (and watch Saturday SEC football games) with Aggie Clubs throughout 100 countries in major cities.
  10. 160+ graduate students currently enrolled for risk management, tax-risk management, and wealth management program, many with 10+ years experience, to build your career network today.

Texas A&M, an annual budget of $6.3 billion (FY2020), is the largest U.S. public university, one of only 60 accredited U.S. universities of the American Association of Universities (R1: Doctoral Universities – Highest Research Activity) and one of only 17 U.S. universities that hold the triple U.S. federal grant of Land, Sea, and Space!

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Cost-Sharing Post TCJA | The Fiona Show sponsored by Crossborder AI Solution for Transfer Pricing

Posted by William Byrnes on April 14, 2020


Cost-sharing arrangements are subjective at best—even by transfer pricing standards. Over the years, major tech-companies like Xilinx, Amazon, Altera, and now Facebook, have all been victims of their own interpretations of cost-sharing regulations that have been written, re-written, modified, and in some cases, grandfathered to previous or even temporary versions. And that’s all not to even mention the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. So, does the world have a right to be a little perplexed? We’d say so.

Listen to our recorded webinar in front of a live audience of transfer pricing counsel from large U.S. MNEs representing 10 major industries.  The webinar explores the mis-understood history of cost-sharing, the impact of Covid-19 on stress testing intra-group risk allocation amongst its global value chain, and the likely impact of the TCJA on future cost-sharing arrangements.

Episode 41: Cost-Sharing Post TCJA

Interested in tax risk management, technology, and analytics?  Check out what Texas A&M is doing this Summer International Tax Risk Management Summer Zoom Courses May 18 – July 3 interested in transfer pricing and tax risk management? Check out Texas A&M’s transfer pricing courses

 

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U.S. IRS Data for Country-by-Country Reports, Tax Year 2017 and 2016

Posted by William Byrnes on December 20, 2019


Six new tables presenting data from Form 8975, Country-by-Country Report, and Form 8975 Schedule A, Tax Jurisdiction and Constituent Entity Information, are now available on SOI’s Tax Stats Web page. The tables present data from the estimated population of corporate and partnership returns filed for Tax Year 2017. Five tables display the number of filers, revenues, profit, income taxes, earnings, number of employees, and tangible assets. The first three tables are classified by major geographic region and selected tax jurisdiction. The fourth table is classified by major industry group, geographic region, and select tax jurisdiction. The fifth table is classified by effective tax rate of multinational enterprise subgroups. A sixth table displays number of constituent entities classified by major geographic region, selected tax jurisdiction, and main business activities.

Country-by-Country Report: Tax Jurisdiction Information

Data Presented: Number of Filers, Revenues, Profit, Income Taxes, Earnings, Number of Employees, Tangible Assets

Classified by: Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction
Tax Years: 2017 | 2016
Classified by: Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction with Positive Profit Before Income Tax
Tax Years:  2017 | 2016
Classified by: Major Geographic Region and Selected Tax Jurisdiction with Negative or Zero Profit Before Income Tax
Tax Years: 2017 | 2016
Classified by: Major Industry Group, Geographic Region, and Selected Tax Jurisdiction
Tax Years: 2017 | 2016
Classified by: Effective Tax Rate of Multinational Enterprise Sub-groups
Tax Years: 2017 | 2016

Country-by-Country Report: Constituent Entities

Data Presented: Number of Constituent Entities

Classified by: Major Geographic Region, Selected Tax Jurisdiction, and Main Business Activities
Tax Years: 2017 | 2016

William Byrnes’ 4th Edition of his industry-leading Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing treatise was published on December 19, 2019 by Matthew Bender LexisNexis.  William Byrnes is the author or co-author of nine Lexis titles and an advisory board member of Law360’s International Tax journal.

William Byrnes’ completely revised 4th Edition Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing (2020) has been expanded to 2,000 pages of analyses and practice notes, 47 chapters divided over six parts: Part I: U.S. regulatory analysis, application of transfer pricing methods, and jurisprudence; Part II: OECD; Part III: United Nations; Part IV: European Union; Part V: Industry topics; and Part VI: Country practice and tax risk management. Professor Byrnes brings together 50 of the industry’s eminent transfer pricing counsel, economists, and financial accountants to provide a comprehensive two-volume “go-to” resource for tax risk management.

William Byrnes explained, “I am fortunate to be able to call upon and work with the industry’s leading transfer pricing professionals from firms such as Alston, Covington, Pillsbury, Jones Day, McDermott, Duff & Phelps, Miller Chevalier, PwC, KPMG, and multinational companies like Vertex and Veritas.” Sixty contributors add subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.

Last chance to join one of the case study teams for TRANSFER PRICING taught live online, using Zoom, by Dr. Lorraine Eden, Prof. William Byrnes, and many industry experts… The courses are for tax attorneys, accountants, or economists and count toward the Texas A&M’s INTERNATIONAL TAX Master degree (taught online).

The class of a maximum of 18 students will be grouped into teams of 3 students each. The 6 teams meet using Zoom to prepare a weekly TP Aggiespresentation to respond to a real-world post-BEPS client study. Then all teams meet together online via Zoom twice each week at 8:00am Dallas time Wednesdays and Sundays to discuss and present the case study solutions. Students are provided without charge textbook materials, videos with PPT, and podcasts, and granted access to a large online law & business database library including Lexis, Bloomberg, IBFD, Kluwer/CCH, Thomson, among many other tax resources.

To apply for the transfer pricing courses and international tax courses, contact Jeff Green, Graduate Programs Coordinator, T: +1 (817) 212-3866, E: jeffgreen@law.tamu.edu or contact David Dye, Assistant Dean of Graduate Programs, T (817) 212-3954, E: ddye@law.tamu.edu. Texas A&M Admissions website: https://law.tamu.edu/distance-education/international-tax  (applications and previous university transcripts must be received by Admissions before Wednesday, January 8th at 5pm Texas time). Note that the university is closed for the holidays from Dec. 20 until Jan. 2, 2020.

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William Byrnes’ 4th Edition Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing Treatise Published December 19, 2019

Posted by William Byrnes on December 19, 2019


William Byrnes’ 4th Edition of his industry-leading Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing treatise was published December 19, 2019 by Matthew Bender LexisNexis.  William Byrnes is the author or co-author of nine Lexis titles and an advisory board member of Law360’s International Tax journal.

William Byrnes’ completely revised 4th Edition Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing (2020) has been expanded to 2,000 pages of analyses and practice notes, 47 chapters divided over six parts: Part I: U.S. regulatory analysis, application of transfer pricing methods, and jurisprudence; Part II: OECD; Part III: United Nations; Part IV: European Union; Part V: Industry topics; and Part VI: Country practice and tax risk management. Professor Byrnes brings together 50 of the industry’s eminent transfer pricing counsel, economists, and financial accountants to provide a comprehensive two-volume “go-to” resource for tax risk management.

William Byrnes explained, “I am fortunate to be able to call upon and work with the industry’s leading transfer pricing professionals from firms such as Alston, Covington, Pillsbury, Jones Day, McDermott, Duff & Phelps, Miller Chevalier, PwC, KPMG, and multinational companies like Vertex and Veritas.” Sixty contributors add subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.

“Transfer Pricing is one of the most complex and changing areas of tax risk in the United States and globally,” continued Byrnes. “The big-ticket cases, ones with over a half-billion-dollar adjustment, are almost always transfer pricing.  And with the renewed government focus on this topic around the world, transfer pricing audits will both increase in number and in actions taken, not just for the IRS, but most countries’ revenue authorities. U.S. companies are often the target.”

Byrnes shared, “Dr. Lorraine Eden (Texas A&M) and I will be using the treatise to teach transfer pricing online from January 13 through April 20 as part of the Texas A&M international tax curriculum”.

 

 

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Transfer Pricing case studies online course Jan 13 – Apr 19, 2020

Posted by William Byrnes on December 18, 2019


Last chance to join one of the case study teams for TRANSFER PRICING taught live online, using Zoom, by Dr. Lorraine Eden, Prof. William Byrnes, and many industry experts… The courses are for tax attorneys, accountants, or economists and count toward the Texas A&M’s INTERNATIONAL TAX Master degree (taught online).

The class of a maximum of 18 students will be grouped into teams of 3 students each. The 6 teams meet using Zoom to prepare a weekly TP Aggiespresentation to respond to a real-world post-BEPS client study. Then all teams meet together online via Zoom twice each week at 8:00am Dallas time Wednesdays and Sundays to discuss and present the case study solutions. Students are provided without charge textbook materials, videos with PPT, and podcasts, and granted access to a large online law & business database library including Lexis, Bloomberg, IBFD, Kluwer/CCH, Thomson, among many other tax resources.

To apply for the transfer pricing courses and international tax courses, contact Jeff Green, Graduate Programs Coordinator, T: +1 (817) 212-3866, E: jeffgreen@law.tamu.edu or contact David Dye, Assistant Dean of Graduate Programs, T (817) 212-3954, E: ddye@law.tamu.edu. Texas A&M Admissions website: https://law.tamu.edu/distance-education/international-tax  (applications and previous university transcripts must be received by Admissions before Wednesday, January 8th at 5pm Texas time). Note that the university is closed for the holidays from Dec. 20 until Jan. 2, 2020.

 

 

 

 

Course I: Tangibles, Methods

  • Week 1 January 13 Arm’s Length Standard (v Formulary Approach) case study
  • Week 2 Jan 20 CUP & Comparables case study
  • Week 3 Jan 27 Cost Plus & Resale Minus case study
  • Week 4 Feb 3: Comparable Profits Method & TNMM case study
  • Week 5 Feb 10 Profit Split case study
  • Week 6 Feb 17 Best Method case study

Course II: Intangibles, Services

  • Week 1 March 2 Intangibles Royalty Rates CUT and CPM case study
  • Week 2 March 16: CSA Intangibles Buy In/Out case study
  • Week 3 March 23: Digital Business Unitary Apportionment case study
  • Week 4 March 30 Digital Value Chain, Internet of Things case study
  • Week 5 April 6 U.S. v OECD v UN Manual case study Extractive Industries, Financing
  • Week 6 April 13 Restructuring the Business, Services case study

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Transfer Pricing case studies online course Jan 13 – Apr 19 (live Zoom based classes, small team groups)

Posted by William Byrnes on December 13, 2019


Interested to join one of the case study teams for TRANSFER PRICING taught live online, using Zoom, by Dr. Lorraine Eden, Prof. William Byrnes, and many industry experts January 13 – April 19. The courses are for tax attorneys, accountants, or economists and count toward the Texas A&M INTERNATIONAL TAX online Master curriculum.

The class is divided into teams of 3 or 4 students, each team meets internally using Zoom to prepare a team response and presentation for a real-world post-BEPS client study. Then the entire class meets twice each week: (A) on Wednesdays to discuss the case study with the Subject Matter Expert and Prof. William Byrnes, and (B) on Sundays each team presents interactively their positions and solutions in a friendly rivalry against the other teams, facilitated by William Byrnes and the Subject Matter Expert professor.  Students are provided textbook materials, videos with PPT, and podcasts, while learning to use a robust online law & business database library. The weekly lead Subject Matter Experts listed below and several more will be joining to explain specific tools and issues.

To apply for the transfer pricing courses and international tax courses, contact Jeff Green, Graduate Programs Coordinator, T: +1 (817) 212-3866, E: jeffgreen@law.tamu.edu or contact David Dye, Assistant Dean of Graduate Programs, T (817) 212-3954, E: ddye@law.tamu.edu. Texas A&M Admissions website: https://law.tamu.edu/distance-education/international-tax  (applications with all previous degree academic transcripts must be received by Admissions before Wednesday January 8th at 5pm Texas time)

Texas A&M Law offers the premier online program in international tax with a multidisciplinary, risk-management-focused approach. Our TP Aggiesunique, industry-based online curriculum is vetted by and focuses on the needs of multinational corporations, large firms, and governments. Though one of the largest U.S. public universities of 70,000 students and an annual budget exceeding $6 billion (FY2020), Texas A&M’s international tax curriculum offers small class sizes (maximum 30) to ensure personal faculty and in-class engagement. Smaller class sizes also allow stronger engagement and connections to develop among classmates who learn from each other’s corporate experiences.

  • Class meeting time is 60  – 120 minutes each Wednesday and Sunday at Central (Texas) time 08:00 (am) (i.e. 15:00 Paris; 18:00 Dubai; 22:00 Shanghai). The sessions are normally recorded if students are unable to attend because of client commitments or must sign off early.
            Capstone Week April 20 – 26: students teams build case studies that winning teams can present next year in the courses

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Transfer Pricing case studies online course Jan 13 – Apr 19 (live Zoom based classes, small team groups)

Posted by William Byrnes on November 26, 2019


Interested to join one of the case study teams for TRANSFER PRICING taught live online, using Zoom, by Dr. Lorraine Eden, Prof. William Byrnes, and industry experts January 13 – April 19. The courses are for tax attorneys, accountants, or economists and count toward the Texas A&M INTERNATIONAL TAX online Master curriculum. The class meets each week to discuss the real-world post-BEPS client studies and then again weekly the teams present their positions and solutions.  During the week the teams meet internally via Zoom and study provided materials, videos and audio casts based on provided PPTs, while using a robust online law & business database library.  For more information about how to apply, contact Texas A&M Admissions https://info.law.tamu.edu/international-tax

Texas A&M Law offers the premier online program in international tax with a multidisciplinary, risk-management-focused approach. Our TP Aggiesunique, industry-based online curriculum is vetted by and focuses on the needs of multinational corporations, large firms, and governments. Though one of the largest U.S. public universities of 70,000 students and an annual budget exceeding $6 billion (FY2020), Texas A&M’s international tax curriculum offers small class sizes (maximum 30) to ensure personal faculty and in-class engagement. Smaller class sizes also allow stronger engagement and connections to develop among classmates who learn from each other’s corporate experiences.

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Nike State Aid case analysis: Would you pay $100 for a canvas sneaker designed the 20’s? (Where does the residual value for “Just Do it” and the ‘cool kids’ retro branding of All Stars belong?)

Posted by William Byrnes on July 19, 2019


I have received several requests this month about my initial thoughts on the EU Commission’s 56-page published (public version available here) State Aid preliminary decision with the reasoning that The Netherlands government provided Nike an anti-competitive subsidy via the tax system.  My paraphrasing of the following EU Commission statement [para. 87] sums up the situation:

The Netherlands operational companies are remunerated with a low, but stable level of profit based on a limited margin on their total revenues reflecting those companies’ allegedly “routine” distribution functions. The residual profit generated by those companies in excess of that level of profit is then entirely allocated to Nike Bermuda as an alleged arm’s length royalty in return for the license of the Nike brands and other related IP”

The question that comes to my mind is: “Would I pay $100 for a canvas sneaker designed the 20’s that I know is $12 to manufacture, distribute, and have enough markup for the discount shoe store to provide it shelf space?” My answer is: “Yes, I own two pair of Converse’s Chuck Taylor All Stars.” So why did I spend much more than I know them to be worth (albeit, I wait until heavily discounted and then only on clearance).  From a global value chain perspective: “To which Nike function and unit does the residual value for the ‘cool kids’ retro branding of All Stars belong?”

infograph

U.S. international tax professionals operating in the nineties know that The Netherlands is a royalty conduit intermediary country because of its good tax treaty system and favorable domestic tax system, with the intangible profits deposited to take advantage of the U.S. tax deferral regime that existed until the TCJA of 2017 (via the Bermuda IP company).  Nike U.S., but for the deferral regime, could have done all this directly from its U.S. operations to each country that Nike operates in.  No other country could object, pre-BEPs, because profit split and marketing intangibles were not pushed by governments during transfer pricing audits.

The substantial value of Nike (that from which its profits derive) is neither the routine services provided by The Netherlands nor local wholesalers/distributors.  The value is the intangible brand created via R&D and marketing/promotion.  That brand allows a $10 – $20 retail price sneaker to sell retail for $90 – $200, depending on the country.  Converse All-Stars case in point.  Same  $10 shoe as when I was growing up now sold for $50 – $60 because Converse branded All-Stars as cool kid retro fashion.

Nike has centralized, for purposes of U.S. tax deferral leveraging a good tax treaty network, the revenue flows through NL.  The royalty agreement looks non-traditional because instead of a fixed price (e.g. 8%), it sweeps the NL profit account of everything but for the routine rate of return for the grouping of operational services mentioned in the State Aid opinion. If Nike was an actual Dutch public company, or German (like Addidas), or French – then Nike would have a similar result from its home country base because of the way its tax system allows exemption from tax for the operational foreign-sourced income of branches.  [Having worked back in the mid-nineties on similar type companies that were European, this is what I recall but I will need to research to determine if this has been the case since the nineties.]

I suspect that when I research this issue above that the NL operations will have been compensated within an allowable range based on all other similar situated 3rd parties.  I could examine this service by service but that would require much more information and data analysis about the services, and lead to a lesser required margin by Nike. The NL functions include [para 33]: “…regional headquarter functions, such as marketing, management, sales management (ordering and warehousing), establishing product pricing and discount policies, adapting designs to local market needs, and distribution activities, as well as bearing the inventory risk, marketing risk and other business risks.”

By example, the EU Commission states in its initial Nike news announcement:

Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV have more than 1,000 employees and are involved in the development, management and exploitation of the intellectual property. For example, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV actively advertises and promotes Nike products in the EMEA region, and bears its own costs for the associated marketing and sales activities.

Nike’s internal Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion (AMP) services can be benchmarked to its 3rd party AMP providers.  But by no means do the local NL AMP services rise to the level of Nike’s chief AMP partner (and arguably a central key to its brand build) Wieden + Kennedy (renown for creating many industry branding campaigns but perhaps most famously for Nike’s “Just Do it” – inspired by the last words of death row inmate Gary Gilmore before his execution by firing squad).

There is some value that should be allocated for the headquarters management of the combination of services on top of the service by service approach.  Plenty of competing retail industry distributors to examine though.  If by example the profit margin range was a low of 2% to a high of 8% for the margin return for the combination of services, then Nike based on the EU Commission’s public information falls within that range, being around 5%.

The Commission contends that Nike designed its transfer pricing study to achieve a result to justify the residual sweep to its Bermuda deferral subsidiary.  The EU Commission states an interesting piece of evidence that may support its decision [at para 89]: “To the contrary, those documents indicate that comparable uncontrolled transactions may have existed as a result of which the arm’s length level of the royalty payment would have been lower…”.  If it is correct that 3rd party royalty agreements for major brand overly compensate local distributors, by example provide 15% or 20% profit margin for local operations, then Nike must also.  [I just made these numbers up to illustrate the issue]

All the services seem, on the face of the EU Commission’s public document, routine to me but for “adapting designs to local market needs”.  That, I think, goes directly to product design which falls under the R&D and Branding.  There are 3rd parties that do exactly this service so it can be benchmarked, but its value I suspect is higher than by example ‘inventory risk management’.  We do not know from the EU document whether this ‘adapting product designs to local market’ service was consistent with a team of product engineers and market specialists, or was it merely occasional and outsourced.  The EU Commission wants, like with Starbucks, Nike to use a profit split method.  “…a transfer pricing arrangement based on the Profit Split Method would have been more appropriate to price…”.  Finally, the EU Commission asserts [para. 90]: “…even if the TNMM was the most appropriate transfer pricing method…. Had a profit level indicator been chosen that properly reflected the functional analysis of NEON and CN BV, that would have led to a lower royalty payment…”.

But for the potential product design issue, recognizing I have not yet researched this issue yet, based on what I know about the fashion industry, seems rather implausible to me that a major brand would give up part of its brand residual to a 3rd party local distributor.  In essence, that would be like the parent company of a well-established fashion brand stating “Let me split the brand’s value with you for local distribution, even though you have not borne any inputs of creating the value”.  Perhaps at the onset of a startup trying to create and build a brand?  But not Nike in the 1990s.  I think that the words of the dissenting Judge in Altera (9th Cir June 2019) are appropriate:

An ‘arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations’.

The EU Commission obviously does not like the Bermuda IP holding subsidiary arrangement that the U.S. tax deferral regime allows (the same issue of its Starbucks state aid attack), but that does not take away from the reality that legally and economically, Bermuda for purposes of the NL companies owns the Nike brand and its associated IP.  The new U.S. GILTI regime combined with the FDII export incentive regime addresses the Bermuda structure, making it much somewhat less comparably attractive to operating directly from the U.S. (albeit still produces some tax arbitrage benefit).  Perhaps the U.S. tax regime if it survives, in combination with the need for the protection of the IRS Competent Authority for foreign transfer pricing adjustments will lead to fewer Bermuda IP holding subsidiaries and more Delaware ones.

My inevitable problem with the Starbucks and Nike (U.S. IP deferral structures) state aid cases is that looking backward, even if the EU Commission is correct, it is a de minimis amount (the EU Commission already alleged a de minimis amount for Starbucks but the actual amount will be even less if any amount at all).  Post-BEPS, the concept and understanding of marketing intangibles including brands is changing, as well as allowable corporate fiscal operational structures based on look-through (GILTI type) regimes. More effective in the long term for these type of U.S. IP deferral structures is for the EU Commission is to spend its compliance resources on a go-forward basis from 2015 BEPS to assist the restructuring of corporations and renegotiation of APAs, BAPAs, Multilateral PAs to fit in the new BEPS reality.  These two cases seem more about an EU – U.S. tax policy dispute than the actual underlying facts of the cases.  And if as I suspect that EU companies pre-BEPS had the same outcome based on domestic tax policy foreign source income exemptions, then the EU Commission’s tax policy dispute would appear two-faced.

I’ll need to undertake a research project or hear back from readers and then I will follow up with Nike Part 2 as a did with Starbucks on this Kluwer blog previously.  See Application of TNMM to Starbucks Roasting Operation: Seeking Comparables Through Understanding the Market and then My Starbucks’ State Aid Transfer Pricing Analysis: Part II.  See also my comments about Altera:  An ‘arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations’.

Want to help me in this research or have great analytical content for my transfer pricing treatise published by LexisNexis? Reach out on profbyrnes@gmail.com

Prof. William Byrnes (Texas A&M) is the author of a 3,000 page treatise on transfer pricing that is a leading analytical resource for advisors.

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Analysis of Altera’s Double Take. Will Altera Be Reheard En Banc or Will Altera Seek The Supreme Court To Weigh In On Chevron and State Farm?

Posted by William Byrnes on June 8, 2019


Prof. William Byrnes (Texas A&M Law) is the author of the treatises Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing and Taxation of Intellectual Property & Technology

“an arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations”

In a double take two-to-one decision because of a withdrawn decision due to the death of a judge, a Ninth Circuit panel in Altera reversed a unanimous en banc decision of the Tax Court that the qualified cost sharing arrangements (QCSA) regulations[1] were invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.[2]  The renown Professor Calvin Johnson (Texas) and I shared comments on this case.  Professor Johnson’s pragmatism is worth noting (see his latest Altera article here) in the context of Altera: “$100 million of stock options is a $100 million cost, as a matter of law.” Because it is a cost for public accounting, Calvin states it is incredulous hat Altera would enter into a arm’s length negotiation in which the counterparty invests $200 cash, and Altera invests $200 cash plus $100 million stock options, but then Altera agrees to ignore its additional $100 million cost and agrees to split equally.  Altera wants to deduct its $100 million of stock cost domestically but pass on the associated income to the foreign-controlled group member.  This is bad policy.

I agree with Professor Johnson that it is bad policy.  But I think that Treasury is taking shortcuts to generate the result that it wants instead of going through the steps necessary to effect a change in policy. Most of my academic colleagues support the majority’s opinion of the proposition that Congress bestowed such latitude to Treasury in IRC § 482.  I agree that the latitude is within the Code Section, but that Treasury to date has regulated a policy dependent on the arm’s length and comparables, as the dissent enunciates and the Ninth Circuit panel majority supported in Xilinx II.  Treasury may change its policy approach, but that requires a formal procedural process laid out by the APA, I argue in favor of the dissent’s approach.  Even with the new language added to IRC § 482 by the TCJA of 2017, Treasury, I propose, must still formally open a public process that it is changing tact from arm’s length and comparables to something else like apportionment of profits and loss by formulae.

The last word has not been heard in Altera.  I expect that Altera will request an en banc hearing.  However, Altera II may be the case that the two newest members, in particular, Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, of the Supreme Court have been waiting for to weigh in on Chevron and State Farm.  Expect Altera III.

Altera I and Altera II (withdrawn)

The Ninth Circuit’s issuance, withdrawal, and re-issuance of a CSA decision is also a double take of Xilinx.[3] However unlike Altera, after the withdrawal of its initial Xilinx decision favoring the IRS position, the Ninth Circuit rejected the IRS’ position that the (pre-2003) QCSA Regulations required treating deductions for stock-based compensation as costs that must be shared by the foreign related party in cost-sharing arrangements. The former QCSA regulations, and current ones still, require that related entities share the cost of employee stock compensation in order for their cost-sharing arrangements to be classified as qualified cost-sharing arrangements. Treasury has consistently stated that the previous and current versions of the QCSA regulations are consistent with the arm’s length standard whereas the Tax Court has consistently disagreed with the IRS position.

At the Tax Court level for Altera, the Court held that the current QCSA regulations are a legislative rule because the regulations have the force of law, as opposed to an interpretive rule, and thus the State Farm standard applied.[4] The Tax Court concluded that Treasury did not undertake “reasoned decision making” required by State Farm in issuing the cost-sharing regulations because Treasury failed to support with any evidence in the administrative record its opinion that unrelated parties acting at arm’s length would share stock-based compensation (SBC) costs.[5] The Tax Court held that Treasury’s decision-making process relied on speculation rather than on hard data and expert opinions and that Treasury ignored public comments evidencing that unrelated party cost-sharing arrangements did not share stock compensation costs.

The Ninth Circuit’s first panel’s opinion, now withdrawn, held that Treasury did not exceed its authority delegated by Congress under IRC § 482.[6] That panel explained that IRC § 482 does not speak directly to whether Treasury may require parties to a QCSA to share employee stock compensation costs in order to receive the tax benefits associated with entering into a QCSA. The first panel held that the Treasury reasonably interpreted IRC § 482 as an authorization to require internal allocation methods in the QCSA context, provided that the costs and income allocated are proportionate to the economic activity of the related parties and concluded that the regulations are a reasonable method for achieving the results required by the statute. Thus, the first panel granted Chevron deference to the QCSA regulations.

The primary issue of Altera I and II, and the cases that precede it that have found in favor of the taxpayers is whether the arm’s length standard requires the comparability standard be met through a method seeking evidence of empirical data or known transactions?  Alternatively, is Treasury afforded deference to disregard a comparability method to instead seek an arm’s length result of tax parity that relies on an internal method of allocation to allocate the costs of the U.S. employee stock options between the U.S. and foreign related parties in proportion to the income enjoyed by each, determined post facto (after the fact) of the cost-sharing agreement?[7]

Altera II’s majority, relying on Frank,[8] states that the arm’s length standard need not be based solely on comparable transactions for reallocating costs and income, though recognizing that Frank is limited[9] to situations wherein it is difficult to hypothesize an arm’s length transaction.  The dissenting Judge provided a descriptive history that Treasury has repeatedly asserted that a comparability analysis is the only way to determine the arm’s length standard. Regarding Frank, the dissent stated, “The majority’s attempt to breathe life back into Frank is, simply, unpersuasive.” The Judge emphasized that the Ninth Circuit had declared Frank an outlier because (a) the parties in Frank had stipulated to applying a standard other than the arm’s length, (b) “there was no evidence that arms-length bargaining upon the specific commodities sold had produced a higher return,” and (c) that the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the services rendered by the subsidiary made it “difficult for the court to hypothesize an arm’s length transaction.”[10]

Pre Altera

The regulatory rules for cost-sharing arrangements (“CSAs”) at issue in Altera I and II, issued in temporary form January 5, 2009[11] and in subsequent final form effective December 16, 2011,[12] are different from the previously issued CSAs. The rules for earlier CSAs are subject to grandfather provisions.  For periods before January 5, 2009, the status of an arrangement as a CSA and the operative rules for complying arrangements, including rules for buy-in transactions, were determined under the qualified cost sharing arrangement regulations issued in 1995 and substantively amended in 1996 and 2003 (the “2003 QCSA Regulations”).[13]

The Ninth Circuit, in Xilinx,[14] rejected the position of the Service that the pre-2003 QCSA Regulations in effect in 1997–99 required treating deductions for stock-based compensation as costs that must be shared in cost-sharing arrangements.

The purpose of the regulations is parity between taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions and taxpayers in controlled transactions. The regulations are not to be construed to stultify that purpose. If the standard of arm’s length is trumped by 7(d)(1), the purpose of the statute is frustrated. If Xilinx cannot deduct all its stock option costs, Xilinx does not have tax parity with an independent taxpayer. Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5795, *14 (9th Cir 2010)

The Xilinx concurring opinion summarizes the positions at odds between Xilinx and the IRS:

The parties provide dueling interpretations of the “arm’s length standard” as applied to the ESO costs that Xilinx and XI did not share. Xilinx contends that the undisputed fact that there are no comparable transactions in which unrelated parties share ESO costs is dispositive because, under the arm’s length standard, controlled parties need share only those costs uncontrolled parties share. By implication, Xilinx argues, costs that uncontrolled parties would not share need not be shared.

On the other hand, the Commissioner argues that the comparable transactions analysis is not always dispositive. The Commissioner reads the arm’s length standard as focused on what unrelated parties would do under the same circumstances, and contends that analyzing comparable transactions is unhelpful in situations where related and unrelated parties always occupy materially different circumstances. As applied to sharing ESO costs, the Commissioner argues (consistent with the tax court’s findings) that the reason unrelated parties do not, and would not, share ESO costs is that they are unwilling to expose themselves to an obligation that will vary with an unrelated company’s stock price.  Related companies are less prone to this concern precisely because they are related — i.e., because XI is wholly owned by Xilinx, it is already exposed to variations in Xilinx’s overall stock price, at least in some respects. In situations like these, the Commissioner reasons, the arm’s length result must be determined by some method other than analyzing what unrelated companies do in their joint development transactions. Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191, 1197, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5795, *16-17 (9th Cir 2010)

The concurring Judge concludes: “These regulations are hopelessly ambiguous and the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of what appears to have been the commonly held understanding of the meaning and purpose of the arm’s length standard prior to this litigation.”

The Treasury amended the QCSA in 2003 to explicitly provide that the intangible development costs that must be shared include the costs related to stock-based compensation. From January 5, 2009, the 2009/2011 QCSA Regulations apply (the “2009 QCSA Regulations”). For periods starting with January 5, 2009, a pre-January 5, 2009 arrangement that qualified as a CSA under the 2003 QCSA Regulations is subject in part to the 2003 QCSA Regulations and in part to the 2009 QCSA Regulations. Arrangements that qualified as CSAs under the 2003 QCSA Regulations, whether or not materially expanded in scope on or after January 5, 2009, are known as “grandfathered CSAs.” The IRS contends that grandfathered CSAs are subject, with significant exceptions, to the 2009 QCSA regulations provisions for cost sharing transactions (“CSTs”) and platform contribution transactions (PCTs).  The significant exceptions for the grandfathered CSAs include that, unless the CSA is later expanded by the related parties, the original pre-2009 CSA is not subject to the 2009 QCSA regulations ‘Divisional Interest’ and Periodic Adjustment rules.

However, the IRS attempted to adjust the application of the 2003 QCSA Regulations by issuing a Coordinated Issue Paper on Section 482 CSA Buy-In Adjustments on September 27, 2007 (the “2007 CSA-CIP”).[15] The CSA-CIP was de-coordinated effective June 26, 2012, after the rejection of its concepts in the 2009 Tax Court decision in the VERITAS case. [16] The CSA-CIP provided that the Income Method and the Acquisition Price Method, similar to the specified transfer pricing methods set forth in the 2009 QCSA Regulations, are to be considered ‘best methods’ under the 2003 QCSA Regulations even though they only could be applied as ‘unspecified methods’. The Tax Court in VERITAS, addressing assessments for the tax years 2000 and 2001, neither cited nor followed the IRS methods of its 2007 CSA-CIP. Note that VERITAS survives Altera II because the 2009 QCSA Regulations years were not yet promulgated for the years of concern.  From the IRS’ perspective, though it does not acquiesce in the decision, it cured VERITAS by including the Income Method and the Acquisition Price Method as specified methods for determining “buy-in” payments for the 2009 QCSA regulations buy-ins.  Thus, the IRS continues to aggressively litigate in favor of these methods, exemplified by the appeal from Altera[17] and Amazon[18] in 2017.

Post Altera

Although the IRS withdrew the CSA-CIP in 2012, it continues to pursue cases under the pre-2009 Treasury Regulations as is the CSA-CIP remained in place. Amazon filed a Tax Court petition in December of 2012 challenging a $2 billion transfer pricing adjustment related to a qualified cost sharing arrangement between Amazon.com Inc. and its European subsidiary pre-2009.  Amazon claimed that the IRS erred in relying on a discounted cash flow method which the tax court clearly rejected in VERITAS. In the 207-page Amazon opinion, the Tax Court ruled that the IRS’s adjustment with respect to a buy-in payment for the intragroup CSA was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

Moreover, the IRS has an ongoing CSA controversy against Microsoft for the 2004-06 tax years for which President George Bush’s former Treasury Secretary John Snow promised at a February 7, 2006 hearing to then Chairman of the Committee Senator Charles E. Grassley that the IRS would bring a substantial CSA adjustment.[19] Microsoft reported an effective tax rate for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018 of 15 percent, eight percent, and 19 percent respectively.[20] Microsoft reported that this unresolved transfer pricing issue is the primary cause for it to increase its tax contingency from $11.8 billion to $13.5 billion to $15.4 billion.[21] The IRS has not issued a deficiency because the controversy remains in the IDR stage of the audit currently due to litigation over the issues of legal privilege and the issue of the IRS’ contract with a third party law firm to assist in the audit.[22]

The IRS announced in 2016 and 2018 a CSA adjustment against Facebook for the tax years 2010 and subsequent of at least $5 billion, and of 2011 – 2013 of approximately $680 million.[23] Facebook reported an effective tax rate of 13 percent for the second quarter of 2017 and 2018.[24] The controversy remains in the procedural phase on the docket of the Tax Court. The Microsoft and Facebook controversies appear to be further second take of Amazon and Altera.

Based on Treasury’s litigation stances and the 2015 temporary CSA regulations proposals, Treasury updated several International Practice Service Transaction Units’ audit guidelines relevant for CSAs, including (1) Pricing of Platform Contribution Transaction (PCT) in Cost Sharing Arrangements (CSA)—Initial Transaction, (2) Change in Participation in a Cost Sharing Arrangement (CSA)—Controlled Transfer of Interests and Capability Variation, (3) Pricing of Platform Contribution Transaction (PCT) in Cost Sharing Arrangements (CSA) Acquisition of Subsequent IP, (4) Comparison of the Arm’s Length Standard with Other Valuation Approaches—Inbound, and (5) IRC 367(d) Transactions in Conjunction with Cost Sharing Arrangements (CSA).

Altera’s Double Take Analysis Of Majority and Dissenting Opinions (Read the Altera II Decision here)

The Ninth Circuit Court majority evaluated the validity of Treasury’s regulations under both Chevron and State Farm, which the Court stated: “provide for related but distinct standards for reviewing rules promulgated by administrative agencies.”[25] The majority distinguished State Farm from Chevron in that State Farm “is used to evaluate whether a rule is procedurally defective as a result of flaws in the agency’s decision-making process,” whereas Chevron “is generally used to evaluate whether the conclusion reached as a result of that process—an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision it administers—is reasonable.”  The majority first turned to the Chevron analysis that:[26]

“When Congress has ‘explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”

The Ninth Circuit Court panel’s majority resolved that IRC § 482 is ambiguous because it does not address share employee stock compensation costs.[27] The majority stated that it is not persuaded by Altera’s argument that stock-based compensation is not “transferred” between parties because only intangibles in existence can be transferred. Altera argues that QCSAs to “develop” intangibles does not constitute a “transfer” of intangibles. The majority instead concludes that the transfer of intangibles may include the transfer of future distribution rights to intangibles which stock-based compensation are albeit yet to be developed. The majority relies upon the expansive meaning of the statutory word “any” for IRC § 482 (“any” transfer . . . of intangible property).[28] But the dissent counters that “any” does not modify “intangible property.” Rather, “any” precedes and thus, applies only to “transfer.”[29]

The majority accepts Treasury’s new explanation that the taxpayer’s agreement to “divide beneficial ownership of any Developed Technology” constitutes a transfer of intangibles.[30]  The dissenting Judge points out that Treasury never made, much less supported, a finding that QCSAs constitute transfers of intangible property.[31] The dissent states that:[32]

“No rights are transferred when parties enter into an agreement to develop intangibles; this is because the rights to later-developed intangible property would spring ab initio to the parties who shared the development costs without any need to transfer the property. And, there is no guarantee when the cost-sharing arrangements are entered into that any intangible will, in fact, be developed.”

The majority next turned to the reasonableness of Treasury ignoring the comparables presented by the Taxpayer and during the regulatory comment period.  The majority quotes from an aspect of the legislative history:[33]  

 “There are extreme difficulties in determining whether the arm’s length transfers between unrelated parties are comparable. . . . [I]t is appropriate to require that the payment made on a transfer of intangibles to a related foreign corporation be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.”

The majority concludes that Congress granted Treasury the authority to develop methods that did not rely on the analysis of ‘problematic’ comparable transactions and that Treasury promulgated the QCSA based on this authority because Treasury stated, “The uncontrolled transactions cited by commentators do not share enough characteristics of QCSAs involving the development of high-profit intangibles…”.[34]

The dissenting Judge pointed out that Treasury merely cited to the general legislative history IRC § 482 1986 amendment but that Treasury “did not explain what portions of the legislative history it found pertinent or how any of that history factored into its thinking.”[35] The dissenting Judge holds out that the majority accepts the “ever-evolving post-hoc rationalizations” of Treasury and then “goes even further to justify what Treasury did here”.[36] Commentators of the 2009 QCSA regulations submitted comparable transactions demonstrating that unrelated companies do not share the cost of stock-based compensation. Treasury distinguished these uncontrolled transactions as not sharing enough characteristics of QCSAs involving the development of high-profit intangibles. The dissent agreed with the Tax Court which held that Treasury’s explanation for its regulation was insufficient under State Farm because Treasury “failed to provide a reasoned basis” for its “belief that unrelated parties entering into QCSAs would generally share stock-based compensation costs.”[37]

The dissenting Judge explained that the legislative history and plain reading of the second sentence of IRC § 482 did not offer Treasury the flexibility to depart from a comparability analysis required by the first sentence but for a limited context of “any transfer (or license) of intangible property”.  The Judge then pointed out that Treasury’s 1988 White Paper also stated: “intangible income must be allocated on the basis of comparable transactions if comparables exist.”[38]  Thus, the Tax Court’s found for Xilinx because the IRS had not provided evidence that unrelated parties transacting at arm’s length share expenses related to stock-based compensation.[39]  The Ninth Circuit majority upheld the finding in favor of Xilinx because the arm’s length standard required that stock-based compensation expenses would not be shared in the absence of evidence that unrelated parties would share these costs.[40]

The majority next concludes that Treasury complied with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) so that the 2009 QCSA survives a State Farm analysis.[41] The State Farm analysis second step requires that the Treasury “must consider and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”[42] The majority summarizes Altera’s four arguments that Treasury did not meet this requirement: (1) Treasury improperly rejected comments submitted in opposition to the proposed rule, (2) Treasury’s current litigation position is inconsistent with statements made during the rulemaking process, (3) Treasury did not adequately support its position that employee stock compensation is a cost, and (4) a more searching review is required under Fox,[43] because the agency altered its position.  Boiled down, Altera argues that Treasury stated its intent to coordinate the new regulations with the arm’s length standard and then dismissed submissions addressing arm’s length comparables.

The majority was not persuaded by Altera’s argument that an arm’s length analysis requires actual transactional analysis. Altera submitted that “unrelated parties do not share stock compensation costs because it is difficult to value stock-based compensation, and there can be a great deal of expense and risk involved.”[44] Treasury responded in the 2009 QCSA that “the uncontrolled transactions cited by commentators do not share enough characteristics of QCSAs involving the development of high-profit intangibles to establish that parties at arm’s length would not take stock options into account in the context of an arrangement similar to a QCSA.”[45] The majority sided with Treasury’s justification that the lack of similar transactions led it to “employ a methodology that did not depend on non-existent comparables to satisfy the commensurate with income test and achieve tax parity.”[46]  The majority also concluded that Treasury’s use of an internal method of reallocation is consistent with the arm’s length standard because the internal method attempts to bring parity to the tax treatment of controlled and uncontrolled taxpayers as does a comparison of comparable transactions when they exist.[47]

Finally, the majority distinguished the previous, contrary, 2010 holding of the majority in Xilinx that stock-based compensation is not required to be included for a CSA. This majority stated that administrative authority was not at issue in Xilinx and that the previous panel was not called upon to consider the “commensurate with income.  The Xilinx panel had to reconcile a conflict between two rules: the specific methods of the 1994 arm’s length rule and the pre-2003 QCSA Regulations.[48]

The dissenting panel member instead concluded that the two-member majority justified Treasury’s about-face by (a) providing “a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given”,[49] (b) encouraging “executive agencies’ penchant for changing their views about the law’s meaning almost as often as they change administrations”,[50] and (c) endorsing a practice of requiring interested parties to engage in a scavenger hunt to understand an agency’s rulemaking proposals.[51]  The dissenting Judge was troubled that Treasury stated “for the first time and with no explanation that it may, instead, employ the “commensurate with income” standard to reach the required arm’s length result.”[52]

Based on the Tax Court decision in Xilinx and in Altera that the taxpayer had presented sufficient evidence of comparable transactions, the dissent agreed with the Tax Court’s finding that Treasury was required at least to attempt to gather empirical evidence before declaring that no such evidence was available, in the face of such evidence being available.  In light of this evidence, Treasury concedes the comparables issue in its appellate brief and instead pivots its justification for the 2009 QCSA that Treasury is not required to undertake an analysis of what unrelated entities do under comparable circumstances. Treasury’s argument is that it was statutorily authorized to dispense with a comparability analysis in this narrow context and thus Treasury does not need to investigate whether the uncontrolled transactions were comparable.[53] The dissenting Judge would hold that the APA requires Treasury to state that it was taking this new position in a stark departure from its previous regulations.[54]

In my opinion, Treasury had to concede the comparables point.  The issues remain the same as explained by the Xilinx concurring Judge above.  Treasury’s argument, regarding CSAs, is that related parties should be treated differently because as a group the parties have more information and more control over the other party as regards the share options.  Given the group relationship, the U.S. and the foreign party will split the costs of the U.S. employees’ share options.  But the application of the arm’s length standard has been understood to treat the related parties and unrelated.  If unrelated, then the assumption of information is unfounded.  Moreover, why would the foreign party bear the costs of the share options of the U.S. employees without negotiating on behalf of its employees to also receive such options?  What is the quid pro quo for the foreign subsidiary?  Yet, I also consider that potentially such lopsidedness in favor of the U.S. party can be brought to bear by the economic dominance of the U.S. party. which can potentially occur in an outsourcing relationship.  However, Altera and amicus industry groups provided agreements evidencing the contrary and the IRS chose not to seek rebuttal evidence (or it could not locate any). 

The issues of comparables and comparability, at least in my perspective, are distinguishable.  The first step is to identify transaction comparables, which Altera clearly has, and the second is to then to adjust for the commonly accepted (market, economic) variances between the comparables.  By example, size of parties in relation to each other, size of market and competition within, term, etc the factors of the Treasury Regs and other arm’s length differences that would require adjustments.  I disagree with the underlying premise of the “three percent”. Stated another way, 97 percent of transactions are therefore incomparable.  That’s a lot of “unicorns”.  But business is not like our fingerprints and rarely generates unicorns.  More often, competitors develop distinguishing approaches that can be adjusted for.  Said another way, I disagree with the lack of comparables, and base my disagreement on the managerial sciences like supply and value chain.  The economy does produce unicorns and we call these unicorns first movers.  Sometimes we grant patent protection to maintain unicorn status for a period of time.  And sometimes first movers develop a new formation of the supply and full value chain that we call a business method.  But for the issue of a monopoly or concentrated oligopoly, such first movers eventually experience competitors and comparables begin to emerge.  Thus, the argument for a lack of comparable transactions within an industry or industry segment necessarily requires believing that unicorns are common.

Also, the “three percent” must be viewed in historical context.  Firstly, that report was written at a time when there was a lack of available information via the Internet and electronic (pay for) databases that captured such information, cleaned it, and tagged it.  Secondly, the domestic economy itself was less mature and robust, with much less competition and thus much less transactions to be compared. Thirdly, the world was not a globalized competitive economy as it is today.  The OECD and Treasury still state a lack of comparable transactions today with regard to “hard to value intangibles”.  My academic sense thinks that it is just hard, laborious work to find them.  (And arguably for simplicity maybe as a policy we should move away from the arm’s length). 

The dissenting Judge finds that in 1986 Congress could not have legislated against the backdrop of stock-based compensation and cost-sharing arrangement because these activities did not develop until the 1990s. Thus, the dissenting Judge concludes that while “Congress may choose to address this practice now, it cannot be deemed to have done so then.”[55] In his conclusion, the Judge states “… an arm’s length result is not simply any result that maximizes one’s tax obligations.”[56] In my opinion, the ball is in Treasury’s court, not Congress’.

Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing is 36 chapters, 3,000 pages, updated annually to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the OECD and UN. It is also designed for use by tax administrators, both those belonging to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and those belonging to the tax administrations of other countries, and tax professionals in and out of government, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign. Fifty co-authors contribute subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.  Free download of chapter 2 here

END NOTES

[1]Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(d)(2).

[2] Altera Corp. v Commr, __ F.3d. __ (9th Cir., June 7, 2019) (case no. 16-70496) [hereafter “Altera II”] reversing Altera Corp. v. Commr, 145 TC No 3 (July 27, 2015) [hereafter “Altera I”].

[3] Xilinx, Inc v Commr, 125 TC 37 (2005), affd, 598 F 3d 1191 (9th Cir 2010). It is noted that in 2009 the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion accepting the position of the Service, but withdrew that opinion on Jan. 13, 2010.

[4] See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Interpretive rules are excluded from the general notice requirement for proposed rulemaking by 5 U.S.C. sec. 553(b)(3)(A). See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) that the Tax Court held incorporates the State Farm standard.

[5] Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

[6] The Ninth Circuit’s majority stated that the summary of the first panel’s withdrawn opinion constitutes no part of the opinion of the second panel.

[7] Altera II at 6, citing Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972) (quoting 26 C.F.R. §1.482-1(b)(1) (1971)).

[8] Frank v. Int’l Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520, 528–29 (9th Cir. 1962).

[9] Oil Base, Inc. v. Comm’r, 362 F.2d 212, 214 n.5 (9th Cir. 1966).

[10] Altera II dissent at 54.

[11] 74 Fed Reg 340 (Jan 5, 2009) (the “Temporary Regulations”).

[12] 76 Fed Reg 80,082 (Dec 22, 2011) (the “Final Regulations”).

[13] Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A. The “A” was added to the QSCA Regulations effective on January 5, 2009, when the Temporary Regulations were published.

[14] Xilinx, Inc v Commr, 125 TC 37 (2005), affd, 598 F 3d 1191 (9th Cir 2010).

[15] Coordinated Issue Paper on Section 482 CSA Buy-In Adjustments, LMSB-04-0907-62 [hereinafter CSA-CIP].

[16] VERITAS Software Corp v Commr, 133 TC 297 (2009), nonacq, 2010-49 IRB (Dec 6, 2010) (detailed explanation of the IRS’ reasoning available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201005.pdf, assessed June 7, 2019).

[17] Altera I.

[18] Amazon.Com, Inc. v Commr, 148 TC No 8 (March 23, 2017).

[19] Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on Fiscal 2007 Budget is Available, 2006 TNT 31-15 (Feb 15, 2006).

[20] Fiscal year end of June 30 for 2016 and 2017, last three months ending December 31, 2018.  Microsoft 10-K (2017) at 38; Microsoft 10-K (2018); Microsoft 10-K (2Q 2019) at Note 11-Income Taxes.

[21] Microsoft 10-K (2017) at 39; Microsoft 10-K (2Q 2019) at Note 11-Income Taxes.

[22] United States v Microsoft Corp, No 2:15-cv-00102 (WD Wash May 5, 2017).

[23] See U.S. v Facebook Inc ND Cal, No 3:16-cv-03777 (pet filed July 6, 2016).

[24] Facebook 10-Q (2Q 2017) at 20; Facebook 10-K (2018) at 35, 48.

[25] Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 521 (2d Cir. 2017).

[26] Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.

[27] Altera II at 25.

[28] The Court cites United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning . . . .”) and Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 856 (2009) (“Of course the word ‘any’ (in the phrase ‘any other provision of law’) has an ‘expansive meaning, giving us no warrant to limit the class of provisions of law [encompassed by the statutory provision].”

[29] Altera II dissent at 79.

[30] Altera II dissent at 67.

[31] Altera II dissent at 73.

[32] Altera II dissent at 73.

[33] See H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 425.

[34] Citing Compensatory Stock Options Under Section 482, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,171-02, 51,173 (Aug. 26, 2003).

[35] Altera II dissent at 63.

[36] Altera II dissent at 67.

[37] Altera II dissent at 65.

[38] Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code (“White Paper”), I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-1 C.B. 458, 474;

[39] Xilinx v. Commissioner (“Xilinx I”), 125 T.C. 37, 53 (2005).

[40] Altera II dissent at 58.

[41] Altera II at 33.

[42] 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015).

[43] FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).

[44] Altera II at 36.

[45] Compensatory Stock Options under Section 482 (Preamble to Final Rule), 68 Fed. Reg. 51,171-02, 51,172–73 Aug. 26, 2003).

[46] Altera II at 39.

[47] Altera II at 41.

[48] Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1994).

[49] Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery II”), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947))

[50] BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 586 U.S. ___, No. 17-1042, slip op. at 9 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)

[51] Altera II dissent at 51.

[52] in its preamble to § 1.482-7A(d)(2),

[53] Altera II dissent at 66 citing Appellant’s Br. 64.

[54] Altera II dissent at 68 citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position.”).

[55] Altera II dissent at 80.

[56] Altera II dissent at 81.

 

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IRS 2015 APA for Transfer Pricing Final Rev Proc 13 Key Differences from 2013 Version

Posted by William Byrnes on August 13, 2015


This morning the US Treasury released the long awaited Advanced Pricing Agreement Procedures.IRS_logo

The 13 principal differences between these final revenue procedures and the proposed version of Notice 2013-79 are:

1. The final revenue procedure clarifies that if APMA requires, as a condition of continuing with the APA process, that the taxpayer expand the proposed scope of its APA request to cover interrelated matters (interrelated issues in the same years, covered issues or interrelated issues in other years, and covered issues or interrelated issues in the same or other years as applied to other countries), APMA will do so with due regard to considerations of principled, effective, and efficient tax administration and only after considering the views of the taxpayer and the applicable foreign competent authority. Further, APMA will communicate to the taxpayer any concerns about interrelated matters and possible scope expansion as early as possible.

2. In the interest of efficient tax administration, rollback years may be formally covered within an APA. A rollback will be included in an APA when a rollback is either requested by the taxpayer and approved after coordination and collaboration between APMA and other offices within the IRS or, in some cases, is required by APMA, after coordination and collaboration with other offices within the IRS, as a condition of beginning or continuing the APA process.

3 The final revenue procedure provides expanded guidance as to when an APA request will be considered complete.

4. The required contents of APA requests that were specified in the Appendix of the proposed revenue procedure have generally been retained.

5. Taxpayers are required to execute consent agreements to extend the period of limitations for assessment of tax for each year of the proposed APA term, and the required consent could be either general or restricted.

6. User fees are increased for APA requests but provides that total user fees may be reduced for multiple APA requests filed by the same controlled group within a sixty-day period. Also, user fee for requests for discretionary LOB relief are increased.

7. The final revenue procedure limits the scope of requests to which mandatory -pre-filing procedures apply to requests involving taxpayer-initiated positions.

8. To ensure that taxpayers have broad access to the U.S. competent authority to resolve disputes under U.S. tax treaties, taxpayers will not be required under the final revenue procedure to expand the scope of a competent authority request to include interrelated issues as a condition of receiving competent authority assistance. Taxpayers may still be required to provide information that will allow the U.S. competent authority to evaluate the appropriateness of the relief sought under the applicable U.S. tax treaty in light of the taxpayer’s positions on interrelated issues.

9. The final revenue procedure clarifies that the U.S. competent authority may consult with taxpayers with respect to certain additional issues that may arise in connection with competent authority requests, such as issues relevant to the determination of foreign tax credits and repatriation payments.

10. The final revenue procedure provides additional guidance on requesting discretionary determinations under the limitation on benefits articles of U.S. tax treaties, including time frames for taxpayers to provide notification of material changes in fact or law and the introduction of a triennial statement procedure to maintain a favorable grant of discretionary benefits.

11. Consistent with the objective of providing taxpayers with broad access to the U.S. competent authority to resolve disputes under U.S. tax treaties, the U.S. competent authority will not condition assistance on the taxpayer’s notification of the U.S. competent authority, or on obtaining its concurrence, with respect to signing a standard Form 870 with IRS Examination.

Similarly, a taxpayer will not be required to obtain the U.S. competent authority’s agreement prior to entering into a closing agreement or similar agreement with IRS Examination, but in these cases the assistance provided by the U.S. competent authority will be limited to seeking correlative relief from the foreign competent authority, thus potentially not eliminating double taxation.

12. The final revenue procedure provides additional information about the process followed by the U.S. competent authority in conducting its review under the simultaneous appeals procedure.

13. The final revenue procedure clarifies and refines the bases on which the U.S. competent authority may decline to accept a competent authority request or may cease providing assistance, consistent with U.S. tax treaty policy that taxpayers should have broad access to the U.S. competent authority to resolve instances of taxation not in accordance with the applicable U.S. tax treaty.

Procedures for Advance Pricing Agreements  Download APA New Procedures Rev Proc 15-40

Procedures for Requesting Competent Authority Assistance under Tax Treaties  Download APA New MAP Procedures Rev Proc 15-41

William Byrnes is the primary author of Lexis’ Practical Guide to US Transfer Pricing which provides 3,000 pages of in-depth analysis and practical examples for the corporate transfer pricing counsel and risk manager.

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Attacking BEPS through the Profit Split Method

Posted by William Byrnes on August 5, 2015


Prof. Jeffery Kadet‘s explains – Why Expansion of the Profit Split Method is Required to Combat BEPS…

Recognizing the reality that multinational corporations are centrally managed and not groups ofJeffrey-M-Kadet-244x300entities that operate independently of one another, the OECD base erosion and profit-shifting project is considering expanded use of the profit-split method.

This article provides background on why expanded use of the profit-split method is sorely needed. In particular, resource-constrained tax authorities in many countries are unable to administer or intelligently analyze and contest transfer pricing results presented by multinational groups. Most importantly, this article suggests a simplified profit-split approach using set concrete and objective allocation keys for commonly used business models that should be welcomed by multinational groups and tax authorities alike.

Read Prof Jeffery Kadet’s full analysis on SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2593548

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OECD Releases BEPS Proposed Action 8 on Cost Contribution Arrangements & Transfer Pricing

Posted by William Byrnes on May 1, 2015


Logooecd_enPublic comments are invited on a discussion draft which deals with work in relation to Action 8 of the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).

Action 8 (“Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation: Intangibles”) requires the development of “rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group members” and involves updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements. The discussion draft sets out a proposed revision to Chapter VIII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and is intended to align the guidance in that chapter with the other elements of Action 8 already addressed in the Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles released in September 2014.

Interested parties are invited to submit written comments by 29 May 2015 (no extension will be granted) and should be sent by email to TransferPricing@oecd.org in both PDF and Word format. They should be addressed to Andrew Hickman, Head of Transfer Pricing Unit, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.

Check out William Byrnes’ Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing, available within LexisNexis, which is updated Book Coverannually to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is also designed for use by tax administrators and tax professionals, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign.  Fifty co-authors contribute subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel. Chapter 13 covers Cost Sharing Arrangements.

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Advance Pricing Agreements Report released by IRS

Posted by William Byrnes on April 3, 2014


Report Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements (2013)

Highlights excerpted:

In February of 2012, the former APA Program was moved from the Office of Chief Counsel to the Office of Transfer Pricing Operations, Large Business and International Division of the IRS (TPO) and combined with the United States Competent Authority (USCA) staff responsible for transfer pricing cases, thereby forming the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement (APMA) Program.  During the last quarter of 2013, new proposed revenue procedures governing APA applications and MAP applications were released for public comment in Notice 2013-79, 2013-50 I.R.B. 653, and Notice 2013-78, 2013-50 I.R.B. 633, respectively. These proposed revenue procedures reflect the changes in APMA’s structure, and more importantly, were informed by the cumulative experience of more than 20 years of APA practice in the United States, which has produced more than eleven hundred unilateral and bilateral agreements since 1991.

During 2013, the APMA Program continued to benefit from the merger and processing efficiencies that began in 2012. For the second year in a row, the number of executed APAs increased (from 140 in 2012 to 145 in 2013). The median completion time fell from 39.8 months in 2012 to 32.7 months in 2013. The increase in efficiency is further illustrated by the fact that the number of executed APAs (145) again surpassed the number of applications filed (111).

Part I of this report includes information on the structure, composition, and operation of the APMA Program; Part II presents statistical data for 2013; and Part III includes general
descriptions of various elements of the APAs executed in 2013, including types of transactions covered, transfer pricing methods used, and completion time.

The 111 APA applications received during 2013, represent a slight decrease from the 126 received in 2012.  Almost 75 percent of the bilateral applications filed in 2013 involved either Japan or Canada.  The APMA Program increased the number of APAs executed in its second year. The 145 APAs executed in 2013 surpassed the previous record of 140 executed agreements set in 2012. Of the 145 agreements executed in 2013, 68 of the agreements (47 percent) were new APAs (i.e., not renewal APAs), an increase from the 57 (41 percent) new APAs executed in 2012.

In 2013, approximately 55 percent of the APAs executed involved transactions between a non-U.S. parent and a U.S. subsidiary; 40 percent of the APAs executed involved transactions between a U.S. parent and a non-U.S. subsidiary; and the remaining 5 percent involved transactions that included either a partnership or a branch. In 2012, approximately 75 percent of the APAs executed involved transactions between a non-U.S. parent and a U.S. subsidiary, while the remaining 25 percent involved transactions between a U.S. parent and a non-U.S. subsidiary.

Although more than 75 percent of covered transactions involve tangible goods and services transactions, the IRS also has successfully completed numerous APAs involving transfers of intangibles.  More than 60 percent of the tested parties in the APAs executed in 2013 involved distribution or related functions, e.g., marketing and product support.

In controlled transactions using the CPM/TNMM, the Operating Margin was the most common profit level indicator (PLI) used to benchmark results for transfers of tangible and intangible property. Per the applicable regulations, Operating Margin is defined as the ratio of operating profits to sales. The Berry Ratio, defined as the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses, was applied as the profit level indicator in 8 percent of the controlled transactions that used the CPM/TNMM. Each other profit level indicator accounted for a smaller share.

For services transactions, the majority of cases applied the Services Cost Method or the CPM/TNMM. The Services Cost Method evaluates the amount charged for certain services with
reference to the total services costs.

For the APAs executed in 2013 that used external comparables data in the analysis, the most widely used data source for comparables was the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Other sources were also used in appropriate cases, e.g., where the tested party was not the U.S. entity. The most commonly used sources are:

  • Disclosure
  • Mergent
  • Orbis
  • GlobalVantage
  • Worldscope
  • OneSource
  • Osirus

practical_guide_book

Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing, 28 chapters from 30 expert contributors led by international tax Professor William Byrnes,  is designed to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is also designed for use by tax administrators, both those belonging to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and those belonging to the tax administrations of other countries, and tax professionals in and out of government, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign.  Fifty co-authors contribute subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.

 

 

 

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OECD releases BEPS draft for Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy

Posted by William Byrnes on March 25, 2014


The OECD released Monday, March 24, a discussion draft on the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy.

In July 2013, the OECD published its Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. The Action Plan identifies 15 actions to address BEPS in a comprehensive manner and sets deadlines to implement these actions. Excerpting from the Report, Action 1 reads as follows:

Action 1 Address the tax challenges of the digital economy

Identify the main difficulties that the digital economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules and develop detailed options to address these difficulties, taking a holistic approach and considering both direct and indirect taxation. Issues to be examined include, but are not limited to, the ability of a company to have a significant digital presence in the economy of another country without being liable to taxation due to the lack of nexus under current international rules, the attribution of value created from the generation of marketable location-relevant data through the use of digital products and services, the characterisation of income derived from new business models, the application of related source rules, and how to ensure the effective collection of VAT/GST with respect to the cross-border supply of digital goods and services. Such work will require a thorough analysis of the various business models in this sector.

The OECD’s March 24 discussion draft on the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, after surveying the elements of the new global digital economy, outlines the tax minimization techniques and then provides broad proposals to reduce the BEPS resulting therefrom. Below, I have excerpted and paraphrased the relevant aspects to provide an overview.

Section IV “Identifying Opportunities for BEPS in the Digital Economy” undertakes a general discussion of the common features of tax planning structures that raise BEPS concerns. Section IV then describes the core elements of BEPS strategies with respect to both direct and indirect taxation.  The common features of digital economy tax planning features include:

Eliminating or reducing tax in the market country

  • Avoiding a Taxable Presence
  • Minimizing Functions, Assets and Risks in Market Jurisdictions
  • Maximizing Deductions in Market Jurisdictions

Eliminating or reducing tax in the intermediate country

Eliminating or reducing tax in the country of residence of the ultimate parent

Avoiding withholding tax

Opportunities for BEPS with respect to VAT

  • Remote digital supplies to exempt businesses
  • Remote digital supplies to a multi-location enterprise (MLE)

Section V “Tackling BEPS in the Digital Economy” of the discussion draft examines how work on the actions of the BEPS Action Plan and in the area of indirect taxation will address BEPS issues arising in the digital economy. This section also highlights the particular characteristics of the digital economy that must be taken into account to ensure that the measures developed effectively address BEPS in the digital economy.

Restoring Taxation on Stateless Income

Measures that will restore taxation in the market jurisdiction

  • Prevent Treaty Abuse (Action 6)
  • Prevent the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status (Action 7)

Measures that will restore taxation in both market and ultimate parent jurisdictions

  • Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Action 2)
  • Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments (Action 4 and Action 9)
  • Counter Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively (Action 5)

Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation (Actions 8-10)

  • Intangibles, including hard-to-value intangibles, and cost contribution arrangements
  • Business risks
  • Characterization of transactions
  • Base eroding payments
  • Global value chains and profit methods

Addressing BEPS Issues in the Area of Consumption Taxes

Section VI “Broader Tax Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy” discusses the challenges that the digital economy raises for direct taxation, with respect to nexus, the tax treatment of data, and characterization of payments made under new business models. Section VI also discusses the indirect tax challenges raised by the digital economy with respect to exemptions for imports of low-valued goods, and remote digital supplies to consumers. Thereafter, Section VI lists administrative challenges faced by tax administrations in applying the current rules.

An overview of the tax challenges raised by the digital economy includes:

  • Nexus and the Ability to have a Significant Presence without Being Liable to Tax
  • Data and the Attribution of Value Created from the Generation of Marketable Location-Relevant Data through the Use of Digital Products and Services
  • Characterization of Income Derived from New Business Models
  • Collection of VAT in the Digital Economy

Section VII “Potential Options to Address The Broader Tax Challenges Raised by the Digital Economy” provides a brief framework for evaluating options to address the broader tax challenges raised by the digital economy. This section then provides an overview of potential options that have been received by the Task Force, along with a description of some of the issues that will need to be addressed in developing and evaluating those options.

Modifications to the Exemptions from Permanent Establishment Status

A New Nexus based on Significant Digital Presence

Virtual Permanent Establishment

Creation of a Withholding Tax on Digital Transactions

Consumption Tax Options

  • Exemptions for Imports of Low Valued Good
  • Remote digital supplies to consumers

Submitting Comments to OECD

Interested parties are invited to submit comments electronically in Word on this discussion draft, before 5.00pm on April 14, 2014 to CTP.BEPS@oecd.org.

Persons and organisations who intend to send comments on this discussion draft are invited to indicate by April 7 whether they wish to speak in support of their comments at a public consultation meeting on Action 1 (Address the tax challenges of the digital economy), which is scheduled to be held in Paris at the OECD Conference Centre on April 23, 2014. Persons wishing to attend this public consultation meeting should fill out their request for registration on line as soon as possible but by April 7, 2014.

This meeting will also be broadcast live on the internet and can be accessed on line. No advance registration is required for this internet access.

practical_guide_book

Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing (William Byrnes & the late Robert Cole (2013)) is designed to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is also designed for use by tax administrators, both those belonging to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and those belonging to the tax administrations of other countries, and tax professionals in and out of government, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign.  Fifty co-authors contribute subject matter expertise on technical issues faced by tax and risk management counsel.

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OECD releases “transfer pricing comparability data and developing countries” for comment

Posted by William Byrnes on March 16, 2014


On Tuesday the OECD released Transfer Pricing Comparability and Developing Countries (March 11, 2014).  The OECD is seeking stakeholder and public comment until April 11, 2014 and will publicly discuss the contents in two parallel sessions on March 28, 2014, the last day of the Global Forum on Transfer Pricing.  This last day of the Global Forum meeting will be held in conjunction with the Task Force on Tax & Development.  Written comments should be sent to TransferPricing@oecd.org.

Transfer Pricing Comparability and Developing Countriesets out and briefly discusses four possible approaches to addressing the concerns over the lack of data on comparables that have been expressed by developing countries. 

  1. Expanding access to data sources for comparables, including steps to improve the range of data contained in commercial databases, expand developing country access to such databases, and improve access to comparables data in developing countries with a significant number of sizeable independent companies.
  2. More effective use of data sources for comparables, including guidance or assistance in the effective use of commercial databases, the selection of foreign comparables, whether and how to make adjustments to foreign comparables to enhance their reliability, and alternative approaches to finding comparables.
  3. Approaches to identifying arm’s length prices or results without reliance on direct comparables, including guidance or assistance in making use of proxies for arm’s length outcomes, the profit split method, value chain analysis, and safe harbours, an evaluation of the impact, effectiveness and compatibility with the arm’s length principle of approaches such as the so called “sixth method”, which is increasingly prevalent particularly in developing countries in Latin America and Africa, and a review of possible anti-avoidance approaches.
  4. Advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement proceedings, including a review of developing country experiences with the pros and cons of advance pricing agreements and negotiations to resolve transfer pricing disputes, as well as guidance or assistance with respect to mutual agreement proceedings.

Transfer pricing expert Dr. Gary Stone of PriceWaterhouseCoopers has > analyzed < the OECD paper, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/tax/newsletters/pricing-knowledge-network/assets/pwc-oecd-comparability-data-developing-countries.pdf   Dr. Stone is the global leader of the Transfer Pricing Group of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).  Dr. Stone is based in Chicago and has directed and performed numerous analyses of intercompany pricing and economic valuation issues for Fortune 500 size companies.  Dr. Stone is a contributing co-author to Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing.

practical_guide_book

Lexis’ Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing (William Byrnes & the late Robert Cole (2013)) is designed to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is also designed for use by tax administrators, both those belonging to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and those belonging to the tax administrations of other countries, and tax professionals in and out of government, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign.

The U.S. rules are presented along with ideas on how to apply them in a common-sense fashion in a multi-jurisdictional world.  A few of the highlights in the latest update to the treatise include:

  • The most important development in U.S. transfer pricing in the year ended in July 2013 is the strengthening of the IRS’s capability to enforce the U.S. transfer pricing rules.
  • We examine Transfer Pricing Operations’ three groups: the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement group (APMA), the Transfer Pricing Practice, and the International Practice Networks (IPNs).
  • We note the 2014 budget proposal, carried over from 2013, of the Obama administration limiting the shifting of income through intangible property transfers, which would expand the scope of intangible property for purposes of IRC Sections 367(d) and 482 to include ”workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value.”
  • We discuss the new ”Rapid Appeals Process,” which is available for controversies that have arisen in an LB&I audit. It contemplates that Appeals, the examination team, and the taxpayer will discuss the case jointly in a single preopening conference in an effort to resolve the outstanding issues before the case is considered further by Appeals.

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OECD transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting released as discussion draft for public comment

Posted by William Byrnes on January 31, 2014


Yesterday (January 30, 2014) the OECD released an initial draft of revised guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting for comment by interested parties.

Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan released on July 19, 2013 calls for a review of the existing transfer pricing documentation rules and the development of a template for country-by-country reporting of income, taxes and economic activity for tax administrations.

The OECD Announcement stated that its Committee on Fiscal Affairs believes that it is essential to obtain input from stakeholders on this Discussion Draft to advance the work.  Specific issues on which comments would be appreciated are noted in the draft.

The OECD requests that comments be submitted in writing to transferpricing@oecd.org by February 23, 2014.

A public consultation event will be held at the OECD in Paris at the end of March 2014 with specifically invited persons selected from among those who provide written comments. An open discussion of the draft with all interested persons will take place at a future date to be determined in April or May.

practical_guide_book

Transfer pricing rules are an inescapable part of doing business internationally, and the LexisNexis Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing provides an in-depth analysis of the U.S. rules. This product is designed to help multinationals cope with the U.S. transfer pricing rules and procedures, taking into account the international norms established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is also designed for use by tax administrators, both those belonging to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and those belonging to the tax administrations of other countries, and tax professionals in and out of government, corporate executives, and their non-tax advisors, both American and foreign.

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Practical Guide to U.S. Transfer Pricing coordinating author speaks …

Posted by William Byrnes on August 1, 2013


practical_guide_bookWilliam Byrnes has been appointed a primary author for his sixth Lexis title.  

Read Professor Byrnes’ comments at http://www.tjsl.edu/news-media/2013/9861

 

For the 2013 OECD policy initiative regarding multinational’s transfer pricing, see “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en

 

and the more recently published “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf

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Transfer Pricing course begins March 28

Posted by William Byrnes on March 7, 2011


Dates:  Video-conference course starting March 28 ending 10 weeks later in late May

Medium – Wimba live lectured webcam video-conference and LexisNexis blackboard course-ware

Enrollment Contact: Associate Dean William H. Byrnes – wbyrnes@tjsl.edu

or call +1 (619) 961-4211

includes access to full online international tax library of databases such as IBFD, CCH, Checkpoint, RoyaltyStat, EdgarStat, LexisNexis, Westlaw, amongst many others.

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